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RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS ET MOTS CLEFS 
En ce qui concerne l'admission aux soins intensifs de patients avec handicaps 
sévères potentiels ou une survie prédite très diminuée, les attitudes et opinions divergent. 
Cette thèse confinne que les soignants ne sont pas bien infonnés sur le devenir des 
prématurés et ne considèrent pas les nouveau-nés de la même manière que les patients 
plus vieux. 
Huit scénarios de patients critiques, incompétents, tous avec des séquelles 
neurologiques potentielles importantes, ont été présentés à des médecins et à des 
étudiants en médicine, droit, anthropologie et bioéthique. Les répondants devaient 
estimer pour chaque scénario si l'admission aux soins intensifs était dans le meilleur 
intérêt de chaque patient, s'ils interviendraient, puis s'ils accepteraient une requête 
familiale de ne pas intervenir. Les patients aux deux pôles de la vie avaient moins 
d'estimations de meilleur intérêt et plus d'acceptation de refus d'intervention. De plus, 
les estimations de meilleur intérêt n'étaient pas reliées à la survie ni au handicap 
potentiel. Les interventions pour le nouveau-né étaient désirées moins souvent que pour 
les individus plus vieux, même ceux avec un devenir beaucoup plus sombre. Afin de 
comparer directement la valeur de la vie des huit patients, les répondants devaient 
indiquer dans quel ordre ils soigneraient les patients s'ils arrivaient à l'urgence tous en 
même temps. Le prématuré fut placé aù septième rang, le bébé à tenne au cinquième. La 
survie, les années potentielles de vie gagnées et le handicap présent ou futur n'étaient pas 
associés au rang. 
La valeur de la vie des nouveau-nés est moins que peut ne l'être prédite à l'aide 
de données médicales objectives. Des recommandations de sociétés académiques 
pédiatriques se penchent sur la prise de décision en ce qui concerne les prématurissimes. 
Celles-ci mettent l'emphase sur les choix parentaux et sur le devenir des patients. Ces 
recommandations officielles justifient l'intervention optionnelle pour ces patients par leur 
survie et le devenir à long tenne. Des statistiques de devenir similaires ne justifieraient 
pas une telle approche chez des patients plus vieux. Pourquoi se sent-on moins obligé 
d'intervenir pour les nouveau-nés en difficulté? Met-on les nouveau-nés dans une 
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catégorie morale différente, voire même inférieure? Cette question est explorée d'un 
angle légal et éthique et plusieurs avenues sont explorées: du statut de personne, au choix 
reproducteurs, aux enfants «précieux », et à des facteurs liés à l'anthropologie et 
l'évolution. 
MOTS CLEFS 
Nouveau-nés, prématurité, néonatologie, pédiatrie, soins intensifs néonatals, bioéthique, 
soins intensifs, valeur de la vie, principe du meilleur intérêt, qualité de vie, statut de 
personne, prédictions, incertitude, devenir à long terme, handicap, patients incompétents, 
énoncé de principe, allocation des ressources, opinions, perceptions, éthique substitutive, 
dévaluation, légalité de la naissance, opinions, perceptions, retrait d'intervention. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY AND KEY WORDS 
Opinions and attitudes diverge when it cornes to admitting patients with potential 
severe neurological handicaps or extremely diminished lifespan to intensive care units. 
The thesis confinns that caregivers are not weIl infonned of outcomes of pretenn infants, 
and that they do not consider neonates in the same way as oIder patients. 
Eight scenarios of critical incompetent patients, aIl with potential neurologie 
sequelae were presented to physicians and to students in law, medicine, bioethics, and 
anthropology. Assessments ofwhether intervention was in the best interests of a patient 
were not c10sely related to survival, nor to disability. Intervention for newbom infants 
was desired much less frequently than for older individuals, ev en sorne with much worse 
predicted outcomes. Accepting a family' s refusaI of intervention was much more 
common for the very old and the very young. Respondents were invited to directly 
compare the value ofpatients' lives by giving the order they would resuscitate the 
patients, were they to aIl arrive at the same time. The premature infant was ranked 7th , the 
tenn infant 5th • Survival, the potentiallife years gained, and 1 or impainnent (or potential 
for) were not associated with decision-making. The value placed on the life of newboms 
is less than expected by any objective medical data. Specifie policies regarding decision-
making for extreme pretenn infants exist in many countries and are often directive, 
focusing on parental choice and expected outcomes. Furthennore, the recommendations 
often state survival and disabilities as reasons for optional intervention, although such 
outcome statistics would not justify similar approaches in older populations. Why do we 
feelless obligated to treat imperiIled neonates? Do we put newboms in a special and 
lesser moral category? This question is explored from a legal and ethical perspective and 
several hypotheses are offered, pertaining to personhood, reproductive choices, "precious 
children", and probable evolutionary and anthropologie al factor. 
VI 
KEYWORDS 
Neonates, Prematurity, Neonatology, Pediatries, Neonatal intensive care units, bioethics, 
intensive care units, value of life, best interest princip le, quality of life, personhood, 
predicting outcomes, survival, disabilities, uncertainty, incompetent patients, policy 
statements, resource allocation, opinions, perceptions, devaluation, legality ofbirth, 
withholding and withdrawal of intervention, substitutive ethics, "qualitative fieldwork". 
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SHORT SUMMARY 
Opinions and attitudes diverge when it cornes to adrnitting patients with potential 
severe neurological handicaps or extremely diminished lifespan to intensive care units. 
The thesis confirms that caregivers are not weIl informed of outcomes of preterm infants, 
and that they do not consider them like oIder patients. 
Eight scenarios of critical incornpetent patients, aU with potential neurologic 
sequelae were presented to physicians and to students in different disciplines. 
Assessments ofwhether intervention was in the best interests of a patient were not 
c10sely related to survival, nor to disability. Interventions for newborns were desired 
rnuch less frequently than for oIder individuals, even sorne with rnuch worse predicted 
outcomes. Accepting a family' s refusaI of intervention was much more common for 
neonates. Respondents were asked to rank patients: the preterm was 7th, the term infant 
5th • Survival, potentiallife years gained, and / or impairment (or potential for) were not 
associated with ranking. The value placed on the life of newborns is less than expected by 
any objective medical data. Specific policies regarding decision-making for extrerne 
preterms state survival and disabilities as reasons for optional intervention, although such 
outcome statistics would not justify similar approaches in oIder populations. Why do we 
feelless obligated to treat imperilled neonates? Do we put newborns in a special and 
lesser moral category? This question is explored from a legal and ethical perspective and 
several hypotheses are offered, pertaining to personhood, reproductive choices, "precious 
children", and probable evolutionary and anthropological factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the moment of birth a foetus becomes a baby. This instantaneous transition from 
intrauterine to extrauterine life has enormous moral and legal implications. In Canada, the 
foetus has almost no rights in utero, maternaI autonomy being paramount. 1 The foetuses only 
rights are to inherit, ifborn alive, or to sue for avoidable insults that may have been 
experienced during the pregnancy. 2 On the other hand, the foetus has no right to life. Indeed, 
abortion is not a crime in Canada (R. v. Morgentaler) and, moreover, a father cannot legally 
prevent the abortion of the foetus by the woman carrying his baby (Tremblay v. Daigle). If a 
foetus dies in utero from professional negligence (Sullivan and LeMay v. The Queen), or 
because ofbattery to the woman, the person causing the injury can be prosecuted for the 
injury to the woman, but cannot be charged with murder nor homicide, because the foetus 
(even past the expected delivery date) is not considered to be a person.3 At the moment of 
birth, as soon as the shoulders have exited the birth canal, the baby becomes a full-fledged 
citizen, endowed with legal rights that should be no different from any other citizen. In the 
medical context, these rights are said to be identical to those of any other vulnerable 
incompetent patient who lacks decision-making capacity. Competent patients usually make 
life and death decisions for themselves (autonomy). For incompetent patients the surrogate 
(often the family) has to decide. Ifthe patient had not previously expressed any preferences, 
they have to intervene according to their perception of the patient's best interest. Neonates 
are naturally incompetent and when they are sick, the decision-m'aking in life and death 
situations can be difficult. One has to judge what is the preferable course of action for a baby, 
despite all the uncertainties involved. Responsibility for decision-making in this population is 
usually given to the baby's parents, who are generally considered to be the best to judge what 
is in their child's best interest, and what are acceptable risks and benefits of interventions. 
The Neonatal Resuscitation Program (NRP) textbook, which is the standard 
neonatal resuscitation text used in North America and many other parts of the world, 
states: "The ethical princip les regarding resuscitation of newborns should be no different 
from those followed in resuscitating an older child or adult.,,4 This statement 
notwithstanding, CUITent practice does not seem to be consistent with the idea that the 
princip les are no different. There is clear evidence of categorical separation of the ethical 
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assessments associated with treatment or non-treatment decisions for newboms from 
similar decisions for oIder children or adults. For example, the 1983 President's 
Commission on Bioethical Issues devoted a special section of its report to dilemmas 
surrounding the treatment of newboms, thus distinguishing these dilemmas from the 
more general dilemmas addressed in its discussion ofwithholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment in adults.5 Such distinctions, though weIl intentioned, have reified 
the dichotomy that has isolated newboms from the rest of the population, kept them in a 
separate moral universe, and allowed decisions to be made upon a different basis than 
those made for any other age group. 
This PhD deals with the moral difference between the neonate and oIder patients 
through articles in clinical ethics, more particularly in reflective bioethics. The 
introduction that precedes the articles will have three main sections: (1) the recent birth 
and evolution ofbioethics, clinical ethics and reflective bioethics; (2) the birth and 
evolution of neonatology; (3) a brief overview of ethical issues and values in 
neonatology. This thesis will present five articles, aIl published or accepted for 
publication. In the four articles accepted or published in scientific joumals, there is an 
abstract, an introduction with a literature review, methods used for the research, results, 
and a discussion. Therefore, there will not be an introduction and methodology preceding 
every article. Instead, a short review of the methods used will be presented. 
This thesis has three parts, (1) the perception and opinions of caregivers about 
sick neonates; (2) the principle ofbest interest, the value oflife ofneonates and how they 
can influence decision-making; (3) the reasons behind the relative devaluation of 
neonates. AIso, before each of the three parts, a short text will introduce the articles and 
place them in context. 
The first part of the thesis will analyze the perceptions and opinions of caregivers 
regarding critically ill neonates. Are the caregivers, involved in obtaining informed 
consent for interventions for premature infants, themselves weIl informed? The prior 
literature suggested they were often misinformed and pessimistic regarding outcomes of 
premature infants. The study presented goes one step further to ask: what would 
caregivers do were the y adequately informed, would their decision-making be different? 
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We also investigated how this misinfonnation was related to ethical confrontation, a fonn 
of moral distress experienced by caregivers in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). 
The second part of the thesis has two articles presenting the results of another 
study. The first section ofthis study was designed to verify if the best interest principle 
was used for decision-making regarding neonates. The second section investigated what 
individuals would do in situations of scarcity. For health care decisions, a physician is 
expected to act in the conflicting roles of doing the best for individual patients, while also 
doing the best for society by using resources judiciously. The caregiver might be 
convinced that Intensive Care Unit (lCU) admission for a lung cancer patient is in his 
best interest, while at the same time realize that sorne might judge this money better used 
invested in smoking prevention programs. Patient selection for scarce resources demands 
that we place a relative value on human lives. Likelihood of survival, handicap, and age 
might all influence which patient will be given the highest priority. We studied how 
physicians and students (in medicine, anthropology, bioethics and law) took decisions of 
resource allocation for eight hypothetical patients, two ofthem being newbom infants. 
The third part presents sorne of the hypotheses that could explain the devaluation 
ofneonates: from personhood to the sense of dut y, to reproductive decision-making, to 
familial distributive justice and the "replaceability factor" of neonates, or their possible 
interchangeability. Throughout the articles presented in this thesis, inconsistencies behind 
sorne of the principles we use will be pointed out. In tum, these inconsistencies 
eventually affect our decision-making. A general discussion and conclusion will explore 
the scientific and ethical validity of policies that specify which neonatal patients should 
receive or not receive resuscitation. Many professional societies and national 
commissions have developed policies or guidelines about the treatment ofpretenn 
infants. These blanket policies are generally based on gestational age. No other area of 
medicine has been as focused upon this or as specific in its delineation of treatment 
limitations. Instead, in other areas, guidelines for resuscitation are quite broad and 
general, with much room for clinical judgment and professional discretion. Why is 
neonatal bioethics different in this area? This thesis will come to a conclusion that 
neonates, and particularly premature infants are devalued compared to older individuals, 
and that they should perhaps be considered to be morally different. 
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Medical developments have changed the way we respond to diseases of neonates, 
to their illnesses, and to the pain and suffering of their parents; not only as physicians, but 
also as a society. We have to question ifwe are responding adequately to these new 
challenges. If we can recognize the biases we have and the true reasoning behind our 
decision-making, only then can we, and the people whom we train, be empowered to 
respond appropriately and consistently to the real needs of sick neonates and their 
families. 
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Bioethics, clinical ethics and reflective bioethics 
Scientific research and the resulting discoveries have produced substantial social 
benefits, such as decreased infant mortality and increased longevity. Scientific research 
has also uncovered new dilemmas which pose troubling ethical questions. In the 1960s, 
revelations of abuses ofhuman subjects in biomedical experiments were made public. 
These medical experiments had mostly occuITed during the Second World War. During 
the Nuremberg Trials, the Nuremberg code was erected as a set of standards for clinicians 
and scientists to follow wh en enrolling patients in medical research. The Nuremberg code 
is often considered as the origin of modern bioethics. Modern bioethics was indeed 
initially mainly research ethics. Research ethics continued to evolve following public 
attention that was drawn to unethical research practices. Unethical research practices and 
the desire to regulate medical research led to the Belmont Report in 1979, the 
establishment of the National Human Investigation Board in the US, and the requirement 
for establishment of Institutional Review Boards (IRB) across North America. AIl of 
these institutions and reports identified basic ethical princip les that should underlie the 
conduct of clinical studies involving human subjects, and also developed guidelines to be 
followed. For example, in the Belmont report, published in 1979, a statement of basic 
ethical princip les to assist physicians in resolving the ethical problems surrounding 
research with human subjects is centred on the following three important principles: the 
respect for autonomy of individuals, beneficence, and justice. Modern bioethics was 
evolving. 
With more and more scientific discoveries, and new challenges in public health and 
resource allocation, the needs for bioethics expanded. In addition to research ethics, which 
remained more normative, and ethics ofhealth policy and clinical ethics developed. Since 
the early 1980s, many journals have been developed in the field ofbioethics, in adaition 
many degrees with a specialization in bioethics are now offered around the world. The 
CUITent thesis is in the field of clinical ethics. At first, bioethics was mainly practiced and 
studied by theologians, philosophers and social scientists. Today, many bioethicists come 
from other backgrounds. The number ofindividuals with a professional background in 
health care has increased, and bioethics has become multidisciplinary. The epistemological 
question of the nature ofbioethics remains under debate: is it a speciality ofmedicine, of 
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philosophy, a field in itself? Who is an ethicist? Is an ethicist anybody who calculates the 
risk-benefit ratio and the consequences ofhis interventions for patients? Dr Lantos, a 
paediatrician and ethicist, summarizes the debate well: "The field ofbioethics is defined; it 
is a fence-straddling field. Its very existence as an independent field suggests sorne 
deficiencies in the traditional systems of medical education. But it is not clear whether 
bioethics per se is an adequate response or whether studying philosophy, theology, 
sociology, anthropology or survey methodology can help us decide whether what a 
particular doctor does in a particular situation is right or wrong. It represents a first step.,,6 
Clinical ethics is an applied field ofbioethics, studying how judgments and moral 
values are applied to medical decisions. Mark Siegler is seen by many as being the father 
of clinical ethics. In 1984, the University of Chicago established the Centre for Clinical 
Medical Ethics devoted to this clinical specialty. This centre has trained more than 200 
physicians and nurses, many ofwhom now direct programs all over North America. Now 
many universities and hospitals have bioethics degrees for the training ofnew clinical 
ethicists. As a discipline, medical ethics expresses its practical application in clinical 
settings. Clinical ethicists, generally caregivers who perform ethics consultations in 
clinical settings, have brought a more practical aspect to bioethics. 
l was attracted to clinical ethics when l heard Dr Meadow, a neonatologist and 
also a clinical ethicist from The Center for Clinical Medical Ethics in Chicago give a talk 
at the Society for Pediatric Research (SPR) in 2002. For me, it was a revelation. Dr 
Meadow was doing exactly what l wanted to do: combining bioethics and medicine with 
an original approach to generate new insights into how physicians act, and how decisions 
should be made for vulnerable patients. In this thesis, the practice of medicine, 
paediatrics and neonatology were a source of questioning, and were fed in tum by my 
ethics curriculum throughout medical school, residency, neonatal fellowship and my 
research in bioethics. The bioethics l have aspired to do is in a field sometimes referred to 
as "reflective bioethics", which combines bioethics and medicine by pushing the analysis 
of clinical decisions further than with the application of moral theories. Dr Casarett and 
colleagues describe reflective bioethics as follows: 
"(reflective bioethics is) Looking beyond narrowly circumscribed issues such as 
the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, right or wrong, or 
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what constitutes informed consent, out to larger considerations of the cultural and 
medical contexts in which these individual discussions ought to be undertaken. ,,7 
, 
Clinical reflective bioethics, as pertaining to neonatology, does not study only 
dilemmas in this field, nor does it define decisions made by caregivers as being right or 
wrong, it analyzes how decisions are taken, in what context, and what influences these 
decisions. These analyses may unveil sorne biases caregivers have in the decision-making, 
and help describe where the difficulties are in taking those decisions. 
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The birth and evolution of neonatology 
The birth of neonatology as a speciality paralleled in time that of modem bioethics. 
Even ifhuman beings have been providing sorne medical care for newborn infants for 
centuries, neonatology is a recent speciality. The high infant mortality was recognized as a 
problem as early as the 1860s,8 but improvements in the care of neonates and major 
decreases in mortality are rather recent. The first premature infant incubator was invented 
and marketed in 1898 by Dr. Joseph B. DeLee in Chicago, Illinois. In 1965, the first 
neonatal intensive care unit (NI CU) was opened in New Haven, Connecticut, and in 1975, 
the subspecialty ofneonatology was established by the American Board ofPediatrics.8 
Before 1970s, babies that were even mildly premature would often die. Patrick 
Bouvier Kennedy, the son of the late US president John F Kennedy was born in 1963 at a 
gestational age (GA) of 35 weeks and died 2 days later. At that time, to be born 5 weeks 
early was a substantial risk. Patrick Kennedy's death from hyaline membrane disease 
(HMD) also called respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) was extremely publicized and 
helped spark new public awareness ofprematurity and further research. This disease 
occurs wh en there is not enough surfactant in premature lungs. Our lungs produce 
surfactant. It helps to keep them open and prevents their collapse. Surfactant is usually 
produced by the lungs of neonates, but the amounts may be insufficient wh en the y are 
premature. The 1960-80s brought a rapid evolution in neonatal care. Mechanical 
ventilators, also called respirators, allowed for survival of newborns that were more and 
more premature. Despite these advances many babies would die from HMD. HMD can 
be ameliorated and even prevented if mothers who are about to deliver prematurely 
receive betamethasone, a hormone that speeds the production of surfactant in the lungs of 
the baby before he is born. In the 1980s, the development of exogenous surfactant (from 
the lungs of cows or pigs), which can be instilled into the lungs of babies, drastically 
improved survival and decreased adverse outcomes. Since the 1990s, because of 
antenatal corticosteroids, mechanical ventilation and exogenous surfactant, babies born at 
35 weeks almost never die, and long term outcomes are generally almost identical to term 
babies. 
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Neonatology is a subspecialty of paediatrics that focuses on the medical care of 
newborn infants who require intensive monitoring. Rather than focusing on a particular 
organ system, which is the case in most other specialities, neonatologists focus on the 
global care of newborns that require NICU admission. Many newborn babies are 
admitted to the NICU, the most common indication for admission being prematurity. In 
Canada, 7-8% ofbabies are born premature, with a gestational age (GA) of less than 37 
weeks. Most premature babies in the NICU are only mildly premature, between 32 and 
36 weeks gestation. The lower the GA, the fewer such infants there are. For example, in 
the NICU there are more infants born at 33-35 weeks than 30 weeks, fewer at 27 weeks, 
and still fewer at 24 weeks of GA. Extremely premature babies, with a gestation of less 
than 28 weeks or a weight of less than 1000 grams (also called Extremely Low Birth 
Weight babies, ELBW), comprise 0.8% of aIl deliveries and about 10% ofNICU 
admissions. In modem NICUs, infants weighing 1000 grams or born at 27 weeks 
gestation have an approximately 90% chance of survival with the majority having normal 
neurological development. 9 Other babies admitted to the NICU can have congenital 
malformations requiring surgery, alternate modes of feeding or increased surveillance, 
yet others have birth asphyxia, suspected infections requiring antibiotics, or respiratory 
difficulties. Neonatology is a hospital-based speciality and NICU nurses are specifically 
trained to care for these vulnerable infants. The average length of stay of babies in one of 
our NICUs is 14 days, with sorne babies exceptionally staying for more than 4 months 
and other less than 24 hours. JO 
As in every academic speciality, sorne neonatologists pursue research to improve 
the care ofneonates. Other neonatologists are specialized in the follow-up ofbabies that 
are particularly at risk. Neonatal follow-up is quite unique. There have until recently been 
no other specialities where patients at risk are systematically followed and assessed by 
the same department where they were admitted. Neonatal follow-up is a form of quality 
control: it better assesses the long term effects ofhealth problems early and later in life 
and helps neonatologists understand the outcomes of the babies treated in the NICU. 
With the help of neonatal follow-up, neonatologists have found ways to improve 
outcomes, prevent sorne of the disabilities, and are better equipped to inform parents in 
the delivery room and the NICU. 
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Ethical issues in the NICU 
As neonatal medicine has developed, clinical ethics has also become increasingly 
present in the healthcare environment. For more than 30 years, neonatal medicine has 
provided specialized and intensive care measures aimed at improving the health and 
survival of neonates. Because of many improvements in the way we care for these 
infants, a substantial reduction in infant mortality has occurred. Babies are more likely to 
survive and less likely to develop a handicap for each problem they encounter and at each 
GA. The rate of handicap or significant morbidity appears to have remained steady 
because, even if a lower proportion ofbabies survive with impairments, more babies 
survive. In fact, prematurity rates are continuing to increase. This is due to a constellation 
of factors: lower socio-economic status, increasing maternaI age, pregnancies with 
multiple embryos created by artificial reproductive technologies, obesity, and many other 
factors that are increasing in our society. Although Canada has an increasing rate of 
preterm births, the United States of America (USA) retains the highest rate of 
industrialized countries with 12.5% in 2004. 11 One of the ethical issues in NICU is how 
to prevent babies from coming to the NICU in the first place. Global ethical issues, 
totally out of the scope ofthis thesis but extremely important, include the world wide 
infant mortality. While my thesis focuses on babies who are admitted to the NICU who 
are at elevated risk oflater disabilities, many babies born in the world still die ofbenign 
infections, mild prematurity, and ev en malnutrition. This ongoing tragedy is beyond the 
scope ofthis thesis but merits considerable reflection and thought. 
In countries in which medical technology is developing quickly, many ethical and 
moral questions arise at the same time as a new development is made or, aIl too often, 
afterwards. Knowledge regarding management of pregnancy and delivery has advanced 
such that the risks for the mothers and the infants are considerably reduced, but such 
knowledge brings about new questions. At what GA, birth weight (BW), or for what 
long-term outcomes should very sick newborn infants receive intervention? Do parents 
always have a choice when their newborn is at risk of handicap? Should they be entirely 
responsible for the decisions, or should others also be involved? What is the best way to 
take these critical decisions? 
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The rest of this introduction will present a brief overview of ethical issues and 
values in perinatal and neonatal care. It cannot be exhaustive and sorne areas might be 
only briefly covered. When a foetus or newbom infant is at high-risk the individuals 
involved in decision-making are the parents, the nurses, and the physicians: aIl are 
attempting to act in the best interests ofthe baby. Decision-making with regard to at-risk 
babies usually concems three major categories of questions. Firstly, whether to intervene 
for a baby, whether the intervention should be stopped, and finally who should be 
primarily responsible for the decisions, and how. The health care workers are confronted 
with these decisions, which involve many values and principles. Decision making in 
neonatology is often complex, it does not simply consist of explaining the treatment 
options to a patient and then asking ifthey prefer one treatment to another. Frequently, in 
fact, the unbom patient is not even "present" at the moment these decisions are made. 12 
At the moment ofbirth however, the foetus becomes a person and therefore a citizen with 
as much right to protection as other vulnerable patients. Even though the premature infant 
is endowed with these rights at birth, for sorne commentators such premature infants are 
still not considered to be entirely persons. 13,14 Legally, physicians need a patient's 
consent in order to care for them. 15 Ifthe patient is incompetent a "legally authorized 
person" will take the decisions for them. 15 Babies, being naturally incompetent are 
generally in the care oftheir parents who take decisions for them, a process known as 
"substituted consent". Such substituted consent should be given in the best interest of 
incompetent patients. According to the standard of "best interests", the individual who is 
giving substituted consent must evaluate the different options in order to maximize the 
benefits of an intervention and minimize as much as possible the harm associated with it. 
The future quality oflife of the patient will inevitably be evaluated in the decision-
making process. It is assumed that parents are the best placed to know what is in the best 
interest oftheir children and will act accordingly. Except in an emergency situation, a 
court order is required in order to treat infants without parental consent. Ultimately, 
however, if the physician believes "that the designated surrogate threatens the patient's 
best interests, the decision should be overridden", such overriding of family decision-
making has been supported in the courtS. 16,17 Indeed ifresuscitation is considered to be in 
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any incompetent patient's best interest, and significant harm is caused by not intervening, 
refusaI of care is generally not accepted, neither ethically nor legaIly. 
A complicating factor for many ofthese decisions in neonatology is that failure to 
provide the medical care in question often leads to death. It is easier to make decisions or 
compromises about decisions which have less serious consequences compared to 
deciding between death on the one hand, or on the other hand, the risk of a life requiring 
multiple interventions and with potentiallong term disabilities, and furthermore, to make 
such a decision for an infant before or soon after it is bom. 
Values in NIeD care 
A. Vitalism: the value of Iife 
The princip le of personal integrity and the importance of the value of life require 
that life be respected for aIl human beings and that killing is not acceptable. One point of 
view regarding how these values impact on medical decision-making is that of the 
vitalists. For vitalists, life is the supreme value, and one cannot compare a life with 
handicap to an absence of life. 18 The principle of justice, related to the value of equality, 
is also extremely important for vitalists, in other words, aIl individuals have a right to life 
no matter what its nature, and must be protected against whosoever wishes to put that life 
in peril. Dr. Koop, Surgeon General of the United States during the Baby Doe period (see 
below), was a vitali st. For him, aIl human beings were created in the image of God and 
must be kept alive. 18 For vitalists, even individuals who are in a persistent vegetative state 
de serve to receive whatever treatment is required to keep them alive and even such a 
limited existence has value. 
Paul Ramsay, in an article conceming the "slippery slope" was to sorne extent in 
favour of a vitali st vision for newbom infants, because, he stated, letting a baby die 
opened the door to horrible crimes. He compared the situation to the crimes of the Nazis, 
which started with little things and rapidly degenerated, "any boundaries preventing 
infanticide that can be fixed or preserved today are precious and should be cheri shed and 
strengthened, however non-rational they may be".19 This argument can seem extreme, but 
other authors have evoked vitali st arguments that are more deserving of reflection. Burt 
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felt that the population must have confidence in medicine and in physicians because they 
save lives and preserve health. The idea of leaving babies to die "because they are not 
normal" shook the population of the USA in the Baby Doe affair. 20 This baby, with 
Trisomy-21, died of malnutrition because the family refused a surgical intervention that 
was simple, commonplace and had few long-term complications. On the other hand, 
individuals with trisomy 21 have moderate to severe mental retardation, and this is what 
prompted the parent's request. The physicians accepted this request. Burt considered that 
it is essential to preserve the social image of physicians and as a result, it is in the best 
interests of the population as a whole to treat aIl newbom infants in order to preserve 
confidence and social peace.20 Walter felt thatjudgments of value with regard to newbom 
infants who are at risk of long-term consequences in sorne way define our humanity.21 
In their book Mixed Blessings: Intensive Care for Newboms, the sociologists 
Jeanne Guillemin and Lynn Holmstrom criticize intensive care nurseries because they are 
too vitalist.22 According to them, decisions made are almost always in favour oflife and 
are almost automatic. Parents are often similarly committed to the lives of their infants, 
which according to these authors, does not help, as they state: "parents' sheer 
determination coupled with their commitment to the survival oftheir infant also 
contributes to the aggressiveness oftreatment in the NICU, it seems they also err on the 
side of over-treatment rather than under-treatment.,,23 Dr Lantos, a world-renowned 
paediatrician and bioethicist, finds this lack ofunderstanding of intensive care on the part 
ofthe sociologists bizarre; he writes in a criticism of the book "the authors don't explain 
why they think such a response by doctors and parents should be considered a bias rather 
than a moral commitment or a normal social response. This is a curious judgment for a 
social scientist to make, it is as if a social scientist would point out that parents are biased 
on the side of picking up their crying infants rather than letting them scream, or that 
lifeguards have a bias to rescue people who appear to be drowning,,?4 The media also 
add to a vitali st image of the NICU, they are often sensationalist and biased. A good 
example of a sensationalist documentary is the film Médecine Sous Influence, where 
NICU physicians are painted as technology crazed vitalists and extremists who refuse to 
let go and experiment on neonatal victims. In fact, extreme vitalism is a feature neither of 
our health care system, nor ofthose working in intensive care. Evidence for this can be 
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found in studies of the modes of death in NICUs, very few babies die du ring on-going 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the majority succumb because intensive care is withheld 
or withdrawn, which would not be allowed in a vitali st world-view. 
Life is always sacred for vitalists, but what does it represent for them? With 
advances in medical technology issues have arisen which have forced a re-evaluation of 
what life is. With the ad vent of organ transplants, the concept ofbrain death emerged. An 
individual can thus be dead even if his heart continues to beat - at the time this was a new 
concept. But what about the human being with a persistent vegetative state able to 
survive without a respirator but with no ability to communicate? In the eyes of sorne, 
patients in persistent vegetative state are dead, even ifthey are not brain dead. For others, 
there is no obligation to treat if "there is inability to survive infancy, inability to survive 
without severe pain, and inability to participate, at least minimally, in hum an experience 
(capacity for interaction)".25 For vitalists, the best interest ofan infant is always to treat to 
extend life because even the most limited life is better than death. 
B. Quality of life: the value of health 
Healthcare workers in general promo te the value ofhealth with respect to the 
individual, which is to say they promote the quality of life and the relief of suffering. 
Quality of life judgments are based on an assessment of the value of the life of an 
individual, of its usefulness to them or others, and are essentially subjective. 
Ramsay, a vitalist, writes that "a quality of life approach wrongly shifts the focus 
from whether the treatments are beneficial to patients to whether the patients' lives are 
beneficial to them", which opens the door to euthanasia which he condemns.26 
Beauchamp and Childress state that Down syndrome (Trisomy-21) is not a reason for 
letting a newbom die, even if the baby has malformations that put his life in danger. 27 As 
a result they come to the conclusion, that legally and morally "mental retardation is 
irrelevant in determining iftreatment is in the patient's best interests. Proxies shou1d not 
confuse quality of life with the value of the patient' s life for others and they should not 
refuse treatment ifit would be in conflict with a patient's best interests in order to avoid 
burdens to the family or costs to society".28 
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Several research studies have shown that parents of pretenn infants, and the 
infants themselves when they are older, judge their quality of life to be much better than 
judgments made by health care workers.29,30 Parents, both of full tenn infants, and of very 
premature babies, have a very different attitude to the treatment of extremely premature 
infants and a differentjudgement of the value oflife with disabilities as opposed to 
death. 31 Healthcare workers in neonatal intensive care units are a group who are relatively 
homogeneous in tenns ofhealth and (lack of) disability and have a tendency to negatively 
judge disabilities and to undervalue the quality of life of pretenn infants and their 
families. 31 Many studies have demonstrated that neonatologists underestimate the long-
tenn outcome of premature infants and that nurses are even more pessimistic than 
physicians.30,32,33 Dr. Saigal has perfonned numerous research projects on this subject and 
has demonstrated that healthcare workers are much less tolerant regarding the possibility 
of disability and its uncertainties. For them, for example, it is much more difficult to 
envi sion the life of an infant in a wheelchair or blind than it is for the parents.34 In several 
studies, parents appear to be much more vitalist than healthcare workers.29,30,31,34 
Furthennore, parents of infants both premature and full tenn have very different 
perceptions to the health care workers; 64% ofthem were in agreement with the 
statement, "we should try to save all newbom infants independently oftheir birth 
weight", in comparison 6% ofhealthcare workers agreed with this statement.30 Parents of 
premature infants, of handicapped pretenn infants, and of infants bom at tenn had 
identical responses. 30 In contrast, in one study, 71 % of nurses and 36% ofpaediatricians 
considered that saving the lives of newbom babies with potential for severe disabilities 
was not ethical. 32 
If potential disability has limited influence for vitalists in tenns of when to 
intervene, mortality should have sorne importance. On the other hand, mortality is not the 
only outcome considered in ethical decision-making for NIeU physicians and parents. 
Also important are the burden of prolonged intensive care, and the risks of long-tenn 
disability, or of later death. 12-25% of babies bom before 27 weeks gestational age will 
have major neurological or developmental disabilities: cerebral paIsy (8-10%), deafness 
(3%), blindness (3%), and developmental retardation (10-20%); up to 50% will have 
behavioural or educational problems: hyperactivity, leaming difficulties, dyslexia or 
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behavioural problems.35,36 Importantly, although survival increases drastically between 
23 and 25 weeks, there is little independent effect of gestation on disability rate at these 
early gestations.36,37,38,39 
We should also consider the severity of handicaps that are experienced by former 
preterm infants. Cognitive deficits are the most common, but are rarely severe - the mean 
Intellectual Quotient (lQ) of extremely premature infants being approximately 86, which 
is to say one standard deviation less than control infants. This can be compared to a mean 
IQ of 40.2 for adolescents who have Trisomy-21 and for whom consideration of their 
degree of handicap when making medical decisions is considered to be unethical (see the 
comment by Beauchamp and Childress above).40 Motor dysfunction (cerebral paIsy), 
although usually classified as a severe adverse outcome, may occur in up to 12% of very 
premature babies; however, the majority of babies with cerebral paIsy are ambulant and 
have a good quality of life. Multiple disabilities, with a profound burden on an individual 
and their family, are devastating when they occur, but are infrequent and arise in less than 
5-10% ofbabies born at less than 28 weeks. 36 
The principle ofbeneficence, that is, to do good to one's patients, is important for 
aIl healthcare workers, the mIe of least harm is also important. Lantos has written on this 
subject, "The question is whether we can have the good without the bad, or ifnot, 
whether the CUITent balance ofbenefits to burdens is worth it".24 It is difficult to predict 
for those who take into account the quality of life, which is generally the case for those 
who work in neonatology: what life is worth being lived? How do we make a judgement 
of the value of future life of a baby in order to know if death would be in their best 
interests? 
C. Autonomy 
Autonomy is also a value that is important in our health care system. For 
Engelhardt, a philosopher, informed consent has become a legal formality, or ev en a 
ritual "grace before meals".41 In our pluralist society, secular and post-modem, liberty, 
equality and security are important goals and only rare individuals are in disagreement 
with these objectives. On the other hand, there are many more disagreements about how 
to arrive at these objectives. There is a diversity of moral opinions and a multitude of 
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ideas about what is the good. Beyond the limits ofwhat is legal, imposed by society, 
there is for Engelhardt only one way to escape nihilism and to approach others in a 
manner which is not coercive, that is to respect the other and not to use their body 
without their consent, to respect their autonomy, their manner ofthinking and ofleading 
their lives, in aIl spheres and not only in the medical sphere. The respect of the other in 
their autonomy is also critical in order to establish a common secular ethics, "If we do not 
take this approach to grounding ethics then we will be lost in nihilism; there will be no 
way to ground a morality for moral strangers".41 For Engelhardt, it is our human abilities 
that define us as humans and gives us the right to consider personhood as a moral status. 
For newbom infants, Engelhardt states they do not have the status of persons because 
they are not autonomous, thus substituted consent is vital for deciding treatments that 
they will receive. 14,42 
Thomasma, a physician and bioethicist, does not accept the autonomy model for 
patient-physician relationships, nor the contractual relationship that results from imposing 
this model, nor the fact that autonomy should be considered univers al and supreme. 
Autonomy for Thomasma means self-determination.43 ,44 There are important limits to 
self-determination for any sick person. According to him it is false to believe that sick 
persons are capable of exercising their autonomy as much as those who are in full health. 
According to him, caring for a patient implies attempting to retum to them their 
autonomy. The vision of Thomasma is relevant to our discussions - parents of children in 
intensive care are also suffering and they often have difficulty in taking life and death 
decisions.44 
According to feminist theories, autonomy is relational. Sherwin, a philosopher, 
described two different approaches, the facilitatory model and the adversarial model. 45 
Facilitatory policies view the pregnant woman as wanting to give to her foetus or child 
the best possible environment, both having many common needs, with several obstacles 
which stand in the way of fulfilling them: poverty, dependence, and isolation. In contrast, 
the adversarial model seeks to control the pregnant woman or the newly delivered mother 
by viewing the foetus or child as an adversary who must be protected from his mother, 
with distinct interests.46 Such policies act against the autonomy ofthe mother and will 
often question their competence, including attempting to force treatments on premature 
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infants. As neonatologists, it is important to inform parents and help them come to the 
best decision for their children. On the other hand, as for any incompetent patient, it is 
also important for physicians to be the spokesperson for our "naturally incompetent" 
patients, and certain refusaIs oftreatment are not acceptable, for example that of baby 
Doe. 
The best interests of parents and the family might not always be identical with 
those of the child. The President's Commission, created in the U.S. to reflect the 
acceptable norms for ethical treatment of newborns, recognized the importance of 
families: "the impact of a decision on an incapacitated patient's loved ones may be taken 
into account in determining someone's best interests, for most people do have an 
important interest in the well-being oftheir families",47 it seems that health care workers 
in neonatology do not only have the high-risk babies as patients, but also their parents. In 
reality, it is not rare to consider the best interests of the family; their suffering associated 
with intensive care is often considered. Parental suffering is included in the formula of 
debating the best interests ofthe baby, however, this has generally not been discussed in 
the literature regarding life and death decision making, but it seems to be that at times, 
parental suffering is more acute than that of the baby. This suffering is related to maternaI 
guilt feelings, to the intolerable uncertainties encountered each day, to the threat ofbad 
news, to the fear that the baby's life wou Id have been meaningless ifhe or she should die, 
to the chronic sleep deprivation ... etc. At times, the parents' emotional reserves and their 
resilience may be exhausted. Parents can become emotionally drained and when yet 
another crisis occurs, a request or acceptance for discontinuation oftherapy may result 
from their suffering as much -or even at times more- as their baby's. The best interests of 
the patient and the best interests oftheir family may sometimes be confounded, indeed 
this may be unavoidable. 
D. Value of equality (principle of justice) 
The principle of distributive justice is also important for caregivers: in terms of 
costs there is a desire to do the most good for the largest number and to give medical care 
following princip les of equality to aIl patients. When trying to do the best on a case-by-
case basis posing questions, for example, about the resuscitation of an infant as ifhe or 
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she were an isolated individual, we sometimes forget to regard the entirety of the 
patient's reality and our conclusions as a result can only be incomplete. Finding solutions 
to ethical issues must also on occasion require an analysis of health care policies and 
hospital facilities. Always trying to improve our efforts and do better than those who 
came before us, we now find it inconceivable that women and their foetuses died as a 
result of gestational diabetes not long ago, or that premature infants of 35 weeks of GA 
regularly died because there was so little to offer. But inequalities persist, even today 
premature infants born outside of tertiary care centres have a lower chance of surviving, 
in part because of the deficiencies of air transport. The absence of federal funding and 
legal or regulatory restrictions on assisted reproductive technologies are contributing to 
an epidemic of multiple gestations and are leading to an increase in the frequency of 
prematurity and disabilities. As mentioned above, many infants on this earth do not have 
the good fortune to be admitted to a neonatal intensive care unit and die of simple easily 
treatable illnesses or even hunger. These problems cry out for solutions. 
Contradiction of values 
It is clear that at times different values may be in conflict, for example, the 
supreme value oflife in the sense ofvitalism and the importance ofa good quality oflife 
can be in conflict. What quality of life is worse than death? Beneficence may be in 
conflict with parental autonomy or values of equality and justice. This "confrontation of 
values" can raise questions regarding the best interests· for a child. For example it may be 
difficult for a caregiver to let a premature baby die because of the parents' wishes when 
another with a worse prognosis is admitted to the NleU for intensive support. 
In our pluralist society, definitions of the best interests of a child are subjective. 
Walters describes four different possible positions which have been found in the literature 
regarding decision-making for sick neonates: respect for life, parental authority, best 
interests and personhood.21 Sorne ofthese positions are limited, according to Walters, and 
when pushed to the extreme may not be consistent with the best interests of the infant.7 A 
belief in the absolute value of life is in opposition to considerations of personhood: on 
one hand, an anencephalic infant may be considered to be a human being created in the 
image of God warranting aIl possible medical care, or on the other hand may be 
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considered an acceptable case for infanticide. The principle ofbest interests is subjective. 
Walters developed another principle that of "proximate personhood" which according to 
him truly allows consideration of the best interests of the infant. He attempts to respond 
to the following question "what would l want if! were that baby?" that might appear to 
be a form of intellectual gymnastics - abstract and difficult - but it deserves to be further 
explored. Walters wrote "the issue is not essentially ambulation or whether or not the 
parent or the physician would want to live if inflicted with the anticipated handicap, but 
what the projected childladult would desire (what would they want ifthey were the 
baby). Mature persons could make a projection of substitutive judgment".21 This position 
appears to have sorne validity, especially in the context where a number of studies have 
shown that the quality oflife ofpatients as determined by he al th professionals is c1early 
less than that as determined by patients themselves?9,30,34 When different values and 
different conceptions of the best interests of an infant co-exist, it is often impossible to 
obtain any consensus regarding which is desirable or acceptable. 
As health care workers we try as far as possible to respect the best interests of our 
small premature patients. It appears quite simple to make decisions for the most extreme 
cases: the baby who weighs 350 grams who has such a low chance of surviving and such 
a limited predicted existence that intensive care, even if it were technically possible, is 
generally not indicated. At the other extreme, the decision to admit an infant to the NIeU 
who is mildly premature, but has a good chance of surviving with a good outcome, is 
easy to make. Between these two extremes, the light gray and the dark gray, we attempt 
to respect the best interests of families, which may not always be identical to those of 
their infants. By recognizing parental suffering and giving more support to families and 
health care workers we will be able to improve things for our families. It is also necessary 
to accept that uncertainty will always be an important aspect ofneonatal intensive care, 
both for health care workers and for parents. 
25 
References 
1 Weiler KM, Catton K. The unborn child in Canadian Law. 1976 Dec;14(3), p: 643-59. 
2 Klasing MS. Death of an unborn child: jurisprudential inconsistencies in wrongful death, criminal 
homicide, and abortion cases. Pepperdine Law Rev. 1995;22(3), p: 933-79. 
3 McConnel ML. Sui generis: the legal nature ofthe foetus in Canada. Can Bar Rev. 1991 ;70, p: 548-56. 
4 Textbook ofneonatal resuscitation, 4th edition, American Academy ofPediatrics, page 7.18. 
5 President's Commission for the study of Ethical Problerns in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research. Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatrnent. Washington DC: U.S Government printing 
Office, 1983. 
6 Lantos J, Do We Still Need Doctors?, Routledge, 1997, p: 23. 
7 Casarett R, Daskal F, Frona 1 and Lantos J. Experts in Ethics? The Authority of the Clinical Ethicist. 
Casarett, Daskal, Frona and Lantos, Hastings Center Report 1998; 28(6),p: 6-11. 
8 American Academy ofPediatrics (2001). "Committee Report: American Pediatrics: Milestones at the 
Millennium". Pediatries 1 07, p: 1482-1491. 
9 Lemmons J.A. "Very Low Birth Weight Outcomes ofthe National Institute of Chi Id Health and Hurnan 
Development Neonatal Research Network;January 1995 Through December 1996". Pediatrics 107(1), p: 
1-8. 
10 Royal Victoria statistics, for year 2006-2007. 
Il Peristats, on the March ofDimes internet site: http://www.rnarchofdimes.comlperistats/pdflib/195/99.pdf 
12 The fetus as a person. CMAJ. 1990 Dec 1; 143(11), p: 1156, no authors listed. 
13 Singer P. Practical Ethics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979 
14 Engelhardt T. Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in Beneficent Euthanasia, Kohl M, 
ed. Buffalo, NY, Prometheus 1975. 
26 
15 Article Il of the Civil Code ofQuebec, found at: www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ccg 
16 AAP Committee on Bioethics. Guidelines on forgoing life-sustaining medical treatrnent. Pediatries 1994; 
93, p: 532-6. 
18Koop CE. The Seriously III or Dying Child: Supporting the Patient and Family, in Death Dying and 
Euthanasia, University Publications of America, Ferderick, MD, 1977, p: 537-539. 
19 Ramsey P. Infanticide and the handicapped newborn. Introduction, in Horan DJ, Delahoye M. Provo 
Utah, Brigham Young University press, 1982, p: xv. 
20 Burt RA. Authorizing death for anornalous newborns, in Milunsky A, Annas GJ. Genetics and the law, 
New York. Plenum press, 1985, vol 3, p: 259-269. 
21 Walters IW. Approaches to ethical decision rnaking in the NICU. AlDC, Vol 142, aug 1988, p: 925-830. 
22 Guillemin J, Holmstrom LL. Mixed blessings: intensive care for newborn, New York Oxford University 
Press, 1986. 
23 Ref#S, p: 239. 
24 Lantos 1. The difficulty ofbeing anti-NICU, Lit Med. 1999;18(2):237-40; discussion p: 241-3. 
25 Jonsen AR, Garland MJ. A moral policy for life / death decisions in the NICU. In Etrucs ofNewborn 
Intensive Care, Jonsen and Garland. Bekerley, University of California, Institute of governmental studies, 
1976, p: 148. 
26 Ramsey P. Ethics at the Edges oflife. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, p: 155. 
27 Beauchamp and Childress J. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th edition. Oxford Univ Press, 2001, p: 
139. 
28 Ref 13, p 137. 
29 Dinesen SJ, Greisen G. Quality oflife in young adults with very low birth weight. Arch Dis Child Fetal 
Neonatal Ed 2001 Nov;85(3), p: FI65-9. 
27 
30 Saigal S, Rosenbaum PL, Feeny D, Burrows E, Furlong W, StoskopfBL, et al. Parental perspectives of 
the health status and health-related quality of life ofteen-aged children who were extremely low birth 
weight and terrn controls. Pediatrics 2000, Mar;1 05(3 Pt 1), p: 569-74. 
3\ Streiner DL, Saigal S, Burrows E, StoskopfB, Rosenbaum P. Attitudes of Parents and Health Care 
Professionals Toward Active Treatrnent of Extremely Premature Infants. Pediatrics 2001 Jul; 1 08( 1), p: 
152-7. 
32 Lee SK, PeIUler PL, Cox M. Comparison of the attitudes ofhealth care professionals and parents toward 
active treatrnent of very low birth weight infants. Pediatrics 1991 ;88( 1), p: 110-4. 
33 Haywood JL, Goldenberg RL, Bronstein J, Nelson KG, Carlo W A. Comparison ofperceived and actual 
rates of survival and freedom from handicap in premature infants. Am J Obstet Gynecol 1994 Aug; 171 (2), 
p: 432-9. 
34 Saigal S, StoskopfBL, Feeny D, Furlong W, Burrows E, Rosenbaum PL, et al. Differences in 
preferences for neonatal outcomes among health care professionals, parents, and adolescents. JAMA 1999 
Jun;281(21), p: 1991-7. 
36 Lefebvre F, Mazurier E, Tessier R. Cognitive and educational outcomes in early adulthood for infants 
weighing 1000 grarns or less at birth. Acta Paediatr 2005 Jun;94(6), p: 733-40. 
37 Vohr BR, Wright LL, Poole WK, McDonald SA, for the NICHD Neonatal Research Network Follow-up 
Study. Neurodevelopmental Outcomes of Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants <32 Weeks' Gestation 
between 1993 and 1998. Pediatrics 2005 Sep;116(3), p: 635-43. 
38 Doyle LW, for the Victorian Infant Collaborative Study Group. Outcome at 5 Years of Age ofChildren 
23 to 27 Weeks' Gestation: Refining the Prognosis. Pediatrics 2001 Jul; 1 08( 1), p: 134-41. 
39 Hoekstra RE, Ferrara TB, Couser RJ, Payne NR, COIUlett JE. Survival and Long-Terrn 
Neurodevelopmental Outcome of Extremely Premature Infants Born at 23-26 Weeks' Gestational Age at a 
Tertiary Center. Pediatrics 2004 Jan; 113(1 ):, p: el-6. 
40 Turner S, Alborz A. Academic attainments of children with Down's syndrome: a longitudinal study.Br J 
Educ Psychol. 2003 Dec;73(Pt 4), p: 563-83. 
4\ Engelhardt HT. The Many Faces of Autonomy. Health Care Analysis. 2001;9, p: 283-297. 
28 
42 Engelhardt HT. CUITent controversÎes in obstetrics: Wrongfullife and forced fetal surgical procedures. 
American Journal ofObstetrics and Gynecology, Feb 1, 1985, p: 313-317. 
43 Thornasma De. Limitations of the autonomy model for the doctor-patient relationship, The Pharos, 
spring 1983, p: 2-5 
44 Thornasma DC. Autonomy in the doctor-patient relation, Theor medicine 5 (1984), p: 1-7. 
45 Sherwin S. A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health Care, in The Politics ofWomen's Health: 
Exploring Agency and Autonomy, The Feminist Health Care Ethics Research Network, Susan Sherwin 
Coordinator, Philadelphia: Temple University Press (1998), p: 35-36. 
46 Sherwin S. Abortion through a Ferninist Ethics Lens, Dialogue XXX 1991, p: 327-42. 
47 President's Commission, Deciding to forgo Life-sustaining Treatrnent, Ch. 5. 
29 
METHODOLOGY 
The research and scientific studies, presented as part of this PhD thesis, were 
perfonned using a questionnaire methodology. In the first four scientific articles 
presented in this thesis, the part entitled "Methods" is dedicated to explicitly describing 
how the questionnaire was distributed, filled, and statistically analyzed. 
Below is an overview of how the research was performed using identified target 
groups. AIso, the inherent limitations of questionnaire studies is discussed. When 
planning a questionnaire study, multiple questions need to be asked, in order to ensure 
that the methodology is adequate to address the hypotheses, and that there is no 
unnecessary replication of previous work. These questions relate to determining what is 
the precise goal of the study, whether this is a worthwhile goal, and has previous work 
already addressed the important issues? For example, the goal of the second 
questionnaire was to determine whether age, survival or risk of disability influence 
respondents as they make decisions regarding resuscitation. Opinions and attitudes 
towards resuscitation at different ages of life or for patients with potential brain injury or 
with very reduced lifespan diverge greatly. It is important to determine how these clinical 
decisions are made, and what influences them. The background to the questions and a 
relevant literature review will be covered in the introduction of the thesis and in each 
article. Good questionnaire studies need to be weIl planned in order to be valid, reliable 
. and discriminating. l will take the second questionnaire and analyze how it was created, 
and how the selection of respondents, the data collection and the statistical evaluation 
were performed. 
Creating the questionnaire study 
This questionnaire study was created to examine what effect the age of the 
patient, potential for survival and predictions of disability had on resuscitation decisions. 
This could have been achieved by doing semi-structured interviews in an emergency 
room (ER). Because we wanted to compare a non-medical population, who do not take 
resuscitation decisions in ERs, to a medical population, we chose to do a questionnaire 
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study, understanding the limitation ofthis approach. There were 2 small pilot studies to 
create this questionnaire. The first was done with 4 attending staff, 10 medical residents, 
10 medical students, and 16 students in law, anthropology, bioethics and medicine. 
We created 8 different scenarios of patients of different ages and asked the same 
questions following each patient: 
1- Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
2- Ifthe parents ask you not to resuscitate, will you respect their decision? 
3- Do you think intubating, resuscitating and consulting intensive care for admission is in the 
patient' s best interest? 
4- If it was your child and you had a few minutes to consider your decision, would you wish 
the physician to intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
5- Ifit was your sibling's child and you had time to think (not an emergency situation), and 
s/he asks for your opinion, would you recommend that the physician intubate, resuscitate and 
consult intensive care for admission? 
1. Creating the 8 different patient scenarios 
Five out of eight cases were paediatric, 3 cases were adults. AlI patients had different 
chronological ages. In the first pilot study, we had 12 cases, with 4 scenarios of patients with 
the same age and different outcomes (a neonate and an adult). Because we planned to 
administer the questionnaires during a group activity where a maximum number ofrespondents 
could be reached, and because most of these sessions are 1 to 2 hours, we wanted the 
questionnaire to take about 10-15 minutes to answer. We realized that the questionnaires were 
too long for the data collection we had planned after only 10 respondents (1 st pilot study). In 
the context of questionnaire studies, it can be difficult to have an acceptable balance between 
how much information we want to find out, and how much sustained attention the respondent 
will have. We realized that we could not answer aIl the questions we had in mind in one 
questionnaire study. We therefore measured only one concept: that ofpatients aIl having 
different ages, and aIl needing immediate resuscitation. We also realized sorne students did not 
understand the patients' pathologies and modified them in order to make have 100% (n= 40) of 
individuals in the second pilot study have the desire / motivation to answer aIl questions in the 
questionnaire, and to understand 100% of the questions. 
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We created 8 patients of different ages, with 3 possible outcomes, aIl arriving in the ER 
incompetent, unstable, and in need ofresuscitation. We planned to analyse answers from 
different scenarios and compared them to each other in order to investigate differences in 
answers from respondents. Ethical reasoning based on cases, often requiring the comparison of 
different cases is referred to as casuistry. In my opinion, if one takes a case and then compares 
it to another case identical in aU aspects except one, casuistry can be pushed much further. 1 
have caIled this form of casuistry "substitutive ethics" in every day clinical work. Indeed, by 
changing the patients' stories minimaIly, or by changing only one aspect oftheir presentation, 
one can find surprising answers and make caregivers realize their biases. It can thus be much 
easier to understand the way we make judgments, and the source of our own prejudices. 
a. Patients with 50% survival and 50% normal outcome 
In this study, 1 created 4 patients who had identical outcomes. The patients were a 24-
week gestation premature who has just delivered, a baby just born at term with a known brain 
malformation, a 2 month-old with meningitis and a 50-y-old after a car accident. They aIl had 
50% survival. If they survived, 50% would be without impairment, 25% mildly or moderately 
impaired, and 25% severely impaired. The outcomes were explicitly described after each case 
and before the series of questions were asked. The cases were designed to have realistic 
outcomes. 
The survival rate, and the probabilities of long-term disability of the 24-week patient in 
our survey were designed to conservatively reflect the actual chances of an infant delivered at 
24-weeks gestation in a Canadian tertiary care centre. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 Indeed, in the Canadian 
Neonatal Network (CNN), in 2005, the survival rate of premature infants of24 week 
gestational Age (GA) was 72% when they were born in tertiary care unit. On the other hand, 
most of these babies had prenatal steroids, which is never the case when a woman delivers 
rapidly in the ER. We opted for 50%, which was realistic and an even number. The outcome of 
babies born at 24 weeks of GA, when they survive, have been studied extensively in the 
neonatal follow-up literature, and are similar to those in our scenario. 
The term infant initially was designed to have an AV malformation and have 
hemodynamic instability because of this. This case was long to describe and had clarity issues 
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in out first pilot study, therefore, we used only the tenn (brain malfonnation) and used identical 
outcomes as the premature infant. Because there are less babies who have such malfonnations, 
it is usually hard to exactly pinpoint the outcomes they will have, but we thought those 
described were realistic, and so did the medical respondents. 
We did a literature search to find other infants who could have outcomes who could be 
easily predicted. One of the cases we deleted was a child who had extensive trauma inflicted by 
his parents. This case, we realized, introduced severallayers of decision making (police and 
judicial involvement for example) that we did not wish to address in this study. In contrast a 
purely "medical" problem su ch as septic meningitis in infancy was conceptually more similar 
to the previous cases, and in addition there are good studies about the outcomes of such infants. 
Unstable infants with group B streptococcal meningitis have similar outcomes to those 
described in the questionnaire. 8 
Because trauma and motor vehic1e accidents (MV A) are frequent in older children and 
adults, there are many trauma scores used in the ER to predict patients' outcomes. The 
outcome for our 50 y old patient scenario was thus realistic9. 
b. Patients witb a 5% survival 
A second outcome category was created where patients had a very low survival. Two 
patients had 5% survival: a 14-y-old with acute myeloid leukemia with central nervous system 
(CNS) involvement with 20% risk of impainnent and a 35-y-old with brain cancer with 100% 
risk of handicap with treatment. . We hypothesized a very low survival rate would influence 
respondents. Myeloid leukemias in general have a worse prognosis than Acute lymphoblastic 
leukemias (ALL), and there are many scientific follow-up studies about leukemias. Often there 
are cancerous cells in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and patients need cranial irradiation, which 
can bring about sorne leaming deficits. This scenario was scientifically plausible. Glioblastoma 
Multifonnis (GBM) is a deadly brain cancer that has on average 5% survival. To survive, 
patients need to have a part oftheir brain removed and to undergo radiotherapy and 
chemotherapy. With such treatment, survival is 5% and intact survival is 0% because of the 
surgical procedure. 
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c. Patients with pre-existing disabilities 
Two other patients were already disabled: a 7-y-old with multiple disabilities (cerebral 
paIsy, deafuess, learning disability, hyperactivity) with a new head trauma, an 80-y-old with 
dementia and a new stroke. Both were noted to have a 50% predicted survival and, ifthey 
survived, a 50% chance ofhaving further impairment. 
We created a scenario of a 7-year-old child who reflected sorne of the most severely 
impaired outcomes among ex premature infants. Withholding care or withdrawing care in 
neonatology is often done in order to avoid having survivors with such disabilities. Motor 
delay is the most common neurodevelopmental disability of ex premature infant, however, 
most children are ambulant, and the large majority have a good quality of life. Cognitive 
impairment is also common, but is rarely severe, with average levels being approximately one 
standard deviation below controls JO• Multiple disabilities, with a profound burden on an 
individual and their family, aredevastating when they occur, but are infrequent and arise in 5% 
ofbabies born at less than 28 weeks. 11 We created such a case -which would occur only in 5% 
of premature infants born at 24 week gestation, our other scenario- in order to investigate the 
relative importance of actual, real, proven, disability in comparison with the potential disability 
of the preterm infant. As specified in the MV A adult case, trauma score exist for children and 
adults, are frequently used, and the figures presented were scientifically plausible. 
The geriatric case was a demented 80-y-old with a new stroke. In adults with a primary 
hemorrhagic stroke, the mortality is about 50% in the first 4 weeks, 56% of survivors have 
significant impairment, and more than 10% of the survivors require institutional care. 12 The 
case was created to reflect this. 
, 2. Validation of the questionnaire 
a. Pilot studies 
Pilot studies were done with the same category of respondents that were chosen to 
answer the questionnaire. These respondents were: medical staff and residents, and 
students in medicine, anthropology, law, and bioethics. It was distributed and respondent 
were given 20 minutes to respond. The pilot study respondents were asked if they 
understood each scenario and questions, ifthey would answer aIl the questions, and if 
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they thought the questionnaire needed to be changed, and ifyes, how. The first version of 
the questionnaire had sorne c1arity issues that were addressed, and was too long to keep 
the respondents interested. 
The second pilot (n= 40) study, with fewer questions, showed that the 
questionnaire was c1ear, and that aIl respondents were motivated to answer it. We 
hypothesized that the neonates and the geriatric patient would have the smallest 
proportion of respondents estimating it was in their best interest to be resuscitated, that 
fewer respondents would be willing to intervene, and that conversely, more would be 
wiling to accept a family's request to withhold intensive care. The pilot studies suggested 
that this hypothesis may be correct. When we did the actual study, we were confident that 
the questions were c1ear to the respondents, and that they were likely to fill the 
questionnaire. The reliability of a questionnaire refers to the stability and repeatability of 
measures. The questionnaire produced consistent results under the same conditions in the 
2 small pilot studies: the respondents of the 2 pilot studies (n=50) appeared to give fairly 
consistent results regarding the best interests of the geriatric patient and the neonates. By 
shortening the questionnaire, making it less multidimensional and focusing more on one 
concept, we made our questionnaire simpler to answer and more reliable. 
b. Internai validity 
The internaI validity of a questionnaire concerns the validity of the results internaI 
to the study and minimization of sources ofbias. For laboratory experiments, internaI 
validity is easy to achieve, but it is more difficult for questionnaire studies. In the case if 
this questionnaire for example, it would be internally valid ifwe measured what we 
c1aimed we wanted to measure: the respondents' estimated ofbest interests, the wish to 
intervene or not, and the willingness to let the family withhold care. We wanted to 
compare patients of different ages and similar outcomes, or different outcomes in order to 
see if age or outcomes (survival, disability or both) influenced resuscitation decisions. 
The internai validity could have been influenced by multiple factors and these 
factors were absent or minimized. These will be elaborated in point form below: 
35 
Our scenarios did not have any socio-economic, nor familial/marital status 
information that could have influenced the respondents and not enabled us to measure 
what we wanted to (ie influence of age and / or outcomes). Indeed, if the adult in the 
MVA was under the influence of alcohol at the time, perhaps the respondents' 
willingness to intervene would have been lower, ev en with the same outcomes. In 
contrast, if the mother who delivered at 24 weeks was 40 years old, infertile, and had 
bec orne pregnant with in Vitro Fertilization (NF), the answers might have reflected other 
values in addition to those that we wished to measure. Although not explicit, we might 
not have totally eliminated all social information from our cases. We raised this in the 
discussion of the fourth article presented ("Nobody like Premies") in this thesis: age can 
at times be considered to be a surrogate for social status, especially for older patients. We 
understood this limitation when we started the study, and have indicated it in our 
publications. Perhaps premature infants are also inherently and unconsciously considered 
to be socially inferior? One of the respondents, after the results of the study was out, told 
me he did not ev en finish the cases after reading "24 weeks pregnant" and after "80 year-
old ... demented", he thought intervening for the se patients was "not worth it", although 
he did read the other cases meticulously. If this attitude was widespread, the 
questionnaire would remain valid, as the goal was to determine the influence of age on 
opinions, but the details of the cases that we meticulously described would have had little 
influence on decisions. 
Similarly, all cases were "accidents" and were described to respondents in neutral 
ways, such that there was no information about whether the patients' habits, smoking, 
reckless driving ... etc cou Id have participated in their health "accident". For example, the 
willingness ofrespondents' to intervene could have been lower if the patient who had a 
stroke was a hypertensive obese man who already had a cardiac surgery, was a non-
compliant diabetic and refused to stop smoking. 
There are limitations with our patients' outcomes. Outcomes will never be 
identical between two patients, even less between four. Although for sorne patients, the 
long-term outcomes are presented as identical, the hospital stay and therapy will not be. 
Indeed, a 24 week premature infant will need sorne respirator support for on average 5-6 
weeks, a patient with meningitis will probably have more pain from headaches, whereas 
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an MV A victim might need only 2 weeks of intubation, but many abdominal and limb 
surgeries and have more somatic pain than the other patients. This might influence how 
the respondents answer the questionnaire. We think it is unlikely that these factors would 
influence the non-medical respondents. 
The cases were presented in order, from the youngest to the eldest. To eliminate 
this bias, which could have affected the internaI validity ofthe study, we could have 
printed numerous versions of the questionnaire with the patients in random order. 
Because of the limited financial resources to do this questionnaire study (none!), it would 
have been much harder to copy the information of more than 800 paper questionnaires in 
excel or SPSS format for statistical analysis. Furthermore l am not aware of such a 
procedure having been previously attempted. In my next funded questionnaire research, l 
will consider doing the questionnaire in this fashion. 
Sorne cases might have elicited more "sympathy" and elicited more emotions or 
imagination in our respondents. This was not recognized when doing the study, but only 
after it was finished, when sorne respondent gave us their feedback. For the 7-y-old child, 
several respondents speaking about him referred to the "kid who was crossing the street 
and got hit", although it was only mentioned in the questionnaire that he was "hit by a 
car". These respondents thought he got hit because he was limping, because he could not 
hear the car's horn. One even thought he had not tied his shoelaces properly because he 
was hyperactive! Eliciting emotions with cases is not new in medicine and bioethics, 
but it is possible sorne of my cases elicited more sympathy than others because of this. 
Because of the limited financial means for doing this study, Dr Isabelle Leblanc 
and l were the ones distributing and collecting the questionnaire. l doubt this could have 
elicited sorne "prestige" bias, as sorne students might have wanted to answer what they 
thought we would like. Because the questionnaire was anonymous, it is unlikely it did. 
On the other hand, the fact that there were no financial means involved, and that actual 
attending staffwent in to many c1assrooms and waited for questionnaires (completed or 
not) to be returned, and that this was done to obtain data for a PhD, probably increased 
our response rate! 
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Because of the way we distributed the questionnaires (see below), one could 
suspect there could have been sorne diffusion bias. This is unlikely as we administered 
the questionnaire in similar groups around the same time periods, and tried to get the 
most respondents on each occasion. It is unlikely anthropology students would speak 
about the different scenarios to attending staff in obstetrics. 
During the administration of this questionnaire, l had a 24-week pretenn 
daughter. Sorne of the medical residents and staffknew about this. One could think this 
might have influenced their answers. l compared the questionnaires that were completed 
"before and after" Violette, and the answers were not statisticaUy different. AIso, one 
would think respondents would tend to be more generous towards the premature infants 
(knowing my story) were there time bias in the answers, and it was not the case. 
c. External validity 
Because of our high response rate, we know the results accurately reflect the 
opinions of our target population. If we administered the questionnaire to a member of 
the similar group / culture, we would probably have similar answers. For example, if the 
McGill medical c1ass would answer this questionnaire tomorrow, or the neonatal staff at 
McGiU, it is likely the answers would be similar. As specified later on, this questionnaire 
was only intended to investigate the target population we identified. For example, we did 
not intend to reflect the opinion of aU physicians in Canada, and therefore its external 
validity (for Canadian physicians, or ofindividuals around the world) is unknown. 
3. Selection of samples, data collection methods and research design 
Anonymous questionnaires were distributed to individuals involved directly or 
indirectly with resuscitation decisions: students, nurses, residents, and physicians in 
pediatrics, obstetrics and adult medicine. Anonymity was assured in order to ensure that 
the respondents would not have any fear of their ideas or opinions being public1y known, 
which should help to reduce selection bias in respondents. The first page of the 
questionnaire was an infonned consent fonn, which, to ensure confidentiality, did not 
require a signature, but a check mark. To avoid the respondents feeling pressured or 
fearing discrimination if they did not answer the questionnaire, they were asked to return 
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it face down at the end of the session. The questionnaire started with demographic 
information, including gender, profession, level of training or years ofpractice, having 
children or not. 
There are multiple ways to do questionnaire studies: one uses random sampling 
techniques, where a random sample is taken to represent the group studied. For example, 
if one wishes to study the opinion of neurologists in Canada, one can randomly select 
neurologists from a list of all the Canadian neurologists, and try to have them answer the 
questionnaire. One can th en apply statistical methods to extrapolate to the hundreds of 
neurologists in Canada, such studies are usually hampered by low response rates, and the 
statistical methods used have to assume that the responses of those who do not respond 
would be the same as those who do. Questionnaires sent by mail usually have only a 40-
60% response rate in the literature, with only rare studies having higher 
rates 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21. 
However, the major bias known as response bias is clearly a serious deficiency 
of such studies. Individuals with strong opinions or a particular interest about the issue 
are more likely to respond to the questionnaire, and are thus likely to skew the results. 
We therefore did not use random sampling techniques. An alternate methodology for 
questionnaire studies is to identify a target group and administer the questionnaire to the 
individuals in the target group, attempting to obtain a very high response rate. When 
response rates are high, the studies are more reliable in terms of accurately reflecting the 
opinions of the target group. The results of studies such as this one can be extrapolated to 
a wider population if the sample is representative, the external validity of su ch studies is 
therefore always debatable. However internaI validity can be assured. Studies without 
internaI validity (such as a postal questionnaire -or any questionnaire- study with a low 
response rate) cannot have external validity. Rather than use random sampling 
techniques, our goal was to ob tain close to 100% representation from our target groups. 
In fact, most questionnaire studies in the related field have proceeded this 
way.22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43 This was the methodology used in a 
previous major study dealing with decision-making in NICUS.28 We therefore proceeded 
to identify target groups, and were able to obtain more than 85% response rate in aIl our 
groups. 
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For example, in our second study, the "physician" target groups selected were 
physicians involved directly or indirectly with acute resuscitation decisions in Montreal, 
McGill university: residents, and physicians in pediatrics, obstetrics and adult medicine. 
We obtained a list of aH the individuals identified to be in the target group, for example a 
list of aH the residents in family medicine at Mc Gill University was obtained from the 
family medicine training pro gram office, a list of aH the obstetricians at the MUHC was 
obtained from the hospital, etc. 
AH the target populations in the two questionnaire studies described in this thesis 
were administered the questionnaire in a similar fashion, from the obstetric resident in 
Quebec City in questionnaire #1, to the anthropology student in questionnaire #2. The 
target populations received the questionnaire and were free to fiH it in the following 
manner: the questionnaire was distributed at the beginning or the end of a group activity 
with the prior authorization of the group leader. For example, it was given to residents at 
a teaching period when the pro gram direct or and the chief resident had agreed, or for 
example at the beginning ofa nurse staff meeting if the nurse in charge consented, or at 
the beginning, the middle, or the end of a c1ass with the permission of the law professor. 
If it was not considered appropriate at the time, a more suitable time was arranged with 
the individuals. The questionnaire was anonymous and participation was voluntary. The 
questionnaire was available in French or English. The questionnaire had to be completed 
individu aH y at that moment and could not be taken home. 
4. Method of statistical evaluation 
The questionnaire answérs were entered on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
Descriptive and non-parametric statistics were used, and analyzed with SPSS software 
(Statistical Package for Social Sciences). The analyses were designed to answer the 
questions posed under the hypotheses for each of the studies. These were addressed with 
the use of Chi-square statistics and multivariate modeling using the SPSS logistic 
regression models. Because a large number of potential statistical comparisons were 
possible, we limited the number of comparisons in order to protect against type 1 errors, 
in addition when the sample sizes were very large and multiple subgroups were compared 
this was only done if the initial p was <0.01. 
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When performing logistic regression analysis we used backward stepwise conditional 
procedures, initialIy ente ring any independent variable which was found on univariate 
testing to be related to the dependent variable with a p-value of less than 0.1, elimination 
of a term from the final model was determined at a probability of 0.1. Results were 
presented as Odds Ratios and their 95% confidence intervals. 
5. Limitations of questionnaire studies 
AlI questionnaire studies have their inherent limitations: opinions may not 
actualIy translate into actions if the respondents were in the specific situation. Deciding 
on paper is very different than having to take a decision for an incompetent patient, but 
there is realIy no other way to know caregivers opinions without placing them in the 
actual situation. Questionnaire studies also raise many hypotheses. The studies presented 
in this thesis do not explain why caregivers think this way, and only alIows us to develop 
hypotheses. For example, in our research, we can explore the actions that caregivers' 
state they would take, but did not explore the ration ale behind sorne ofthese actions, and 
only hypotheses around these issues can be raised. As mentioned the internaI validity of 
our studies is assured by rigorous methodology and a very high response rate, on the 
other hand, it is uncertain how generalizable these results are to other groups, particularly 
those from other countries or cultures. 
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PARTI 
Perceptions and opinions of caregivers: from misinformation to moral distress 
The first two articles presented are the following: 
-Annie Janvier, Sophie Nadeau, Marianne Deschênes, Elise Couture and Keith 
Barrington. Moral distress in caregivers: an NICU experience. J Perinatology; 27: 
p:203-208. 
- Annie Janvier, John Lantos, Marianne Deschênes, Elise Couture, Sophie Nadeau, 
Keith J Barrington. What ifthey knew? Acta Paediatrica (2008) 97: p276-79. 
The research for the first two articles was perforrned at the beginning of my 
training in bioethics, which corresponded to the end of my neonatal fellowship. The 
neonatal intensive care unit is frequently the site of ethically challenging cases, many of 
which center around interventions for the extremely premature infant. The philosophy of 
caring for su ch infants differs between physicians, between hospital centers and between 
physicians working in different countries. During training, it was not rare to hear 
residents say that if they themselves were to be the parent of an extreme preterrn, they 
would deliver in a primary care center to be sure the baby would not be treated, or wou Id 
not survive. A fellow in clinical medicine probably hears many such harsh criticisms of 
decision-making that an attending physician no longer hears. A fellow is still considered 
a medical resident, he is also closer to nursing as he literally almost "lives" in the NICU 
for a couple ofyears, is very frequently on service and is the "first line of defense" for 
most interventions. It was also not rare for residents and nurses to question the ethical 
decisions staff neonatologists made, saying they would decide otherwise were they the 
ones with the ultimate power of decision. As attending physicians, we still hear similar 
comments, but less often, and often voiced differently. Are we going too far? Should we 
let parents decide? These are recurrent themes, but trainees and nurses, when asked to 
voice their opinions during rounds or teaching, are often hesitant. Prior to these studies, 
there were no data in the literature regarding the experiences of medical residents in the 
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NICU, or their opinions regarding resuscÏtation decisions for the extreme1y preterm, 
despite the fact that when a mother arrives at a tertiary hospital in premature labor, she 
will often initially see a nurse and a resident before the attending staff in obstetrics or 
neonatology. Residents and nurses are a very important link in neonatal care, and their 
experiences and their opinions deserved to be known. 
For these reasons, we thought that investigating their opinions about extreme 
prematurity and resuscitation practices was therefore important, rather than focusing 
solely on the opinions of attending physicians. The ai ms of this study were to investigate 
residents and nurses opinions regarding acceptability of interventions for very preterm 
infants. We also wanted to de termine whether ethical confrontation (related to moral 
di stress) was frequent for residents and nurses caring for extremely preterm infants and to 
determine factors associated with it. 1 wrote the questionnaire and the research protocol. 
My collaborators, Sophie Nadeau, Marianne Deschênes and Elise Couture were fellows 
at the same time as me. They helped me identify the target groups and the methodology 
we would use for the questionnaire administration. They helped collect the questionnaires 
and are in great part responsible for the excellent answer rate. Keith Barrington, a 
neonatologist, chief of the NICU at the Royal Victoria Hospital, helped with the design, 
statistics and the data analysis. The results ofthese articles were originally presented in a 
single long article, which was hard to read. John Lantos, a clinical bioethicist and 
pediatrician who has a large experience in publishing articles re1ated to bioethics, helped 
in separating the study in papers that would be more focused and likely to be published, 
and in reviewing the second article for clarity and conciseness. 
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
Moral distress in the neonatal intensive care unit: 
caregivers experience 
AJanvier, S Nadeau, M Deschênes, E Couture and I\J Barrington 
Department of Pediatries, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
Background: Thé Neonatal Intensive Care Llnit (NleU) can be ethically 
charged, whlch can creare chàJJenges for healtlHare workers. 
ObJective: To detennine the frequency with which nurses and residents 
have experienced eÙlical confrontations and what factors are associated 
with' increased frequency. 
Deslgn/Metbods: An anonymous questionnaire was distributed to 
nurses in a university center, a high-risk obstetric service, a matemity. 
haspital NICU with 85% in-bom patients and an outbom NICU, mastof 
whose pretenn admissions are Illose wiÙl surgicaJ complications. Obstetric 
and pediatrie residents in Ùle four universities of the province also 
received the questionnaire, which included demographics, opinions 
regarding Ùle gestalional age threshold al which resuscitation of a 
premature infant with bradycanlia was appropriare, knowledge of cerebral 
paIsy (CP) outcomes (as an indicator of knowledge about long-rerm 
sequelae of prematurity) and questions about elllical confrontation in the 
NICU. 
Results: Two hundred and seventy-nine caregivers participated (I15 full 
time nurses and 164 residents). Ali the distributed questionnaires were 
coinpleted. Frequent ethical confrontation was reported by .~5% of the 
nurses and 19% of the residents. Among the nurses, moral distress differed 
significantly between work environments. Nurses working ln an out-bom 
NICU and obstetric nurses were more likely to overestimale CP prevalenœ 
(Pd.05). Nurses who overestimated CP rates had higher thresholds for 
resuscitation and were more Iikely to experience ethical confrontations. 
Of the residents, 60% were pediatrie and 40% obstetric. AlI groups of 
residents frequently overestimated the prevalence of CP, and knowledge 
differed significanlly by residency program (P<O.05). The residents who 
overestimated CP rates had higher thresholds for resuscitation, had more 
incorrect answers regarding prematurity outcomes and were less likely to 
have ethicaJ confrontations. 
Conclusions: A large proportion of nurses and residents report frequent 
ethicaJ confrontations. Many residents and nurses have limited knowledge 
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of outcomes and high threshold for resuscitatlon. Ethical confrontation is 
more common among nurses with poor knowledge about outcomes, and 
less common ln resldents with poor knowledge about outcomes: 
journal of Perina/%gy advance onllne publication, 15 February 2007; 
doi: IO.1038Isj.jp.721 1658 
Keywords: extreme prematuri~'; neonatal resuscitation; moral distress 
Introduction 
Many caregivers have at times felt that they were caring for a 
patient when it may not have been in the patient's best interests to 
continue aggressive therapy, and have felt that their ethical and 
moral principles were confronted. In this study, we call this 
situation ethical confrontation, which has also been called moral 
distress in the literature. 1 Although attending physicians and 
parents are generally intimately involved in the decision-making 
process, residents and nurses may sometimes feel powerless, having 
to follow through witll care plans and resuscitation decisions even 
when they do not agree that the best decision has been made. 1 
We could find no literature describing the frequency of su ch ethical 
confrontations for residents and nurses involved in the care of 
extremely pretenn infants, nor what influences the frequency of 
such confrontations. 
The neonatal intensive care unit is often the site of ethically 
challenging cases, many of which center around the resuscitation 
and treatment of the extremely premature infant. The philosophy 
of caring for such infants differs between physicians, between 
hospital centers and between physicians working in different 
countries.23 Both physicians and nurses routinely underestimate 
very pretenn infants' survival and chances of a good long-tenn 
outcome, with nurses being more pessimistic than physicians.4,s 
The extent of resuscitation is known to be related to these estimates 
of outcomes,6.7 We were unable to find data about residents' 
opinions on the subject in the literature. When a mother arrives at 
a tertiary hospital in premature labor, she will often initially see a 
nurse and a resident before the attending staff in obstetrics or 
neonatology. Investigating their opinions about extreme 
prematurity and resuscitation practices is therefore important, 
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rather than focusing solely on the opinions of attending physicians. 
Indeed, the accuracy of residents' and nurses' knowledge, their 
opinions regarding resuscitation for extremely premature infants 
and the frequency with which they experience ethical 
confrontations can ail modify the interaction with the health-care 
team and the dynamics with the family. 
The ai ms of this study were to determine whether ethical 
confrontation is frequent for residents and nurses caring for 
extremely preterm infants and to determine factors associated with 
ethical confrontation such as age, sex, the fact of having children, 
experience, religion, center where one works, knowledge of 
neurological long-term outcome and opinions regarding 
acceptabHity of resuscitations at the margins of viability. 
We hypothesized that increased knowledge and experience would 
decrease the frequency of ethical confrontation. We further 
hypothesized that residents in the four programs of the province 
would have similar responses and that having children would modify 
opinions about extremely low birth weight (ELBW) resuscitation. 
Methods 
Between }uly and October 2002, an anonymous questionnaire 
regarding opinions and knowledge related to neonatal resuscitation 
and neurological outcome at and below 28 weeks was distributed to 
groups of residents and nurses. AlI residents in pediatrics and 
obstetrics in the province of Québec, Canada were surveyed. Four 
university centers in Québec have a residency program in Obstetrics 
and Pediatrics: Québec, Sherbrooke, Montréal (Université de 
Montréal and McGiII University). Nurses of the McGiII University 
Health Centre involved in perinatal and neonatal care were also 
questioned; the three groups being delivery room nurses, nurses 
working in a maternity hospital neonatal intensive care unit 
(NI CU), NICU nurses working in a Children's hospital. 
In Québec, 99% of molhers have prenatal care, over 80% of 
extremely premature infants are delivered in tertiary centers and 
receive prenatal betamethasone with approximately 80% of these 
having lime to complete more than 24 h of antenatal steroids. 
Because of the high rate of early ultrasounds in the Canadian 
health care, we are generally fairly confident regarding gestational 
age. The questions in Ihis study are asked in terms of gestation al 
age. The 50th percentile for weight for a male at the following 
gestation al ages are'. 600 g at 23 weeks, 750'g at 24 weeks, 800 g at 
25 weeks, 900 g at 26 weeks, 1000 g at 27 weeks and 1125 at 28 
weeks. The Royal Victoria Hospital is a tertiary care center that has 
close to 4000 deliveries per year and has a maternity NICU with 
approximately 400 admissions per year of mostly inborn infants. 
The Montreal Children's Hospital NICU admits 400 out-born 
infants per year, with most of the preterm infants admitted being 
those who needed surgery or home oxygen: they tend to be sicker, 
have more complex problems and poorer predicted outcomes than 
at the maternity hospital. 
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Respondents filled the questionnaires individually during a 
group activity, for example, teaching for the residents or working 
shifts for nurses where a maximum number of caretakers cou Id 
be reached. The first question was a request for consent, and 
if consent was refused the questionnaire was collected with 
the others at the end of the period. The first page of the 
questionnaire comprised demographic information with age, sex, 
religion, having children or not, residency years or nursing 
experience. 
The questions asked were the following: 
Ethical conjrontation 
During your practice, were yOll confronted with resuscitatingl 
treating with important supporVcaring for extreme premature 
infants against your moral beHefs and values (having no choice to 
do it as a resident/nurse)? 
The possible responses were as folJows: always, generally, 
exceptionally, never. 
For analysis, we grouped those who answered the question 
regarding ethical confrontation as 'always' or 'generally', this is 
referred to as 'frequent ethical confrontation'. 
For the following two questions, we asked the caregivers to 
assume an AGA infant with average risk profiles. 
Threshold of resuscitation jor a pre/erm bradycardie injànt 
At what gestation al age do you think it is reasonable to routinely 
resuscilate (in the delivery room) an apnoeic infant with 
bradycardia? 
The possible responses were 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 or 28 
completed weeks of gestation. 
CP prellCllence 
What is the prevalence of CP in infants born at Jess than 1000 g 
when examined at 5 to 8 years of age? 
The possible responses were: 10, 15, 25 and 40%. 
(CP ranges from 8 to 11% depending on the authors.8- IO 
We accepted 10 and 15% as reasonable responses. Therefore, 50% of 
the answers were considered acceptable). 
Cenler resuscitation pme/iees 
We questioned the neonatal directors of ail four university centers 
in Quebec about their resuscitation practice in 2002 and asked 
their approval for publication. 
/Jlalis/ics 
Descriptive stalistics were used; l test was used to compare 
proportions beLWeen groups. 
Results 
Two hundred and seventy-nine questionnaires were completed; 
there "were no refusais of consent. 
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Residents 
One hundred and sixty-four residents completed the questionnaire. 
Depending on the residency program, 90 to 100% of the residents 
were available during the study period and 100% of those who 
received the questionnaire retumed it completed. Seventy-five 
percent of the residents were female, 60% of the residents were in 
the age range of 25 to 29 years, 57% practiced the same religion 
and a further 31% were atheist. In center B, 36/37 (97%) of 
residents had the same primary language, and 87% practiced the 
same religion. In center C, 27/27 (100%) had the same primary 
language and 7f.f1o practiced the same religion (a further 22% were 
atheist). Center D was culturally more diverse: 15/43 (35%) had 
one primary language, 23% another and 77% spoke a variety of 
other languages, more than five religious groups (and atheist) 
were represented, none representing more than 40% of the 
respondents. 
Nurses 
One hundred and fifteen nurses completed the questionnaire. 
During the study period, 78 to 90% of the full Ume nurses were 
available, depending on the unit, and 100% of nurses who received 
the questionnaire retumed it completed. The number of nurses per 
unît was as follows: oostetrics: n 31, inborn NICU: n 38, 
outborn NICU: n = 46. The nurses working in the out-born NICU 
had fewer years in practice, fewer of them had children and they 
were younger than the other nurses (P<0.05). 
Ethical confrontation 
Thirty-five percent of nurses and 19% of the residents experienced 
frequent ethical confrontation. For both groups, ethical 
confrontation was not associated with religion, level of training or 
years of practice, sex, age and having children or not. 
The proportion of residents who experienced frequent ethical 
confrontation differed substantially between centers (X2, 
Pd.05, Table 1). Thirty-six percent of the pediatrie and obstetrics 
residents at center D frequently experienced ethical confrontation 
compared with, for example, obstetric residents at centers A, B 
and C, and pediatrie residents at center C, where 0 to 6% of 
residents had frequent experience of ethical confrontation 
(Pd.05) ('fable 1). 
A higher proportion of the nurses in the outbom NICU reported 
frequent ethical confrontation (56%), more than the nurses in 
either the inbom NICU or the delivery room (22 and 24%) 
(P<0.05). 
Center resuscitation practices and ethica! confmntalion 
Center A: Twenty three- and 24-week gestation infants are 
resuscitated according 10 parental wishes. In 2002, 60 and 75% of 
infants were resuscitated in the delivery room at 23 and 24 weeks 
(data collected routinely by unit). Nineteen percent of residents had 
frequent ethical confrontations in this center. 
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Table 1 
('fililer Fl'l'ifllelll elbical E,'limClle of CP pretlalence 
confronlalioll 
40% 25% 15% or 10% 
Nurses, out-bom NICl! (%) 56 39 30 29 
Nurses, lnbom NICl! 24 8 29 64 
Nurses, obstetrics 22 6 48 45 
Pediatrie residents. center A 28 4 44 S2 
Pediatrie residents, center B 22 22 6J 17 
Pediatrie l'e5ldents, center C 0 38 31 31 
Pediatrie residents, center D 36 15 26 59 
Obstetric residents, center fi 6 6 44 50 
Obstetric l'e5ldents, center B 6 28 33 39 
Obstetrie residents, center C 0 7 57 36 
Obstetric l'e5idents, center D 25 0 31 69 
Abhreviations: CP. cerebral paIsy; NlCU, l1eonatal intensive care unit. 
Center B: Twenty three-week infants are not offered 
resuscitation, Twenty-four-week infants are resuscitated according 
to parental wishes; a majority of the 24-week babies were 
resuscitated in 2002 according to the unit director (no data 
available). In this center, 13% of residents had frequent ethical 
confrontation. 
Center C: Twenty three- and 24-week gestation infants are not 
offered resuscitation. 
Center D: Twenty three- and 24-week gestation infants are 
resuscitated according to parental wishes. In 2002, 75 and 
100% of 23- and 24-week infants were resuscitated (data collected 
by unit). 
In center C, where 23- and 24-week infants were not offered 
resuscitation, 0% of residents reported they were frequently 
ethically confronted. Fifty-two percent of the residents answered 
they never were ethically confronted. The proportion of residents 
with ethical confrontations was significantly less than in ail the 
other centers (P<0.05). In contras t, in center D where most of the 
23- and 24-week infants are resuscitated, 31% of the residents 
experienced frequent ethical confrontation, significantly higher 
than ail the other centers (P<O.05). 
Among the nurses, 74 and 46% would not resuscitate a 
bradycardie premature infant at 24- and 25-week gestation, 
respectively. Thresholds for resuscitation were much higher for 
the nurses working in the out-born NICU than the nurses in 
eUher the inborn NICU or the delivery room (P<O.05). A higher 
proportion of nurses unwilling to resuscitate at 24 and 25 weeks 
reported frequent ethical confrontation (P<O.05). 
The proportion of respondents who had expetienced frequent 
ethical confrontation differed according ta the gestational age that 
they reported as their threshold for resuscitation. Of residents 
reporting that they exceptionally or never expetienced ethical 
Joulîlâï5ilPerinatology 
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confrontation, significantly fewer were willing to resuscitate; both 
at 24 and 25 weeks (P<0.05). 
OveraIl, 75 and 44% of residents would not resuscitate a 
bradycardic premature infant at 24 and 25 weeks, respectively. The 
threshold for resuscitation differed markedly between centers. 
The proportion of residents willing to resuscitate a bradycardic 
infant at 24 weeks ranged from 0 to 43%; at 25 weeks 22 to 
75%; at 26 weeks 46 to 88% and at 27 weeks 57 to 95% depending 
on where the resident was training (P<0.05). More residents 
believed resuscitation was appropriate at 24 and 25 weeks 
in center D, where the largest proportion of preterm infants 
(<25 weeks) were resuscitated (P<0.05). Fewer pediatric residents 
in center C (where resuscitation is not offered at 23 and 
24 weeks) believed it appropriate to resuscitate a 
bradycardic premature infant at each gestational age 
(P<O.OI). 
The proportion of residents willing to resuscitate a bradycardic 
preterm infant at each week of gestation weeks did not significantly 
change with year of training, age, religion and having children or 
not. Twenty-seven percent of pediatric and 34% of obstetric 
residents expressed a resuscitation threshold of 27 weeks or later. 
Residents who incorrectly thought CP rates were 25% or more 
were less likely to report frequent ethical confrontations (P < 0.05) 
(Table 1). On the other hand, nurses who incorrectly thought CP 
rates were high were more likely to report frequent ethical 
confrontations (P<0.05) (Table 1). 
Residents and nurses were not weIl informed about CP rates in 
ELBW infants (Table 1). Fifty-three percent of residents 
significantly overestimated the prevalence of CP in ELBW 
survivors. In one center, 38% of residents thought the CP rate was 
40%; in another center only 17% of the pediatrics residents 
answered 10 or 15% (Table 1). The accuracy of the response did 
not increase with training, the only variable that was significantly 
different between those with accurate or inaccurate responses 
was center of training (P<0.05). Inaccurate beliefs about CP 
prognosis were correlated with higher thresholds for resuscitation 
(P<0.05). 
Using multiple logistic regression to examine the responses of 
residents, and entering center of training as independent variables, 
incorrect answers regarding CP prevalence and threshold for 
resuscitation (by week of gestation), only center of training was a 
significant predictor of ethical confrontation (P<O.OO1). Further 
analysis within each center of training demonstrated that threshold 
for resuscitation (greater than or less than 25 weeks gestation) was 
associated with ethical confrontation (P<0.05) in centers A, Band 
D, but not in center C. 
Among nurses, years of experience, work unit, incorrect answers 
regarding CP prevalence and threshold for resuscitation were also 
examined in a multiple logistic regression. Work unit and incorrect 
answers regarding CP prevalence were both independently 
associated with ethical confrontation, (P<O.OI). 
Journal of Perioatology 
Conclusion 
Although there are case studies Il and published observations 
describing ethical confrontation lZ•13 or moral distress in nurses in 
perinatal practice, there have been no previous studies describing 
the frequency or associated factors of ethical confrontation in 
residents and nurses treating high-risk preterm infants. We 
have demonstrated that a substantial proportion of these 
health-care providers frequently have such experiences. 
Furthermore, we have confirmed that a substantial number of 
residents and nurses caring for such infants are not weIl informed 
about their outcomes and many would not resuscitate infants 
even at 26 and 27 weeks gestation who have high potential for 
good outcomes.14 Clearly, CP is not the only long-term disability of 
the fomler preterm infant. Developmental delay, leaming 
disabilities, hearing loss, etc. oecur with an elevated frequency 
among these children. The question focused on CP because it is 
consistently and ciearly reported and is relatively stable among 
studies.Z- 4 We felt that this made it a better indicator of knowledge 
than other, probably more important, aspects of impairment in 
these infants. 
Residents with a threshold for resuscitation at a later gestation al 
age were less weil informed about the outcomes and have also 
experienced less frequent ethical confrontation. Also among 
residents, ethical confrontation differed substantially between 
residency programs. The centers that were less likely to offer 
intensive care to very preterm infants were the centers where 
residents were most likely to underestimate the likelihood of a good 
outcome and the same centers where there were less frequent 
reports of ethical confrontation. These centers were also more 
culturally homogeneous, with a much greater proportion of the 
residents speaking the same language at home and reporting the 
Same religious affiliation. In Quebec, aIl the neonatologists are 
active academics and are presumably teaching the residents the 
same information regarding outcomes, but the residents' attitude 
toward the extremely immature infant appears to be affected by the 
culture of their training center. Residents who have not 
participated in caring for a 23- or a 24-week infant during their 
training may believe that the outcomes are so bad that 
resuscitation is not indicated. This is also consistent with the fact 
that residents who incorrectly thought that CP rates were 25% or 
more were less likely to have ethical confrontations. We hypothesize 
that the residents who have rarely seen extremely immature babies 
resuscitated are more likely to assume a bad outcome in aIl such 
infants; in not treating 23- or 24-week infants, or seeing fewer of 
them, a resident will experience fewer deaths in the NICU and less 
complications and thus may weIl experience moral distress less 
frequently. ln center D, where 36% of residents experienced 
frequent ethical confrontation, there is also more cultural diversity. 
Because religion and cultural background can affect health 
decisions, values and resuscitation decisions, having more 
51 
1) 
diversity, may increase tensions between health-care workers who 
may have differing opinions regarding the same case. 
The situation seems to be different among nurses. Only nurses 
in one university health center answered the questionnaire: we 
therefore have no information about nurses from different 
university centers across the province of Quebec and cannot 
compare their opinions as we did with the resident population. On 
the other hand, we can compare the answers from nurses in 
obstetrics and neonatology in two different hospitals in the same 
university center. Nurses who are not well informed about CP rates 
will have a higher threshold for neonatal resuscitation, which is 
similar to the finding among the residents. In contrast, they report 
more frequent ethical confrontation. Fifty-six percent of the 
outbom NICU nurses reported frequent ethical confrontation, and 
93% gave inaccurate answers to the question about CP rates. These 
nurses' experience of premature babies is very largely those 
needing surgery or specialized care in the children's hospital, 
therefore when they treat very immature infants they generally see 
more complications than the matemity hospital nurses. The 
incidence of complications seen by nurses probably has potent 
effects on their views on resuscitation of such infants, their 
knowledge of outcomes and their experience of ethical 
confrontation. We hypothesize that the more the major 
complications are seen, the more nurses have a false impression of 
bad outcomes in ail extremely preterm infants, which leads to a 
higher threshold for neonatal resuscitation. Nurses who experience 
more complications and surgeries in extremely immature infants 
report more ethical confrontation, presumably because they are 
taking care of sicker babies where there are more frequently 
questions about the appropriateness of continuing care. 
We did not ask the residents and nurses about the specific 
circumstances of their ethical confrontations. This should be 
further investigated. It would seem self-evident that improving the 
knowledge base of the residents and nurses with regard to long-
term outcomes of the extremely preterm infant would likely reduce 
sorne unnecessary confrontations. However, among residents, this 
study does not suggest that improving knowledge will decrease 
ove rail ethical confrontations; in fact, the contrary appears to be 
the case. Explicit review of the Iikely outcome of the individual 
immature infant and review of reliable evidence regarding quality 
of Ufe of survivors l5 should also help to put treatment options in 
perspective. 
The manner in which we asked the question regarding ethical 
confrontation was based on our own experience that the majority 
of difficult issues in the NICU arose when the familles wlshed to 
continue care, but members of the NICU team felt it was 
inappropriate. This experience is consistent with recent published 
data from a medical intensive care unit where nurses were far 
more likely to experience moral distress in situations of what they 
felt was 'over-aggressive' care rather than situations of under-
treatment. 16 A recent study in a pediatric context17 also found that 
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about 20 times as many nurses, 15 times as manY house officers 
and 10 times as manY attending physicians agreed with the 
statement, 'Sometimes 1 feel we are saving children who should 
not be saved,' as agreed with the statement, 'Sometimes 1 feel we 
give up on children too soon'. However, if a respondent had 
frequent ethical concems about failure to treat an infant in the 
NICU, they may not have responded that they had frequent 
confrontation. This is a limitation of this questionnaire and the 
contrary experience should be explored in future studies. ln a 
questionnaire study, there will al ways be concems about whether 
the respondents had understood the questions in the same way as 
the investigators. Preliminary drafts of this questionnaire had been 
fel! to be easy to understand when tested on some local 
respondents. 
Is it normal to feel ethically confronted, and should we try to 
reduce ethical confrontation? As noted above, there has been !iule 
prior investigation of the ethical stresses experienced by caretakers 
in perinatology. Studies examining ethics, prematurity and 
resuscitation have generally focused on parental decisions and 
physicians' knowledge, opinions and values, but not on ethical 
confrontation as such. ln other fields also, the frequency with 
which health-care workers and trainees experience ethical 
confrontations are unclear. 16,18 Medical and nursing training and 
practice are often difficult, residents or nurses may also participate 
in procedures or resuscitations about which they have major 
reservations in other domains of practice. For example, ethical 
confrontations may be experienced by residents and nurses in the 
setting of performing liver transplantation in alcoholic patients, 
bariatric surgery, aesthetic surgery, prolonged and aggressive 
therapy after multiple relapses in oncology patients, intensive 
resuscitation of elderly patients with poor functioning, etc. ln our 
health-care center, residents and nurses in obstetrics -are not 
cornpelled to participate in pregnancy tem1inations if they do not 
wish to, but this Iimited right of non-participation is not extended 
to other areas of practice. The management of a health-care system 
would become impossible if every health-care trainee or 
practitioner was permitted to examine each case c10sely before 
deciding whether to participate in the care of the patient. Instead, 
we have to have a team approach, trusting that those most 
intimately involved are trying to make the best decisions based on 
the most complete understanding of the clinical situation and the 
desires of the patients (or their parents). This is essential in order 
that the system can function. This is bound to lead to situations 
where ethical confrontations occur, as part of a team providing 
care about which each member has their own ethical opinions 
regarding health, treatment options, autonomy and the value 
placed on Iife. Thus, eliminating ethical confrontations may be 
neither possible nor even desirable. Our data did not address 
whether nurses or residents would prefer to be able to withdraw 
from giving care in a greater proportion of cases. Ethical dilemmas 
such as these may lead to some of the symptoms of bum-out. 19 
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We speculate that further investigation of the se issues, and finding 
ways to support staff who are affected,20 may help to reduce staff 
turnover and improve staff satisfaction even if ethical confrontation 
cannot be avoided. 
Our data are consistent with an interpretation that ethical 
confrontations are more frequent in societies that are more 
pluralist and multicultural. Thus, populations that are more 
homogeneous in their be\iefs may have more infrequent experience 
of ethical confrontation; our results showed that in centers B and 
C, with the least cultural variability as determined by the limited 
demographic information we collected, there were the least 
frequent reports of ethical confrontation. This may reflect less 
variability in value systems, but does not necessarily mean that the 
practices are more ethically appropriate. 
Our study also showed that residents and nurses who are 
inaccurately pessimistic regarding outcomes rates had a higher 
threshold for resuscitation. This was also previously shown in a 
study examining the understandings and practices of 
pediatricians? In contrast with previous work, we did not find the 
nurses to be less interventionist than physicians, although 
that previous study questioned attending staff rather than 
residents.6 Although resuscitation and treatment of infants at 
extremely low gestation al age is fraught with controversy and 
divergent opinions have been expressed, there has been little prior 
investigation of how groups of trainees and nurses are affected by 
the situation. 
In summary, we wished to investigate the ethical experiences of 
nurses and residents involved in neonatal care because ethical 
confrontations can affect the morale of the health-care team and 
interfere with the provision of high-quality care. Further studies 
will be required to find ways to equip trainees and health-care 
workers with the tools to exanline these confrontations, to learn 
From these difficult situations and thus to profit from them. 
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Objective: To compare caregivers' attitudes towards the resuscitation of a premature infant if they are 
only told the infant's gestational age or if they are only given prognostic information for infants at that 
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Design/methods: Residents and nurses involved in perinatal care were asked whether they would 
resuscitate a depressed AGA 24-week gestation infant at birth. In another question they were asked 
whether they would resuscitate a depressed preterm infant with a 50% chance of survival, knowing 
that of those who survived, 500/0 would have a development 'within normallimits', 20-25% a 
serious handicap and 40% with behavioural and/or learning disability. 
Results: Two hundred and seventy-nine caregivers responded (91 % response rate). In the scenario 
that only presented gestational age, 21 % of respondents wou Id resuscitate. In the scenario that only 
presented prognostic statistics, 51 % of respondents would resuscitate CP < 0.05). 
Conclusions: Providers of perinatal health care respond to vignettes differently depending upon the format in 
which information is provided. The relative unwillingness to resuscitate a baby of 24-week gestation is surprising 
since outcomes for such babies are the sa me or better than those we described in the scenario that provided 
only outcome data without specifying gestation al age. Two explanations are possible: (1) respondents have 
irrational negative associations with low gestation al ages or (2) respondents are unaware of actual outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous opinions are expressed about the appropriate-
ness of providing support for an extremely immature infant 
(1). The attitudes of health care providers regarding 
resuscitation of the extremely preterm infant affect inter-
vention decisions (2,3), and these attitudes are often based 
on a po or understanding of outcomes (4). When a mother 
arrives at a tertiary hospital in premature labour, she may 
weil see the nurse and the resident or fellow in the delivery 
room first, then frequently the attending obstetrician or ma-
ternai fetal medicine specialist, and then possibly the neona-
tal te am if a consult to neonatology is requested. Little is 
known about the residents' knowledge and perceptions of 
ethical issues surrounding prematurity. Opinions of the 'first 
line' caregivers are important as these perceptions can di-
rectly influence who gets to see the neonatal team in order 
to consider resuscitation, and the 'tone' of the perinatal en-
vironment where parents are, which could also affect the 
parents' perceptions and informed consent. We wondered 
whether caregivers considered resuscitation of an extreme 
preterm reasonable at 24 weeks, and whether their opin-
ion would change if they were presented with the actual 
outcomes. 
THE AIM/QUESTIONS OF THIS STUDY WERE 
1. What are caregivers' attitudes towards the resuscitation of 
a premature infant at 24-week gestation? 
2. If they were given an accurate prediction of Iikely out-
come: would a higher proportion resuscitate the same 
baby? 
METHODS 
Between July and October 2002, we surveyed residents and 
nurses about resuscitation decisions that they would make 
for premature babies, and their knowledge of outcomes. 
The following respondents received an anonymous question-
naire: 
1. Residents: Ali 172 residents in paediatrics and obstetrics 
in the province of Québec, Canada. 
2. Nurses: One hundred and thirty-six nurses of the McGiII 
University Health Centre (MUHC, Montreal) involved in 
perinatal and neonatal care: delivery room nurses, nurses 
working in the maternity hospital and the Children's 
Hospital. 
The questionnaire was filled individually by respondents 
during a group activity where a maximum number of care-
takers could be reached, for example, residents' teaching or 
a nursing shift. The first question was a request for consent, 
and if consent was refused the questionnaire was collected 
with the others at the end of the period. The questions asked 
were the folJowing. 
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'IlIble 1 Description of respondents 
Nurses Residents 
n 115 165 
Age 25-30 (0/0) 15 60 
Age 31-40 (0/0) 38 17 
Junior res (%) X 47 
Nurse <: 5 years experience (Ofo) 23 X 
Nurse> 10 years experienœ (%) 47 X 
Children, yes (DIo) 63 19 
RESUSCITATION OF A 24-WEEK DEPRESSED INFANT 
Do you think it is reasonable to resuscitate (in the delivery 
room) an AGA depressed infant at 24-week gestation? 
The possible responses were: always, generally, exception-
ally, never. 'Always and generally' were counted as positive 
answers. 
HYPOTHETICAL INFANT 
There is an impending delivery of a preterm infant with a 
50% predicted survival and a long term outcome as follows 
if the baby survives: 
1. 50% development 'within normallimits' 
2. 20-25% serious handicap rate 
3. 40% with behavioural and/or learning disability 
4. Do you think such baby, if born depressed, should be 
aggressively resuscitated in the delivery room? 
The possible responses were: always, generally, exception-
ally, never. 'Always and generally' were counted as positive 
answers. 
This question regarding a hypothetical newborn infant did 
not mention the gestational age in the scenario. The sur-
vival rate, and the probabilities of long-term disability were 
designed to conservatively reflect the actual chances of an 
infant delivered at 24-week gestation in a Canadian tertiary 
care centre (5-11). 
RESUlTS 
Two hundred and seventy-nine questionnaires were 
completed; there were no refusais of consent. In total, the 
response rate, calculated as a percentage of ail possible 
respondents in the target groups, was 91%. 
One hundred and seventy-three residents were in train-
ing in pediatrics and obstetrics in 2002. Of these, 165 were 
received the questionnaire (95%) and 100% of these com-
pleted it. One hundred and thirty-six full-time nurses worked 
in perinatology at the MUHC in 2002. One hundred and tif-
teen nurses (85%) received the questionnaire ofwhich 100% 
completed it. The demographic characteristics of the study 
population are shown in Table 1. (Gender, age, years of train-
ing/experience as a nurse, children of their own.) Residents 
were younger than nurses, fewer of them had children and 
fewer were female (p < 0.05). 
Fifty-eight respondents (21%) would always or generally 
resuscitate a depressed preterm infant at 24 weeks. The pro-
portion of nurses and residents who would resuscitate a 24-
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week infant was similar (17 and 23%, respectively). One 
hundred and forty-two (51%) of caregivers would always 
or generally resuscitate the infant in the scenario that only 
presented prognostic statistics, significantly more th an the 
24-week infant (p < 0.01, difference between groups 30%, 
95% confidence intervals, 22-37%). Nurses would resusci-
tate the infant without a stated gestational age less than res-
idents (38% versus 57%, p < 0.05, difference 13%, 95% CI 
2-24%), but they would still resuscitate him/her significantly 
more than the 24-week infant (see Fig. 1, P < 0.01, differ-
ence 21 % 95% CI 10-31%). Only 5% of respondents would 
resuscitate the 24-week infant and not the infant without a 
stated gestation al age, 15% of respondents would resuscitate 
both infants. 
Within the subgroups of residents from each university 
and the subgroups of nurses working in their different units, 
ail groups were less likely to intervene for the infants with 
a known gestational age of 24 weeks than for the infants 
without a stated gestational age. 
DISCUSSION 
This questionnaire is one of many surveying opinions of 
caregivers surrounding neonatal resuscitation; it is unique 
because it includes the opinions of residents. When par-
ents arrive in a university centre, they will usually see nurses 
and residents in obstetrics before the attending staff, and the 
same may be true for the neonatal consult. These caregivers 
may weil 'set the tone' for treatment decisions in these diffi-
cult situations. 
We were able to distribute the questionnaire to 95% of 
residents and 85% of nurses in our target groups, and 100% 
of those who received the questionnaire answered it: this is 
a high response rate for a questionnaire study which pre-
sumably reflects the interest of the topic to the residents and 
nurses working with this population and their desire to state 
their opinion. 
Only 21% of respondents wçlUld resuscitate a preterm at 
24-week gestation. This study showed that many of the re-
spondents said they would not resuscitate, but did not inves-
tigate their reasoning. ls it because of the uncertain future 
of these babies, and a belief that withholding care is easier 
th an withdrawing care? ls it because the respondent believes 
that many of the surviving infants have a life that is so lim-
ited that it is not worth living? Is it more of an emotional 
response to the foetus at 24 weeks that looks barely human? 
A decision to withhold resuscitation in this situation is gen-
erally considered to be ethically appropria te, and is in accor-
dance with the current position statement of the CPS which 
does not mandate resuscitation of these babies. In contrast 
with previous work (12), we did not find the nurses to be 
less interventionist then physicians, although previous stud-
ies investigating this questioned attending staff rather than 
residents. 
The residents and students were from four different uni-
versities in Quebec with different policies regarding re-
suscitation. Ranging from a more interventionist approach 
to very restrictive practices at 24 weeks. We have shown 
in another publication that the residents' attitudes and 
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El24 week preterm 
.Gestation not given 
FIgure 1 Percentage of respondents replying that they would always or generally resuscitate a preterm baby known to be a 24-week infant compared to an infant 
with outcomes described but no gestational age given. 
knowledge regarding outcome varied according to where 
they were trained, those working in a centre which resus-
citated most infants at 24 weeks thought their outcomes 
were better, and were accordingly more willing to resusci-
tate than the residents being trained where resuscitation was 
not offered at that gestation (13). The nurses' attitudes also 
reflect their personal experiences of very preterm infants; 
nurses working in an outborn, mostly surgical, NI CU were 
much more negative about preterm infants, both in terms of 
their estimates of outcomes and their willingness to inter-
vene, presumably as they see only those with complications. 
Nevertheless, in the current project, within the subgroups of 
residents from each university and the subgroups of nurses 
working in their different units, al! groups were less Iikely 
to intervene for the infants with a known gestation al age of 
24 weeks than for the hypothetical case. This shows that, re-
gardless of the underlying ethos of the centre, the very fact 
of being known to be very preterm is considered a negative 
characteristic, warranting a different approach. 
There are c1early disagreements regarding how to make 
decisions for patients who need acute intervention and who 
are not capable of deciding for themselves. Whether age 
or disability among survivors or potential life years gained 
should be considered relevant is not universally agreed 
( 14,15). 
The opinions of caregivers about outcomes are a leading 
cause of rnortality for infants born at <27 weeks. In sorne 
centres, resuscitation of the 24-week infant is not encour-
aged and their survival can be said to be 0%, others publish 
survival rates of 84% (16-18). Thus the survival rate may vary 
from 0 to 84% largely due to the opinions and attitudes of 
the decision makers. Respondents were more likely to want 
to resuscitate the hypothetical preterrn but not the 24-week 
infant, even though in tertiary care centres in Canada the 
survival rate at 24 weeks is substantially better th an that de-
scribed in the hypothetical case, being currently 72% (11). 
Systematic review of large numbers of infants reported at 
extremely low gestation al age also shows that our presented 
long term outcomes were also reasonable, not to say con-
servative (9). Many caregivers who would not resuscitate a 
24-week infant believed it to be reasonable to resuscitate an 
infant having a 50% survival with 50% having an outcome 
'within normallimits'. Differences in attitudes between the 
hypothetical case and the 24-week infant suggest respon-
dents either have irrational negative associations with low 
gestation al ages or that they are rational but unaware of ac-
tuaI outcomes. Even with the outcomes explicitly described, 
only half of respondents would resuscitate when the out-
comes are stated to be a 50% survival and 50% 'normal' 
outcome. We wonder if our respondents would give the sarne 
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answers if the hypothetical case had been an older child with 
other childhood pathologies with similar prognoses, such as 
a comatose child after penetrating head trauma, or severe 
bacterial meningitis in early infancy; research which we have 
published in preliminary form suggests that they would be 
much more likely to institute intensive care for the older 
child (19). 
This is a questionnaire study that has multiple limitations. 
We do not know if opinions would translate into actions 
were the resident were in the specific situation, but the sur-
vey method is used to determine attitudes rather than pre-
dict actual actions. In any case the final decision regarding 
resuscitation is usually made by the staff physicians and fam-
ilies. However, it is important to know the opinions of the 
caregivers who often have the first contact with families in 
this situation. The wording of the two scenarios was slightly 
different, which complicates the interpretation of the results 
somewhat, however other questionnaires that we have per-
formed also show a consistently negative approach to the 
very preterm infant, which is out of proportion to the prog-
nosis; respondents are much more likely to wish to intervene 
for other infants with an identical prognosis who are more 
mature or slightly older (20). Those findings are consistent 
with the results presented herein: the unwillingness to inter-
vene for extremely preterm infants is out of proportion to 
their prognosis. 
This research project has demonstrated that if caregivers 
knew the outcomes of an infant, as opposed to only being 
told the gestation al age, significantly more would wish to 
resuscitate infants at 24-week gestation. This reflects the 
need for more education about outcomes in neonatology. 
Reviewing outcomes of ELBW infants with good quality in-
formation could help to put treatment options in perspec-
tive. Discussions regarding individual cases in the neona-
tal intensive care unit using good quality relevant evidence 
may also help to improve knowledge and assist residents and 
nurses in providing the best care and the best information to 
families. 
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PARTH 
The principle of best interest and the value of life of neonates 
In an emergency situation, resuscitation of patients is often performed without 
obtaining explicit consent, which is assumed unless documentation of a previous decision 
is available. At other times, informed consent would be obtained because there is 
sufficient time to have a discussion with the patient or his representatives. Because of the 
constraints oftime and the urgency of the situation, patients with potential brain in jury 
may receive active resuscitation in circumstances that might otherwise be considered 
questionable. In such an emergency context, and even when time is limited, the risk-
benefit ratio of the intervention has to be analyzed. Is it probably not always reasonable 
to resuscitate a patient, nor to proceed to starting intensive care. For the majority of 
individuals there are outcomes that would not justify Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation 
(CPR). However, there are numerous opinions on where, and how, to draw the line. Sorne 
authors have written about futility of treatment, when a treatment does not work, or when 
the outcome does notjustify a treatment. J,2,3,4,5,6 There is sorne agreement that a physician 
does not have to initiate CPR when it is futile, but both the definition of futility, and the 
prediction of outcomes to determine if intervention would indeed be futile, are uncertain 
or subjective. In consequence CPR is often initiated in emergency situations.7,S,9,10 For 
extremely premature infants, physicians will· generally consult with the parents and obtain 
consent before intervening. In 1994, the Canadian Paediatric Society (CPS) 
recommended that resuscitation onder a GA of25 weeks be done only with informed 
consent of the parents. Physicians would inform parents and they would in tum, decide 
what is the best avenue oftreatment for their children. Ideally, the decision-making 
process between the caregivers and the family of the incompetent patient goes smoothly. 
In reality, as in many areas ofhuman endeavour, opinions are often divergent when is 
cornes to resuscitation of patients with potential brain injury or with very reduced 
lifespan. 
For incompetent patients with no advanced directives, surrogates are expected to 
use the patient's best interest as the guiding principle for decision-making. II ,12 
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Treatments are considered to be in patients' best interests when the benefits of an 
intervention outweigh risks and burdens. In addition, however, ifthe caregivers believe 
"that the designated surrogate threatens the patient's best interests, the decision should be 
overridden"; such overriding of family decision-making has been supported in the 
courtS. I1 ,I3,!4 If resuscitation is considered to be in an incompetent patient's best interest, 
and significant hann is caused by not intervening (such as when failure to intervene will 
lead to death), refusaI of care is generally not accepted, neither according to many ethical 
thinkers, nor by the courts. 
This study was designed to see if the best interest was respected for decision-
making for incompetent patients of aIl ages. The medicalliterature abounds with articles 
of authors' opinions regarding futility, resuscitation decisions, and allocation of 
resources. There is a scarcity ofknowledge when it cornes to the comparison of opinions 
regarding resuscitation at different ages of life. The research and literature treat the 
geriatric population and the extreme premature infants as two separate groups. Should 
every individual be treated the same way ifthey have the same neurological outcome and 
the same survival? 
The 2 articles presented in part II are the following. They are based on the same 
questionnaire study, with the same participants: 
-Annie Janvier, Isabelle Leblanc and Keith J Barrington. The best interest 
standard is not applied for neonatal resuscitation decisions. Pediatrics, vol 121, 
Number 5, May 2008, p:I-7 (Galleys included in thesis). 
-Annie Janvier, Isabelle Leblanc and Keith J Barrington. Nobody likes premies. 
Accepted by J Perinatology December th 2007, to be published in May 2008. 
The objective ofthis questionnaire study was to determine opinions about 
resuscitation at different ages of life and resource allocation for resuscitation decisions 
and admission to the leu. When do caregivers and students in both medical and non-
medical fields judge it is reasonable to resuscitate patients at high risk of neurological 
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sequelae? In terms of public health and resource expenditure, which patients should be 
prioritized? Resuscitation decisions and patient selection for scarce resources demand 
that we place a relative value on human lives. Likelihood of survival, likely outcomes, 
pre-existing handicap, and age can aIl influence which patient will be given the highest 
priority. Does age make a difference: are premature infants, newbom children, children, 
adults and an elderly viewed in a similar manner when it cornes to resuscitation for life 
threatening and potentially handicapping events? 
1 designed this questionnaire study while 1 was a neonatal attending physician, in 
my early years of practice, and at the end of my course load in bioethics. l wrote the 
research protocol and the questionnaire study. Keith Barrington helped me do the 
numerous corrections for it to finally be accepted to the IRB, one year after its 
submission. Keith Barrington has also helped in the statistical analysis of the results and 
edited the articles. Isabelle Leblanc is a family physician with training in anthropology 
and literature. Medically, she has specialized in palliative care at the end of life and in 
neonatal and paediatric care. She helped me define the target groups, specially relating to 
students and residents. She is partly responsible for the high rate of response we had for 
this questionnaire. 
The goal of this questionnaire was to determine whether we place a different 
value on the lives ofneonates compared to oIder individuals. It seemed to me that 
neonates were not treated like older patients, and that the y were perhaps morally different 
from older patients. Even.though 1 have dedicated my professional career to the care of 
the newbom, the way 1 reacted to their deaths was different to my reactions to the death 
of an older child. Being a physician gives us an invaluable opportunity to do ongoing 
"qualitative fieldwork". By speaking to hundreds of parents, sorne ofthem with disabled 
children, sorne of them with healthy babies or mouming their dead children, one can 
learn a lot ev en without transcribing, co ding and categorizing information. Generally, the 
decision-making process for these families was different to the decision-making 
processes that 1 had experienced as a resident for older children with similar degrees of 
critical illness. While many physicians sense this as being true, it is not described in the 
literature, nor is there empirical evidence to support this perception. My published 
articles only present data from 524 respondents. Since then, we have proceeded to 
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administer the questionnaire to many Quebec specialists (geriatricians, oncologists, 
neurosurgeons, etc ... ), to aIl Canadian neonatologists, and to students in their last year in 
medicine, anthropology, and law. We now have more than 1000 questionnaires, with a 
response rate over 85%. Interestingly, the results in the following 2 articles are very 
similar to the results we have subsequently generated from the other groups that are not 
part ofthese articles. This study has aiso started in other countries: Saudi Arabia, Ireland, 
Holland, Norway and the US. We will have to wait to see if the relative devaluation of 
neonates that we have found in our population is also present in other countries and 
cultures. 
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If resuscitalion is considere<! to be in an in'competent patient's best Interest and signif-
icant harm would be caused by not intervening, then refusai of care is generally not 
accepted, either ethlcally or legally. . 
Whether resuscitation is considered in a patienrs best interests is not ciosely related to 
survival rates or dlsability. Newborn infants and partlcularly preterm Infants are system-
~tically d~alued, compared with older patients whose outcomes are the same orworse. 
ABSTRACT ------------------------------------------------------------------------
OBJECTIVE. Legal and ethical standards require resuscitation when it is considered to be 
in the patient's best interest. We hypothesized that newbom infants might be dealt 
with according to different standards, compared with older patients. 
METHODS. An anonymous questionnaire describing 8 currently incompetent patients 
with potential neurologie sequelae who required resuscitation was administered to 
groups of physieians and students. Respondents were asked whether resuscitation 
was in the patient's best interest and whether !hey yvo~Idçomp!y with the families' 
wishes if resuscitation was refused. ..,:" " ~. \', ,'.", 
RESULTS. There was an 85 % response ~ate o,(~~ ."52~):~'.The" largest ::~i~P9rtions of 
respondents stated that it was in the bês('i~üei'es1s,.ôtfp.e ~"illontli-old.lnfant and the 
7-year-old child to be resuscitatéd(9'7,a/t,~rli:l'.94%;: respe~tively):; (ollowed "b,y the 
50-year-old patient and the term inf~ii((87_°,la), the;2 patients with:S% 'chan'ce of 
survival (76% and 80%), the,'prematù'ëe lrifan((69%); 'iùîa finally-th~ ~O-ye~.r-old 
, ,", 'v ~ ~, , " ~'9.A, ' 
patient (32%). Approximately one fiftn·of the resIlondents' who thought that it Was 
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in a patient's best interests te> be !esu'i~tated/wo.~Jd:!IevnÙieles~ accept ttii.familY's 
refusai of resuscitation for àll sceilàrios excejit·thé:8ci"y~ar=(;i(l,paiient (12%0' acceptance) and the preterm infant 
(54% acceptance). •. ". ;/, .. " . .f,;,.,:~;;~ .~. '" " ;"'<;. ' .. " ' J ; 
CONCLUSIONS. Whether resuscitation is:i~onsidered in::ï'~ati~~t:s best interests is not èlosely related to survival rates or 
disability. Newbom infants ~nd partlcùlarly preterill irifarits.are systemâtic~lly devalued, in comparison with older 
. h. l' " 0"·' Co >" 
patients whose outcomes are the samè or worse.AcceiHinga fàmily's refùsal of resuscitation, even among respon-
dent,s who thought that resuscitation wasinthe.pittienes bestinteres('was much more common for the newboms. 
. ' .:" ... '" " . ' )' , ': . . "~ -' .' . 
. ~' ,:.~-/.;;~.;.I(>:t' ,:,IL:.>; ;~~.; ~~:<:~, ".- " 
TECHNOLOGIC PROGRESS HAS increased the limlts'ofmedièine and enables many patients to survive or to prolong their lives. Sorne life-threateningeverÙs, fbr exârnl)I~'mêni4gitis; trauma, and asphyxia, can lead to potentially 
serious neurologie sequelae and ta complex decision'-makiri'g)nvolving withholding or withdrawal of care. For 
incompetent patients, these decisions are often made'bya surrogate, most often a family member. 
ldeally, the decision-making process involving the caregivers and the family of the incompetent patient proceeds 
smoothly. In reality, individu al intefPretations of risks, benefits, and outcomes can vary depending on religious 
beliefs, cultural factors, and ages. When controversies and disagreements exist and the patient has left neither 
advanced directives nor evidence of any preferences, the patient's surrogate, usually a family member, is consulted. 
Surrogates are expected to use the patient's best interest as the guiding principle for decision-making.1.2 Treatments 
are considered to be in patients' best interests when the benefits of treatment outweigh the risks and burdens. 
lndirectly, the value of the life of the patient is judged during decision-making. If the caregivers think "that the 
designated surrogate threatens the patient's best interests, the decision should be overridden,"l and such overriding 
of family decision-making has been supported in the courtS,U,4 If resuscitation is considered to be in an incompetent 
patient's best interest and significant harm would be caused by not intervening, then refusai of care generally is not 
accepted, either ethieaUy or legally. We wished to determine whether the same decision-making process would be 
foUowed for preterm and term infants as for older patients and whether decisions are made on the basis of outcomes 
or according to other criteria. The goals of this study were to describe how different groups of educated individuals 
valued patients' best interests, to determine whether survival, disability, poor neurologie prognosis, and age affected 
these estimates, and to de termine whether the best-interest principle is generally followed (ie, if resuscitation is 
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"?","""'\-""'+'!f1 • ;,~!~~~~~X\ Probabillty of Outcomes for Each of the 8 Patient 
Scenarios 
Age of Patient 
24-wk prelerm 
Term 
2mo 
7y 
14y 
35y 
SOy 
Previous 
Disability 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
NA lndlcate5 no! appllcable, 
Survfval 
50 
50 
50 
50 
5 
5 
50 
50 
Probability, % 
Normal Qutcome 
Among Survivors 
50 
50 
50 
o 
80 
o 
50 
o 
New Major 
Disability 
2S 
25 
25 
50 
20 
100 
25 
50 
considered to be in the best interest of an incompetent 
patient, then how often would family demands to with-
hold care be accepted?). 
vere trauma, including head in jury, resulting from a car 
accident. If these patients survived, 50% would be with-
out disability and 25% severely impaired. Two other 
patients were previously disabled, namely, a 7-year-old 
patient with multiple disabilities (cerebral paisy, deaf-
ness, learning disability, and hyperactivity) and new 
head trauma and an 80-year-old patient with substantial 
disability from dementia and a new stroke. Both patients 
were noted to have a 50% predicted chance of survival 
and, if they survived, a 50% chance of having additional 
disability. Two patients were described as having only a 
5% chance of survival, that Is, a 14-year-old patient with 
acute myeloid leukemia with central nervous system 
involvement, with a 20% risk of disability in case of 
survival, and a 35-year-old patient with brain cancer 
with a 100% risk of disabiIity with treatment. 
The patients were presented in order from the young-
est to the oldest. After each patient description, the 
following questions were asked. (1) Do Vou think intu-
bating, resuscitating, and consulting intensive care for 
admission is in the patient's best interest? (2) If the 
METHODS parents/family asked Vou not to resuscitate, would Vou 
Between February 2005 and January 2006, we admin- respect their decision? (3) If the patient was your childl 
istered an anonymous questionnaire to physicians at partner, would Vou wish the physician to intuba te, to 
McGill University HeaIth Center who were invplved ,in" resuscitate, and to consult intensive care for admission? 
resuscitation decisions. The same questio~é\!ië"l'Yas ad", '(4fif-th~ patient was your sibling's or good friend's 
ministered to university students in diffèrentat~éipHn~§,:·"ièhild/par!nerand he or she had a few minutes to con-
including law, anthropology, bioethks; "an~'f!J~dJ~~"::';;f;~i,Qtr.\~èAecisio~ and asked for your opinion, would Vou 
Students in Jaw, me di cine, and anthropo!ogYèwêré'first- ,r;!re'i:orruiteJ1cl that',the physician intubate, resuscitate, and 
t ,," "" l '.... .". <.. ,~ • > _' ~ 
year students at McGill Unive,rsity. Tn~ ibiOethjcs sFu~ '""consulr'tn~<;risive:qlre for admission? (5) If the patient 
dents were postgraduate studenis àt/th~,Uiùversity' of l\-vere you:and' yoi.cwere able to decide, would you want 
Montreal. For the target groups of respÇjndents, our goal th~ physician ,t,? ihnlt>ate, to resuscitate, and to consult 
was to have >80% participation fro1Jlthe full.tilTle:î)hJ:~' ;)ntensive care '!or adfnission? (The last question was 
si cians and from the students. /i}f', ':4(~, I.:.,~k~d' only for ,s,cenàrlos in which the hypothetical pa-
Questionnaires were adniinisterêd}puringa'grôtj~;ac?tiehts'>re~e adults.) Eor each of these questions, respon-
tivity where a maximal numoer of(irespondents,'frdm';. "dents could respond.on a Likert scale, with the following 
each target group could be reached~such as a resia~iÏ'tl::.::\':,Ôptions: always, ge'nera lly, exceptionally, or never. Al-
student teaching session or',a staff 'meeting, for .physt- :3':ways and generally w:'ére counted positive answers. 
'i "" ~ ';, ~~"'. _.,', , .... ~ '-~ ';'r; , .. , !"t'\.. '. ~. f 
cians. We obtained the authorization of t)1e'gro~p:!ead~r,:Ç,Pr0I!ortiop:s'werecompared by using the ;f test with 
belore distributing the queStionnair~.a:nd,':Y~,<lt.t~rl9.e~'a~,:",Y,é;l~~s,",çprr,!-!Stion; P"values of >.01 are reported as not 
group activity that was most cdnvenierit, foçàU'respo!l'-"';.signifi,çant/I:o Jimit the number of comparisons and to 
dents. The first question was a req~~s't'f~r èbns~n.t;ilfi~6~·:~~"'-~~?l~Çt~a~_ài~~i'nfpe 1 errors, i~ addition to limiting ~he 
sent was refused, then the queStlOnn"alre w;as.'col1ec:te~-,' .. ,cntlfa~ P val,!e for each comparlSon to ,01, the followmg 
blank with the others at the end of the Refioqi The ~rst . arialy~ês ~ere performed. For each of the questions, we 
page of the questionnaire contained demogràphic jnformâ- "compared the proportions answering always or generally 
tion (ie, gender, work environment, occupation, residency' . for the 8 patients with a single ;f test and examined com-
years, and having children or not). The questionnaires parisons between scenarios only when the overall ;f was 
were completed individually and could not be ta ken home. significant at P < .01. Similarly, in comparisons of re-
Eight scenarios of currently incompetent, critically il! sponses between groups of respondents for a particular 
patients with potential neurologie sequelae were pre- question, the overall ,y2 had to be significant at P < ,01 
sented. Ali arrived in the emergency department of a before individual groups were compared. This study was 
university health center when a family member cannot approved by the McGill University institutional review 
be immediately consulted. The patients were of different board. 
ages, and their outcomes were explicitly described; gen-
der or other social information (such as marital status) RESULTS 
was not provided (Table 1). 
There were 4 patients with a 50% chance of survival, 
that is, a premature infant at 24 weeks of gestation who 
has just been delivered, an infant just born at term with 
a known brain malformation, a 2-month-old infant with 
bacterial meningitis, and a 50-year-old patient with se-
2 JANVIER et al 
Study Groups 
A total of 615 individuals were in our target groups; 527 
received the questionnaire, with 524 respondents (re-
sponse rate: 85% of the target groups and 99% of par-
ticipants) (Table 2). Ali groups had similar response 
64 
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~::tK~ijg(2~; Description of Respondents 
Total Students Physicians Residents Staff 
Members 
Target group, n 615 417 198 86 112 
No, reached 527 359 168 72 96 
No, answered 524 357 167 72 95 
Respanse rate, % 85 86 84 84 85 
Female, % 53 52 55 61 51 
Have children, % 22 9 50 28 67 
Junior resident, % NA NA NA 56 NA 
<5 y of practice, % NA NA NA NA 30 
Response rate desCribes those in the target group who filled in the questionnaire, Total respon-
dents include balh sludents and phySicians, The physioan glOup includes residents and staff 
members, 
to be resuscitated (P < .001 in eomparison with ail other 
patients). Finally, the smallest proportion of respondents 
estimated that it was in the best interests of the 80-year-
old patient to be resuscitated (32%; P < .001 in com-
parison with ail other patients) (Fig 1). 
If It Were Vour Own Child, Partner, or Sibling 
The proportions desiring resuscitation for their own 
ehild, partner, and sibling were almost identieal and 
were not signifieantly different from the proportions 
thinking it to be in the patient's best interest to be 
resuscitated. Most groups of respondents wanted resus-
citation for their preterm infant signifieantly less than for 
ail other ehildren, with neonatologists being exceptions 
(92%, same as for other infants). Ethies students wanted 
to resuscitate their own ehild, partner, or sibling less 
than ail other groups for ail scenarios (P < .01) except 
for the 80-year-old patient, for whom the responses 
were not signifieantly different. 
If It Were Vou 
The respondents wanted resuscitation for themselves in 
smaller proportions than for their partner or sibling for 
rates. Fewer students than physicians had ehildren (P < 
.0001). Of the 357 student respondents, 107 were in 
law, 88 in anthropology, 139 in medicine, and 23 in 
bioethies. Of the 95 attending staff members, 32 were 
in family medicine, 23 in obstetrics, 12 in neonatology, 
and 28 in emergeney medicine (adult and pediatrie). 
There were 86 residents, 20 in obstetrics, 33 in pediat-
ries, and 19 in family medicine. 
ail 3 adult scenarios (P < .01 for ail eomparisons). For 
Best Interests /"example, for the 80-year-old scenario, 36% would never 
The 2-month-old infant and the 7-y~ar:~ld:'çl1Îld Wi~h·;~ant resusç:itation for themselves, eompared with 15% 
multiple disabilities had the largest 'proport!onf',ôJ,re- Jorc~ siblihg 'or, partner (P < .001). For these 3 questions, 
spondents stating that it was alwa,vs oi'ge~erallyiritheir ',;tlierè:was ho signifieant difference between the students' 
best interest to be resuscitated (97ôÎ~'llnd, 94% , resp~e- ,;ans~~Ï's,::arid ~liJse given by physicians. The answers 
tively; not signifieant in eomparison/wÙli.'éaeh other;/were not'diffèrent 'between respondents who had ehil-
P < .001 in comparison with ail other piiHeÎ'lts), followed ôren and those who'did not. 
by the 50-year-old patient and the.term infant (both 
87%; P < .01 in comparison with ail ,other p~tient~). For, • Best Interests Ver~usAc~ePting Nonresuscitation 
the 2 patients with a 5% ehànce ofsurvival;~:76% and: . The;8Q-year-gld:patient was the patient with the most 
80% of responses were alway~, or:;g~nêrally (notsigni~~':_ r.esponaëÎitsaee~p~ing!the family's wish not ta resusci-
icant in comparison with eaeh otlier;, P < .005 iri;'c6riî:~,; _ fate (88%; P .<;:-,: .OO'! in eomparison with ail other pa-
parison with ail other patients). Fdrthe preteIm infànt, -'ftients), followèd by thè preterm infant (66%' P < .001 in 
69% estimated that it was in'thé p~tiènü bést mt~r,~sts ~.- é'oinp~rison with ail other patients) and th~n by the 2 
FIGURE 1 
Percentage of respondents who thought it was in a pa-
tien!'s best interest ta be resuscitated and transferred ta 
intensive care (gray bars) and the percentage of thase who 
wou Id accept withhalding care from the same patients 
(black bars), 
24 wk tarm 2mo 7y 14y 35y 50 Y SOy 
Patients 
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l.':tA:J3tH4 Proportion of Respondents Who Would Withhold Care at the Famlly's Request, Among Those 
'f" > .,!, ~ .. ' .~u. 
Who Considered Resuscitation to Be Always or Generally in the Patient's Best Interest 
Patient in Scenario 
24-wk preterm neonate 
Term neonate 
2-mo-old 
7-y-old 
13-y-old 
35-y-old 
5O-y-old 
80-y-old 
Respondents Who Stated That Resuscitation 
Was Always or Generally in Patient's 
Best Interest 
n Proportion Who Wou Id Withhold 
Resuscitation at Family's Request, % 
364 53.6" 
459 29.6" 
509 15.3 
490 16.3 
420 22.6 
397 22.4 
458 21.4 
169 71.6' 
, 5ignificanrly different From ail other scenarios. 
b 5ignificanrly different From the 2-month-old, 7-year-old, and 80-year-old scenarios. 
Respondents Who Stated That Resuscitation 
Was Always in Patient's 
Best Interest 
n Proportion Who Would Withhold 
Resuscitation at Family's Request, % 
53 18.9b 
142 14.8 
202 5.4 
205 7.8 
152 11.2 
73 12.3 
65 10.8 
19 36.8" 
patients with a 5% chance of survival (32% and 35%; When findings were analyzed only among the smaller 
P < ,01 in comparison with the 50-year-old patient) and number of respondents who thought that resuscitation 
by the 50-year-old patient. In contrast, the 2-month-old was always in the patient's best interest, there remained 
infant and the 7-year-old child were the patients who a statistically significant variation in the numbers of 
had the largest proportions of respondents not accepting those who would accept the family's refusaI to resusci-
the withholding of resuscitation (15% and 18~,!,respec~ tate (P < .00l). The individual comparisons that were 
tively; not significant in comparison with ~achothei;statistically significant were the 80-year-old patient in 
P < ,005 in comparison with ail other patients)':.' i ~ comparis!ln with ail other patients (P < ,0001) and the 
Not surprisingly, the large majority' of resPQl1Qents • preterm infant in comparison with the 2-month-old in-
who thought it was exceptional)y .or..nev~rir!:the,pa- .: }fali{an.d.~he ?-year-old child (P < .001) (Table 3), 
tient's best interests to be resuscitatedw6uld~âccept fam"i, Amon~,~~o~e ~-qo thought that it was in the patient's 
ily refusaI of intervention f()f~e~·èh~,ô,i.!iH'e{MSCt;nafios •. 'best interestto bejresuscitated, physicians accepted re-
(>95% would always or gem':rally 'accept refusaI: f(lr ail " fUsai 'of care 'statistically more often than students for ail 
scenarios). Among those wl}'O stategjhât it .was,,!-ly\;ayV . patients (P <: .pI) d,cept the 80-year-old patient, for 
or generally in the patient's irest interest tô be:resûsci-;~ .. whom there was no dÎfference. Among the students, the 
tated, between 15% and 22 0ÎowOI.i!d aètepHàtnil~ :f~~;·bioéill.ics students stood out; they were much more Iikely 
fusaI of intervention for each' üfthe'sc'énarios exê~p,U6~'\'io accept"family] refusaI for ail cases, even when they 
the newborn infants and thé 80-y~ar;gld patient; si~Vl1(f;:':"thought thatJesyscitation was in the patient's best interests 
icantly more would accept wifhhold!rl~,~are()r tl1e"i1e"Y'":Ur < .01) (Fig;'2,r nie answers were not different between 
borns and the 80-year-old patient (P,:< .0001) (T~b.te. 3).:.respon,dents who had' children and those who did not. 
," .. ' ,,; ~;10: ;:;~:::l<;~,')0j~~}~;~ii~~1~~:~:~ " 
FIGURE 2 
Percentage of student respondents who would accept 
family refusai of care. Bars indicate the difference between 
students in various disciplines. Gray: medicine; hatched: 
law; dotted: anthropology; black: ethics. 
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DISCUSSION patient. We were surprised that the proportions were 
Decisions about initiating or withdrawing intensive care identicai among ail subgroups, including anthropoJogy 
often are based on the best-interest principle, which and law students, who had not received any formai 
takes risks and benefits in consideration. In this study, training in this sort of decision-ma king, and staff physi-
the majority (69%) thought that resuscitation was in the cians, who presumably had been exposed to bioethical 
best interest of a 24-week preterm infant, but a signifi- reasoning. The exception was the bioethics students, 
cantly larger majority thought that resuscitation was in who were prepared in a very large proportion to with-
the best interests of a term infant and a 2-month-old ho Id a !ife-saving emergency intervention that they con-
infant with identical outcomes, an already seriously im- sidered to be in an Incompetent patient's best interest at 
paired child, an older child with 5% chance of survival, the request of the family; this cou Id point to the impor-
and even an adult with 5% chance of survival and 100% tance that autonomy has in the bioethics curriculum 
chance of permanent disability. The 80-year-old patient or the underlying values of those who self-select to enter 
who already had moderate1y severe dementia was the the field of bioethics. 
only case with fewer respondents than for the preterm This abrogation of the best-interest principle was most 
infant considering it in the patient's best interest to be marked for the 2 patients at the extremes of me, for 
resuscitated. Therefore, there seems to be a different whom more than one haIt of respondents who thought 
value placed on life at its extremes. which, with the that resuscitation was in the patient's best interests 
potentlal for many years of life to be gained, is particu- would accept family refusaI of intervention. The differ-
larIy surprising for those just bom. Survival rates seemed ences between patients were also significant even 
to have sorne influence on estima tes of best interests but, among those who were more definite and answered that 
for the 2 patients with 5% predicted chance of survlval. it was always in the patient's best Interest to be resusci-
including the patient with no chance of intact survival, tated; the 80-year-old patient and the preterm infant still 
signlficantly more respondents than for the premature eHcited a greater willingness to withhold resuscitation 
infant thought it was in the patient's best interest to be than did the other patients, It seems that accepting with-
resuscitated, Disability did not se en: to influen~t:_r~sJ)on:~,. ,holdigg of resuscitation is somehow easier for the very 
dents, because the 7 -year-old chlld whp a!re~dy had., lél d· "·th W . 8 h'l h d 
l ' 1 d' b']" h d hl'··' . f' ~ . -., o.. ,,!n ,e very young, armg, apI osop er an mu tlp e Isa 1 Itles a t e argest propsntlo;n.o, respgn.~" .. b' th" ··t "- k d th t th 1 f . , d'-
d .' h' 'h ., .. , oc. ".,. .,,, Iq~ ,CIS ",Temar e a e va ue 0 persons 15 m 1 ents estlmatlng t at It was m t e paU,ent s .est}!ltt;r~S!S - . " .. t d'b:h' t t th ' d th "f r f t 
to be resuscitated. ."' "" .... ' ;;~'i:ip,:, .• .cr'· ,.' .~ca .e.~,~. ow wl;;, reac 0 elr ea s, ee mgs 0 rag-
W f d th t 'd ;,' f" ·b·" t· ii"'·t>i'A· t' , ',' edy, ev.il~ !ossand sharp regret are supposedly more e oun a a JU gment 0 ~s. ,n ere.s s \;Vas, , ... ., h d h fi"
1 1 1 t d t d · t t' ;·'t"···' n./ ·f·;;,r:' ,. ···h'ld' • appropnate resgonses to t e eat s 0 younger peop e. cosey reae 0 a eSlre o. rea o.e:s •. own:c 1 ·or/".:· ,.' '":., / ; 
t th ' b ' th' t h/t·~·<:' t ·f' One mlght vlè:w:_the'deaths of older people as tolerable, par ner; IS may e a slgn . a w .. a "vve wan or:our . "d-' " .... ,' '. ", ' , " ' 
own families becomes the approaCh,)f,iàt wecon~ide~'t()' :In eed, Jt IS ,not rare ro h:ar t~at It IS better t~!S way, 
b 'n th b tint re ts f i' tin. '.'g .. eneral: I.tWàs a.lso,.. na,ture took Its cou~se . or he hved long enough for an 
el e es e s 0 pa len S. . ."... ... ,.. Id' .' d' 'd 18 S'II t t t ("'t' b tt th' interesting that, for ail of théadultscenanos,more ,rè~:' ? ,<, :r/,~,)VI ~~~ .. I~ ar s"a en;en SilS ~ ~r IS 
spondents would want resuscitaÙôidôr théir pamier or",:way, natYre too~ Itsc?urse or a~ least she dldn t suf-
sibling than for themselves.Does th'i~ reflect a s~~{fbt'j;. fer") are also rqa,d,efor premature mfants by s,taff mem-
dut y ,to those to whom we àre dos~s~t .. .,), ..'~,ers and, by~anllhes, 'perh~ps the premature mfant has 
It IS generally accepted that a treatm~nt that IS con- ,IlOt yet h~ed:,lon,g e~ou~~, , 
sidered to be in a patients' best iI:tere,st',~roul~ ~~,~?!lr~ ,::' _ For' Sie~ysçltatI~n, declslO,ns, sO,~e autho,rs thmk that 
sued,l-4 Several authors contest thls~howev~r •• ~sR~cla,!ly· .,.~~c:s,heWdh~ve m Impact m de,Cls~on-makmg ,an~ h!~o~ 
in the field of incompetent or pediatricpat!ents;,àlj.dg~ve,;J.,pr():eps~d settm~ an upper age hmlt for reSusCltatlOn' , 
more importance to minimizing hàrp..5;6 Foè'exatt!plé~~ ... t,~i~,i~:~ve{Yçoptro~ersial.lI-!l :h~re see~ t~ be no official 
although vaccination is dearly in a child:s'bestïnterests, pohqes .o~,professlonal assOClatlon gUldehnes that sug-
one does not remove a child from his ~r her p~re~ts'· > gest im, age IImit for resuscitation, with the exception of 
custody solely because of refusai of basic vaccinàtions; premature infants,14-18 At 24 weeks of gestation, many 
because removing a child from the family may do much national associations deem prognosis to be 50 poor that 
more harm.5,6 For the patients in our scenarios, the harm IHe-saving interventions are considered optional and 
risked through withholding care is death, and how re- performed only with explicit family consent. 19 The sur-
spondents balance that potential harm with the Hharm" vival chance and the probabilities of long-term disability 
of either intact survival or the possibility of Iifelong for the 24-week patient in our survey were designed to 
handicap warrants additional investigation, Others have reflect conservatively the actual chances of an infant 
suggested that a standard of #reasonableness" would be delivered at 24 weeks of gestation in a Canadian tertiary 
preferable7; however, such a standard also would require care center.20-26 We can find no other population in the 
a subjective assessment of whether it is reasonable to literature for which a 50% survival rate and a 50% rate 
allow the infant to die, rather than having a chance of of normal outcomes among survivors would be seen as 
survival with an uncertain future. dismal enough to deCer liCe and death decisions entireIy 
Our results showed that, for ail patients, -lof 5 to the family. Policy statements Cor preterm infants often 
respondents would be prepared to withhold resuscita- state survival and disability rates as justification for op-
tion at the familles' request, even wh en the respondents tional intervention,U-17 but our results suggest that un-
considered resuscitation to be in the best interests of the derIying, widely he Id beliefs about the value oC the life of 
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a newborn may have a major influence on such recom· garding response bias in questionnaire studies. We were 
mendations. able to obtain agreement from directors of programs and 
The reduced value placed on the life of newborns, and courses to approach their students. residents, or staff 
particularly the preterm infant, by our respondents is members. This led to the choices we made regarding 
less than expected on the basis of any objective medical groups of respondents, which we tried to make as varied 
data. In fact, this limitation of their value is probably not as possible to obtain a wide representation. We recognize 
related to medical factors, because physicians and stu- that sorne respondents are rarely or never involved in 
dents had almost identical answers. What does explain these decisions during their working lives. However, the 
these differences? Il has been suggested that the prox- remarkable consistency between most groups of physi-
imity of gestational ages at which abortions are per- cians and students suggests that these attitudes have 
formed is relevant to resuscitation decisions. 27 This sug- Iittle to do with training or experience. The groups of 
gests that decisions regarding life and death for physicians and students were very heterogeneous but, to 
newboms, especially premature infants, may still be in avoid inflating the number of exploratory analyses, we 
the realm of reproductive choice and essentially consid- did not search out differences between sorne of the 
ered a family decision. Perhaps there is a diminished possible subgroups, Therefore, it may be that important 
sense of dut y toward the premature infant. This would systematic differences in responses were masked. Addi-
explain why 50 many respondents would be ready to tional research is needed to explore the underlying rea-
accept withholding resuscitation ev en if they thought sons for these responses. Neonatologists in particular 
that resuscitation was in the patient's best interest. Sev- might respond differently to sorne of these ethical dilem-
eral authors also suggested that newboms do not have mas in very preterm infants, because they might have 
the same status as older individuals, because they lack had frequent actual experiences with such decisions. H 
personhood.26•28-12 Although there is no general agree- Our initial sample of neonatologists was too small to 
ment on this issue, our responses fit a general assess- draw any conclusions. Estimating an individuals' best 
ment that newborns were of less value. Even the respon- interest indirectly demands pladng a value on his or her 
dents who had children and had personally experienced Iife; the results of our study show that the lives of new-
the graduai development of personhood in an bIfant had boni infants, particularly preterm infants, are systemat-
the same answers. Is the systematic devaluation ofne'!V-', ically devidued in comparison with others, both by phy-
borns attributable to more-deeply rooted anthropoiogic; " sicians and' by a nonmedical educated population. 
cultural, social, and evolutionary façtors?,Umllr~è~ntly, 
most parents had experienced the de~thofârle~bom or 
<-: . 
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• Abstract 
Introduction: Patient selection requires placing a relative value on human lives. 
Methods: An anonymous questionnaire, administered to groups of physicians and students, 
presented 8 currently incompetent patients with potential neurological sequelae requiring 
emergency care. 
Predicted outcomes were explicit: four patients, preterm and term newboms, 2-month-old and 
50-y-old: 50% survival, and 50% chance of impairment. Two disabled patients, 7-y-old and 80-
y-old with 50% survival. A 14-y-old and a 35-y-old had 5% survival, but differing impairment. 
Respondents were asked if they would resuscitate, and in what order they wou Id resuscitate if aIl 
needed it simultaneously. 
ResuUs: 85% response rate, n=524. The proportion stating they would al ways resuscitate was 
smallest for the 80-y-old (18% p<O.OOl), then the preterm (35%, p<O.OOI), then the term and the 
50-y-old (53% and 58%, p<O.OI). The 2-month-old and the 7-y-old would be resuscitated most 
frequently (74% and 77%, p<O.Ol), followed by the patients with 5% survival (64% and 68%, 
• p<O.OOI). The median order of triage was first the 2 month-old, followed by the 7-y-old, the 14-
y-old, the term newbom, the 50-y-old, the 35-y-old, the premature newbom and the 80-y-old. 
Conclusion: Order of resuscitation was not closely related to the predicted survival, impairment, 
or potentiallife years gained. Age probably has the strongest influence, with children's lives 
being valued more than adults', except for the newboms. The value placed on the life of 
newboms, in particular the premature, is less than expected by any objective medicàl data and 
was not consistent with any ethical theory that we tested. 
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Introduction 
Technological and medical progress has increased the demands for intensive care; 
admissions to ICUs create significant costs and may need to be prioritized when multiple eligible 
patients are waiting for an available bed. For an individual patient, whether a specific treatment 
is of any benefit, is an ethically charged question. When more than one patient is eligible for 
intervention and resources are scarce, these considerations become even more complex 1.2,3. 
Many ethical theories have been used to analyze patient selection for scarce resources. The 
differing options for making decisions in such circumstances can be thought of as representing 
the 2 opposing views of best outcomes versus fair chances 1 ,4,5. U tilitarians believe that patients 
with the best outcomes have priority while the egalitarians believe aIl patients have an equal 
daim to life and deserve a fair chance l .6.7,8. Sorne authors have refined this to indude an initial 
minimal medical inclusion criterion and allocate resources to the remaining patients9,IO,II. How 
age is weighted in these considerations is also problematic because it may influence medical 
utility, but may also insidiously introduce social utility into the decisions2,6,12. 
Aim of study: To deterrnine how groups of physicians and university students in bioethical 
disciplines value hypothetical patients. 
Hypothesis: Patients with a low survival will be valued less. Patients at the extreme of 
life will be valued less th an other patients with similar outcomes. 
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C Methods: 
Between February 2005 and January 2006, we administered an anonymous questionnaire 
to physicians involved in resuscitation decisions and to university students in different 
disciplines during a group activity where a maximum number of respondents could be reached. 
Eight scenarios of currently incompetent critically ill patients with potential neurological 
sequelae were presented. AlI arrived in the Emergency Department of a university health center, 
when a family member cannot be consulted. Physician respondents were associated with McGill 
University. Students in law, medicine and anthropology were first year students from McGill 
University. The bioethics students were postgraduates from University of Montreal. We have 
previously published a manuscript using data derived from answers to a different group of 
questions from this study (addressing the issue of best interests), which were designed around the 
same patient scenarios described below. 
The first question was a request for consent; an questionnaires were completed 
individuallyand were collected immediately. The first page comprised demographic 
information. 
( The patients were of different ages, their outcomes were explicitly described; gender or 
C~ 
other social information such as marital status was not given. Four of the patients had a 50% 
chance of survival: a 24-week gestation premature who has just delivered, a baby just born at 
term with a known malformation, a 2 month-old with meningitis and a 50-y-old after a car 
accident. If they survived, 50% would be without impairment, 25% mildly or moderately 
impaired, and 25% severely impaired. Two other patients were already disabled: a 7-y-old with 
multiple disabilities (cerebral paisy, deafness, learning disability, hyperactivity) with a new head 
trauma, an 80-y-old with dementia and a new stroke. Both were noted to have a 50% predicted 
survival and, if they survived, a 50% chance of having further impairment. Two patients had 5% 
survival: a 14-y-old with acute myeloid leukemia (eNS involvement) with 20% risk of 
impairment and a 35-y-old with brain cancer with 100% risk of handicap with treatment. The 
patients were presented in order from the youngest to the oldest. 
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Resuscitation 
After each patient, the following question was asked: "Would you intubate, resuscitate 
and consult intensive carefor admission?" Respondents could respond on a Likert scale, with 
the following options: "always", "generally", "exceptionally" or "never". 
Patient ranking 
Participants were asked in what order they wou Id resuscitate the patients if ail needed 
intervention at the same time (ranking 1-8, with 1 being the first to be resuscitated). To evaluate 
the rankings we ca1culated the mean, the median and the sum of the rankings. The lower the sum, 
the earlier the patient would be resuscitated. 
Ethical approaches to patient selection 
The two polarized ethical positions are equal chances versus best outcomes 1,6,5. A strict 
egalitarian would use random allocation to determine patient ranking I3,14,15. Other authors 
initially determine minimal medical criteria for eligibility, and then decide for the remaining 
patients9,IO,II. For example, the criterion could be a predicted survival of:S 5 years, which would 
exc1ude the 14,35 and 80-y-old. 
A utilitarian approach could be based on survival, or disability, or could combine both 
l1sing QAL Y s. For each of these patients, we calculated the Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QAL Ys) in the manner described by Doyle et a1 16 , this information was not given to the 
respondents. An age based ranking in favour of the young would rank younger candidate before 
older ones 17,18. We evaluated whether patient ranking would fit any of these patterns of patient 
selection. 
This study was approved by the McGill University institutional review board. 
Statistics: Proportions were compared using the Chi-square with Yates correction. 
Because of the large group of respondents, the threshold for significance was set at p < 
0.01. 
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• Results: 
615 individuals were in our target groups, 527 received the questionnaire with 524 
respondents, table 1 (response rate: 85% of the target groups, 99% of participants). AlI 
groups had similar response rates. Students had fewer children than physieians 
(p<0.0001). Of the 357 student respondents, 107 were in law, 88 in anthropology, 139 
in medieine and 23 in bioethics. Of the 95 attending staff, 32 were in family medicine, 
23 in obstetrics, 12 in neonatology, 28 in emergency medicine (adult and pediatrie). 
There were 86 residents: 20 in obstetrics, 33 in pediatries and 19 in family medicine. 
Intubation and consultation to intensive care 
The 2 month-old and the 7-y-old multiply disabled child had the largest proportion wanting 
to always resuscitate (74% and 77%; p<O.Ol compared to others), foIlowed by the 2 patients with a 
5 % survival (64% and 68%; p<O.OOI compared to others, figure 1). Conversely, the 80-y-old was 
the least likely to be always resuscitated (18% p<O.OOl), followed by the premature infant (35%, 
p<O.OOI), followed by the term infant and the 50-y-old (53% and 58%; p<O.Ol compared to 
• others). Sex of the respondents or having children did not affect the answers. 
When pooling the responses "always" and "generally", 2: 96% ofresponses supported 
resuscitation for all patients except for the premature infant and the 80-y-old (79% and 70%, p < 
0.001). For aIl patients, less than 1 % of respondents answered they would never resuscitate, 
except for the premature infant and the 80-y-old (8% and 7%, p < 0.01). 
Students' answers foIlowed the same statistically signifieant pattern as those given by 
physicians. 
Patient ranking 
The median order of resuscitation for all respondents was: 1 st: 2 month-old with 
meningitis, 2nd : 7-y-old impaired child, 3rd : 14-y-old with leukemia, 4th: term infant with 
malformation, 5th : 50-y-old in car accident 6th : 35-y-old with brain cancer, ih: premature infant 
and last 80-y-old with a new stroke (Table 2). Physicians and students had very similar rankings 
(Table 2). All subgroups ranked the 2 month and 7-y-old in first positions, the 14-y-old in 3rd or 
4th position, and the premature infant in 6th or i h position. The patient with the most rankings in 
either i h or 8 position was the 80-y-old (503 responses, p<0.001), followed by the premature 
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either 7th or S position was the SO-y-old (503 responses, p<O.OOI), followed by the premature 
infant (242 responses, p<O.OOl), and then by the other 2 adults (Figure 3). All other children had 
less than 35 respondents ranking them i h or Sth; no respondents ranked the 2 month old either i h 
Sth or . 
Ethical approaches to patient selection 
Random allocation was not used to rank patients; if respondents followed this model for 
decision-making, aU patients should have had a mean ranking of 4.5 (see Table 2). The 
significant differences in ranks is statistical evidence that random allocation was not used, 
otherwise there would have been no significant difference between average patient ranks. 
Patients with a probable f: 5 year predicted survival were rarely ranked in the 
last positions, except for the SO-y-old. 5S respondents (11 %) ranked these patients (14, 
35 and SO-y-old) in the last three positions. 2.5% ofrespondents ranked the two patients 
with a described 5% survival in the last two positions. 
Disability by itself did not influence ranking: Only 3 respondents (0.6%) ranked 
the two patients with pre-existing disabilities, and the 35-y-old with a 100% probability 
of disability in last three positions and 17% ranked the 35 and the SO-y-old in the last 
two positions. 
Because the 24-week infant, term and 2 month infant have identical survival and 
outcomes, they have identical QAL Y s: 32. Calculated QAL Ys for the remaining 
patients are: 7-y-oId: 17, 14-y-old: 3, 35-y-old: 1.2, 50-y-oId: 12, SO-y-old: 1.2. Only 
two percent of respondents placed the 3 patients with the highest QAL Y s in the first 3 
positions. 17% placed the 2 patients with the lowest QAL Ys in the last two positions. 
Significantly more respondents ranked the 35 year old before the newbom infants than 
the other way around, which is statistical evidence that the QAL Y model was not used 
for patient selection. 
There was preferential ranking in favour ofthe children, except for the newboms. For 
example, 75% ranked the 2 month-old before the 50-y-old (who had identical predicted 
outcomes), and 75% ranked the 14-y-old before the 50-y-old despite the oIder patient having 
much better outcomes. Newboms were the exception to this rule, only 19% of respondents 
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• infant (242 responses, p<O.OOl), and then by the other 2 adults (Figure 3). AIl other children had 
less than 35 respondents ranking them 7th or Sth; no respondents ranked the 2 month old either 7th 
or Sth (Figure 3). 
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EthicaJ approaches to patient seJection 
Random allocation was not used to rank patients; if respondents followed this model for 
decision-making, aIl patients should have a me an ranking of 4.5 (see Table 2). Furthermore, not 
aIl subgroups followed the same non-random pattern or ranking. 
Patients with a probable:S 5 year predicted survival were rarely ranked in the 
last positions, except for the SO-y-old. 5S respondents (11 %) ranked these patients (14, 
35 and SO-y-old) in the last three positions. 2.5% of respondents ranked the two patients 
with a described 5% survival in the last two positions. 
Disability by itself did not influence ranking: Only 3 respondents (0.6%) ranked 
the two patients with pre-existing disabilities, and the 35-y-old with a 100% probability 
of disability in last three positions and 17% ranked the 35 and the SO-y-old in the last 
two positions. 
Because the 24-week infant, term and 2 month infant have identical survival and 
outcomes, the y have identical QALYs: 32. Ca1culated QALYs for the remaining 
patients are: 7-y-old: 17, 14-y-old: 3, 35-y-old: 1.2, 50-y-old: 12, SO-y-old: 1.2. Two 
percent of respondents placed the 3 patients with the highest QAL Ys in the first 3 
positions. 17% placed the 2 patients with the lowest QAL Y s in the last two positions. 
There was preferential ranking in favour of the children, except for the newborns. For 
example, 75% ranked the 2 month-old before the 50-y-old (who had identical predicted 
outcomes), and 75% ranked the 14-y-old before the 50-y-old despite the older patient having 
better outcomes. Newborns were the exception to this rule, only 19% of respondents ranked aIl 
five children ~n the first 5 positions. 61 % of respondents ranked the 35-y-old (with 5% survival 
and 100% disability) before the preterm who had much better outcomes. The extremes of life had 
a strong effect on ranking: 263 respondents (50%) ranked the premature infant and the SO-y-old 
in the two last positions. The responses did not fit any described theory of patient allocation . 
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• Discussion 
This questionnaire study examined the relative value given to patients' lives when aIl 
needed immediate life saving medical care. This is called triage by sorne authors and is different 
from resource allocation when aIl patients are stable9.We believe this is the first attempt to 
develop empirical data regarding physician and "lay educated pers ons" attitudes toward triage 
decisions. The respondents were informed that the hypothetical patients needed intervention and 
intensive care to stay alive. Patient selection is described as a two-stage process by several 
authors9, 10, 1 1. The first step determines which patient is suitable for the intervention. For 
ex ample, a patient dying of metastatic cancer will probably not be eligible to receive a liver 
transplant. Our first question: "Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for 
admission?" selected patients to be in the candidate pool. The second step involves comparing 
the patients9,1O,1I,19. Our second question, asking how respondents would rank patients were they 
aIl to arrive at the same time, forced the respondents to directly compare patients. 
The 80-y-old would be resuscitated by fewer respondents than ail the other patients, 
• presumably because of his age and dementia. At the other end of life, the preterm, des pite having 
identical probabilities of various outcomes as the term infant, the 2 month-old with meningitis 
and the 50-y-old trauma victim, would be resuscitated by fewer respondents. Children in general 
would be resuscitated more frequently and before the adults, except for the preterm. Survival and 
disability (or potential for) did not seem to influence the frequency with which patients would be 
resuscitated. For example, the multiply handicapped 7-y-old was the patient most respondents 
would resuscitate. It appears that patients at the extremes of life are not always in the candidate 
pool. 
c 
Survival appeared to have sorne influence on ranking, with the 14-y-old ranked after 2 
other children. Disability, in contras t, did not seem to influence respondents, the 7-y-old being 
resuscitated in second position by aIl subgroups. It does not appear that respondents ranked 
patients in an egalitarian way, using random allocation. A utilitarian approach uses ability to 
benefit from an intervention as measured in quality and quantity of life gained to compare 
patients. However, rankings did not reflect the potential quality adjusted life years gained. 
Several human rights codes prohibit discrimination on the basis of age20. But age, as weil as 
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influencing medical utility, can also indirectly suggest a certain social value.2,6,12 With the 
exception of the newboms, the respondents overall favored the young over the old. 
The relative value placed on the life of newboms, in particular the preterm, is less than 
expected by any objective medical data and did not reflect any ethical theory that we analyzed. 
Interestingly, the few weeks difference between the preterm, the term and the 2 month-old made 
a big difference. Several authors have suggested that ne wb oms do not have the same status as 
older individuals, because they lack personhood.21 ,22,23,24,25 If, as stated by sorne authors, the 
acquisition of personhood occurs at 2 months and that patients with cognitive limitations also 
have limited personhood; 50% of the respondents ranked the extremely young and the extremely 
old according to personhood.23,24,26 Other reasons for the devaluation of the preterm infant could 
be a diminished sense of dut y towards them, or even the fact that abortions are performed at 
similar gestational ages, suggesting that life is perhaps still optional. Are they victims of the 
media, where the focus is on miracles and disasters?27,28 The disease process could also interfere, 
and when seeing the word "premature", maybe the respondent did not read further and assumed a 
_ bad outcome, Medical knowledge did not contribute as the physicians and the students had 
• 
almost identical answers. Is the systematic devaluation of the newbom due to deeper-rooted 
anthropological, cultural, social and evolutionary factors? Until recently, most parents had 
experienced the death of a newbom or an infant, perhaps the necessary protective mechanisms to 
avoid continuaI grief over the loss of newboms has caused us to devalue them. Waring remarks 
that the value of a person is given by how we react to their death: "feelings of tragedy, evil, loss 
and sharp regret are supposedly more appropriate responses to the deaths of younger people. One' 
might view the deaths of older people as tolerable, Indeed, it is not rare to hear that it is "better 
this way, nature took its course", that "he lived long enough" for an older individual29. Similar 
statements ("it is better this way, nature took its course", "at least she didn't suffer") are also sa id 
for premature babies; maybe the premature infant has not yet lived long enough? 
Is it reasonable to want to fix an age limit for resuscitation purposes? Zweibel and 
colleagues found in a national survey that most of their respondents would accept withholding of 
life-prolonging medical care from critically ill older patients, but few would use age al one as a 
criterion3o, Setting an upper age limit for resuscitation is not a new concept31.32. Sorne authors 
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• justify this with the "fair inning" argument: in order for ail individuals to have a fair opportunity, 
everybody is entitled to live a proper lifespan. 17,29J3 The view that it is appropriate to incIude age 
in sorne decisions about resource allocation is cIearly not unanimous34J5J6, and we could find no 
policy or professional association guidelines suggesting an age limit for resuscitation decisions, 
• 
• 
C 'f 1718194041 A 24 k' . 1 .. d' except lor premature III ants. - ,- ,- " t -wee gestatIOn, many natIOna assocIatIOns eem 
prognosis to be so poor that life-saving interventions are considered option al. The survival rate, 
and the probabilities of long-term disability of the 24-week patient in our survey were designed 
to conservatively reflect the actual chances of an infant delivered at 24 weeks gestation in a 
Canadian tertiary care centre42 ,43,44,45,46,47,48. We can find no other population in the Iiterature in 
which a 50% survival rate and 50% "normal outcome" among survivors wou Id be seen as too 
dismal to justify resuscitative efforts. Policy statements for preterm infants often state survival 
and handicap as justification for optional intervention,37,38,39,40,41 but other factors, those which 
influenced our respondents, whatever they may be, appear to be more important. 
Because of our high response rate, we know the results accurately reflect the opinions of 
our target population, but these cannot be directly extrapolated to other groups or cultures. AIso, 
ail questionnaire studies have their inherent limitations: we do not know if opinions would 
translate into actions were the respondents in the specific situation. This study does not explain 
why caregivers think this way, and only allows us to develop hypotheses. Further research is 
needed to continue exploring these avenues. 
This research is the first of its kind. Patients such as the ones we describe would have ail 
died 100 years ago, and decisions to rank them would have been irrelevant as it was "nature" that 
decided the outcomes. Policies, administrators and physicians now decide if a patient lives or 
dies, and which patient to admit to the last intensive care bed. Physicians are often caught in the 
conflicting role of doing the best for an individual patient, while at the same time trying to use 
society' s resources judiciously.49.50 When these two roI es conflict value judgments are required. 
The results of our study are consistent and tell the same story. Sorne lives will systematically be 
devalued wh en compared to others. It is important we are aware of these biases as they will 
likely influence our decisions . 
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Total Students Physicians Residents Staff 
Target group: n 615 417 198 86 112 
n reached 527 359 168 72 96 
n answered 524 357 167 72 95 
Response rate% 85 86 84 84 85 
female(%) 53 52 55 61 51 
chlldren (%) 22 9 50 28 67 
junior resident (%) NA NA NA 56 NA 
< 5 Y of practice (Ofo) NA NA NA NA 30 
Table 1: description of respondents. Response rate describes who in the target group filled the 
questionnaire. Total respondents are students and physicians. The physician group comprises 
residents and staff. 
Median Median Median 
ranking, ail ranking, ranking, 
respondents Students physicians Total of the 
(n=524) (n=357) (n=167) ranks Mean Rank Mode rank 
~4wk preterm 7 7 7 2960 5.7 7 
Term 4 3 4 2027 3.9 4 
2 month 1 1 1 1091 2 
7y 2 2 2 1279 2.4 
14y 3 4 3 1987 3.7 4 
35y 6 6 6 2739 5.2 6 
50y 5 5 5 2663 5.1 6 
80y 8 8 8 4059 7.7 8 
Table 2: Ranking of patients . 
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Legends for Figures 
Figure!: Percentage ofrespondents who wou Id always intubate and consult intensive 
care for the hypothetical patients 
Figure 2: Number of th and last rankings given by respondents for each patient. 
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PART III 
The moral difference between neonates and older patients 
The last part ofthis PhD thesis explores why the neonate is perceived to be 
different to older patients. The folIowing article is an opinion piece. Dr John Lantos, 
knowing my PhD thesis was on the subject, asked me in was interested to write an 
article on this topic. 1 wrote the first draft ofthis paper. He and Karen Bauer, a medical 
student in Chicago with an interest in bioethics, have reviewed and edited the article, 
which 1 then finalized. Unlike the other 4 articles in this thesis, and most ofmy submitted 
and published articles, there is no hard data to support most of the hypotheses in this 
opinion piece. The limitations of the 2 previous questionnaire studies rest in the fact that 
we can conclude from them caregivers are not well informed, and that the neonate is 
relatively devaluated compared to older patients. On the other hand, we did not ask 
respondent why. It would have been possible to do a qualitative study on the subject, but 
it would not have necessarily been representative of the 1000 and more respondents who 
have thus far answered the questionnaires. Because abstracts from the last two papers 
were presented at many conferences and talks, 1 was able to hear hypotheses to explain / 
justify this devaluation from many individuals (from different backgrounds and different 
countries). This exposure and rich interaction -that 1 calI "qualitative field work" - has no 
proven scientific methodology, but can be valuable to generate hypothesis and enrich 
reflexion. These hypotheses deserve to be investigated further to validate them in a 
quantitative study and describe better their relative importance. 
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ARE NEWBORNS MORALL y DIFFERENT .FROM OLDER 
CHILDREN? 
Consider the following two cases: 
Case #1: A previously healthy 2-month-old baby presents to the 
emergency room with fever, irritability, listlessness and respiratory 
pauses according to parents. He is very sick with neurological signs and 
a rapidly spreading rash. The lumbar puncture is purulent and con-
firrns the diagnosis ofbacterial meningitis. The prognosis is poor. If the 
baby survives, he willlikely have severe neurological impairment. 
Case #2: A baby is born at 24 weeks of gestation weighing 
700 grams. In the delivery room, he is not breathing and has a poor 
muscle tone. He is intubated and given oxygen; his heart rate and 
color immediately improve. At this gestation, the average survival is 
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50%, and if the baby survives, he has a 50% chance of having a 
"normal" outcome. l , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
In many hospitals and in most countries today, the initiation of 
intensive care treatment wou Id be considered obligatory for the baby 
in case #1, but optional in case #2.8, 9,10, Il, 12, 13, 14 This is in spite of 
the fact that the long-term prognosis for baby #2 is better than that 
for baby #1. Why do we feel less obligated to treat the premature 
baby? Do we put newborns in a special and lesser moral category? 
The period immediately before and immediately after birth is a 
time during which a fetus becomes a baby. This transition from 
intrauterine to extrauterine life has enormous moral, and legal 
implications. The fetus has almost no rights in utero (mainly the right 
to inherit and to sue for in utero damages if born alive). At the 
moment of birth, however, it becomes a full-ftedged citizen, endowed 
with rights that should be no different from any other citizen. In the 
medical context, these rights are identical to those of any other vul-
nerable incompetent patient who lacks decision-making capacity or 
autonomy. For competent patients, life and death decisions are 
usually driven by autonomy. For incompetent patients, the surrogate 
(often family) has to decide, and if the patient had not expressed any 
preferences, they have to intervene in the best interest of the patient. 
In newborns who were never competent, the gui ding principle is the 
best interest, with a large and poorly defined zone in which parental 
wishes are decisive. The Neonatal Resuscitation Program textbook, 
which is the standard neonatal resuscitation text used in North 
America and many other parts of the world, states: "The ethical 
principles regarding resuscitation of newJ;>orns should be no different 
from those followed in resuscitating an older child or adult."15 This 
statement notwithstanding, this is not the case in practice. 
There is c1ear evidence of categorical separation of the ethical 
assessments associated with treatment or non-treatment decisions for 
newborns from similar decisions for older children or adults. For 
example, the 1983 President's Commission on Bioethical Issues 
devoted a special section of its report to dilemmas surrounding the 
treatment of newborns, thus distinguishing these dilemmas from the 
more general dilemmas addressed in its discussion ofwithholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in adults. 16 Such distinctions, 
though well intentioned, have reified the dichotomy that has isolated 
newborns from the rest of the population, kept them in a separate 
moral universe, and allowed decisions to be made upon a different 
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basis than those made for any other age group. The separation goes 
beyond clinical dilemmas. 
The value of neonatal intensive care has been scrutinized far more 
than pediatrie intensive care and adult intensive care. Such scrutiny 
suggests that neonatal care is he Id to a higher standard of justifica-
tion. It has to prove itself in ways that other critical care units do not. 
Often the conclusions that are drawn reflect people's underlying 
biases, rather than the data. For example, Friedman and colleagues 
could write as late as 2002, "[t]he use of neonatal intensive care 
continued to rise rapidly in the 1990s despite the concerns of 
observers about its cost effectiveness." 17 Such a statement is 
astounding because there have been numerous studies showing that 
neonatal intensive care units (NICU) are far more cost effective than 
medical intensive care units (MICU).18 In fact, neonatal intensive 
care is among the most cost efficient of acute medical intervention, 
with the costs per quality adjusted life year saved being about 1/100 
of the cost of acute adult coronary care. 19 The majority of even the 
surviving extremely low birth weight infants achieve functional out-
cornes and economically productive lives.2o. 21 It is also noteworthy 
that major improvements in newborn survival have not resulted in 
proportionate increases in severe morbidity.22 
Age-based assessments of the value of treatment, whether made at 
the bedside or in the context of cost-effectiveness analyses, can lead to 
differences in the treatment that patients receive. Newborns are not 
the only population subject to such differential treatment. There is 
evidence for the existence of age-based rationing for both the very 
young and the very old. Such.evidence cornes from descriptive epi-
demiologic studies of resource allocation at various ages. Dixon et al 
examined the total number of hospital admissions for people who 
died at various ages in England in 1999-2000. They reported that the 
number of hospital admissions steadily declined with increasing age. 
Decedents aged 25-64 had 3.7 hospital admissions in the last three 
years of life. Those over 65 years old averaged only 2.3 admissions. 23 
A study in the United States showed similar results in that "patients 
who received intensive hospital and physician services were largely 
the 'young old,' aged 65 to 79 years with good functional status, 
while the frail 'older old,' aged 80 years and over, received largely 
supportive care.,,24 In addition, bioethicists have defended age-based 
rationing of care for the elderly. Callahan's book, Setting Limits, 
explicitly argues for the appropriateness of age limits for life-
prolonging treatment. He would have Congress restrict Medicare 
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payments for such procedures as organ transplants, heart bypasses 
and kidney dialysis for the aged.25 Such studies show that age-based 
rationing of hospital resources in adults, inc1uding intensive care, is a 
global reality. 
1s it reasonable to want to fix an age limit for resuscitation pur-
poses? Zweibel and colleagues found in a national survey that most of 
their respondents would accept withholding of life-prolonging med-
ical care from critically il1 older patients. Sorne authors justify this 
with the "fair inning" argument: everybody is entitled to a proper 
lifespan. Deciding on age would not be discrimination, as everybody 
gets older everyday, and cou Id reach the "appropriate lifespan limit." 
In this case, this would not be similar to discriminating on sex or race, 
which most of us do not change during out life.26, 27 The viewpoint 
that it is appropriate to inc1ude age in sorne decisions about resource 
allocation is c1early not unanimous. 28, 29 Furthermore, no policy or 
professional association guidelines in the United States suggest an age 
limit for resuscitation decisions. Instead, they consider age as one of a 
number of factors to be incorporated into an individualized decision 
making process. 
The situation is quite different at the other end of the lifespan. 
There are multiple professional societies, both in the U.S. and 
abroad, which explicitly use gestation al age alone as a criterion for 
initiating or withholding resuscitation. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 
Many national associations use 24 weeks of gestational age as a 
cut-off, below which prognosis is deemed so poor that resuscitation 
should be discouraged. In most tertiary care centers, babies born at 
24 weeks have at leas.t a 50% of survival with at least 50% of sur-
vivors having no chronic health problems or neurological sequelae. 
There is no other patient population for whom such detailed long-
term outcome studies has been done. These is no other group of 
patients for whom resuscitation decisions are determined by the 
results of those studies. Since resuscitation is optional before 
25 weeks and only done according to parental wishes, when a mother 
arrives in labor before that date, it may be considered easier to induce 
delivery before 25 weeks rather th an wait for the baby to be delivered 
later, but still very prematurely, and be "stuck to do something." This 
could be called the "better luck next time approach." Even sorne 
tertiary care hospitals do not wish to resuscitate before 25 weeks and 
recommend this openly.38 At other institutions, though, the same 
mother would be offered the opportunity of aggressive resuscitation 
by the neonatal team. A 2-month-old infant presenting with group B 
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streptococcal meningitis,39 or a 50-year-old pediatrician with an 
extensive hemorrhagic stroke,40 would be likely to have immediate 
resuscitation and institution of care, despite broadly similar risks of 
death or disability when compared to the extremely preterm infant. 
Policy statements for preterm infants often state survival and hand-
icap as justification for optional intervention.41 , 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 
The fact that such outcome statistics would not justify such ap-
proaches in other populations suggests that sorne other powerful 
factors are at work. 
We recently studied justice in resuscitation decisions, by compar-
ing the attitudes of physicians and students in bioethics, medicine, 
law, and anthropology regarding active treatment of eight hypo-
thetical incompetent patients needing intubation and intensive care at 
the same time. One patient was an extremely preterm infant and 
another was a 2-month-old infant with bacterial meningitis, both 
babies had the same outcomes. Another patient was a 35 year old 
with brain cancer with a 5% survival rate and a 100% handicap rate 
after surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy. In the study, 
when we asked in what order should the patients be resuscitated if 
they aIl needed intervention at the same time, the 2 month old with 
meningitis was first, and the premature infant was resuscitated overall 
in seventh position, only before the hypothetical demented 80 year 
old with a stroke, despite having outcomes at least as good as, or in 
sorne cases dramatically better than the six preceding patients.49, 50,51 
Such hypothetical studies, along with the curious, differential and 
often peculiar use of cost-effectiveness analyses, as well as statements 
of principle.s from professional societies and national bioethics 
commissions, all suggest that newborns are treated as a special moral 
category. The relative value placed on the life of newborns, in par-
ticular the preterm, is less than expected by any objective medical 
data or any prevailing moral frameworks about the value of indi-
viduallives. The fetus, which has almost no rights in utero becomes a 
citizen endowed with rights as his shoulders come out of his mother. 
The rapidity of the transition from fetus to citizen may be one reason 
for the moral confusion felt by many doctors, parents, and judges, 
and may be the reason why professional bodies have felt the need to 
offer position statements regarding resuscitation that focus specifi-
cally on the newborn. The moral status of the newborn may also be 
influenced by the fact that terminations of pregnancy are sometimes 
performed even after fetal viability. In such cases, the disjunction 
between the moral status of the fetus in utero and the baby ex utero 
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creates cognitive dissonance that may be resolved by either elevating 
the status of the fetus or denigrating that of the newborn. 
There may be other reasons why newborns do not have the same 
status as older individuals. Sorne have suggested that they have not yet 
achieved sorne vague moral status labelled "personhood. ,,52,53,54,55,56 
That is, the y are human beings -like fetuses- but are not yet fully per-
sons. Many who make this argument also apply it to human beings who 
lack certain key neurologie capacities, such as babies with anencephaly 
or adults with severe Alzheimer's disease. Sorne authors suggest that 
newborns do not acquire full personhood until about 2 months of 
age. 57, 58 This view has no basis in law and would be difficult to oper-
ationalize in a culture that seems to set high value on the lives of 
newborns in many contexts. Yet is seems personhood is important in 
decision-making for newborns. 
Another hint as the special status of newborns cornes from the 
widely recognized phenomenon that perinatologists and neonatolo-
gists are generally willing to intervene more aggressively and for a 
longer time when a mother is older or when she conceived by in vitro 
fertilization after many years of infertility. 59, 60 We often refer to 
these babies as "precious children." They are thought of as "irre-
placeable." These concepts work, in a backhanded way, to denigrate 
the status or the preciousness of other babies. If these are the truly 
special ones, then perhaps the others are not so precious or are 
replaceable, maybe justifying the "better luck next time" approach. 
Such a phenomenon suggests that the value of a baby's life is 
determined, in part, by the family context into which he or she is 
born. After a perinatal loss, we are taught extensively never to tell a 
mother that she is still young, that she will have more kids, or that she 
has another twin (in sorne instances). We are taught not to say it 
because it is a natural tendency to say it after a neonatal loss-but 
probably not so natural after the death of an older child in the PIeU. 
Another instance of such influences-one that leads in the oppo-
site direction-occurs when parents and families already have other 
children and view their current children as the "precious" ones who 
may need protection from the demands that a new baby might make. 
"Intrafamilial distributive justice" may be invoked, as when families 
say, "It won't be fair to our other children" to justify withholding or 
withdrawing care for a 50% survival with 50% normal outcome. This 
justification is routinely accepted by NleU physicians, but we doubt 
PIeU physicians hear similar comments, and if the y did, if they 
would be influenced by them the way neonatologists are. If one of the 
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parents' older children suffered an accident, would they likely make 
the sa me decision to protect and devote attention to their two other 
healthy children or is this decision isolated to newborns? 
The systematic devaluation of the newborn may also be due to 
deep-rooted anthropologieal, cultural, social and evolutionary fac-
tors. Until the late twentieth century, most parents experienced the 
death of at least one newborn or infant. Perhaps the commonness of 
infant death led to protective cultural and emotional mechanisms in 
the form of philosophie differentiation of the newborn from older 
people. Waring, a philosopher, remarks that the way we value a 
person is indieated by how we react to their death, "feelings of 
tragedy, evil, loss and sharp regret are supposedly more appropriate 
responses to the deaths of younger people. One might view the deaths 
of older people as tolerable. Indeed, it is not rare to hear that it is 
'better this way, nature took its course,' that 'he/she lived long 
enough' for an older individual.,,61 Similar statements of "it is better 
this way, nature took its course" and "at least he/she did not suffer" 
are also said for premature babies. Maybe the premature infant has 
not yet lived long enough to justify feelings of tragedy and regret 
secondary to instilled feelings of detachment that desensitize society 
from the loss of newborns? 
Quality of life is often considered in decisions to withhold or 
withdraw care. This, too, may be assessed differently for a newborn 
than for an older child or adult. Babies who suffer intracranial 
hemorrhage are known to have a wide range of outcomes. Sorne may 
be neurocognitively devastated. Others will do quite weIl. The 
uncertainty of outcome, in a newborn, often justifies withdrawal of 
treatment. An older child with a traumatic brain in jury may face a 
similarly uncertain prognosis. Generally, however, for older children, 
uncertainty and the possibility of a good outcome dictates that we 
continue treatment. 
Fifty years ago, most patients who now survive treatment in 
intensive care units would have died, and "nature" would have 
determined outcome rather than nature along with medical inter-
vention. Now, caregivers, hospitals, and families decide if incompetent 
patients die, and when resuscitation should be initiated and withheld. 
When deciding on the best interest of patients, the subjective inter-
pretation of benefits, risks, and burdens cornes into place. In order to 
make a judgment about the patient's best interests, we must place a 
relative value on his life. 
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Decisions to treat newborns differently suggest that we value 
their lives differently. Often, practitioners are unaware of their own 
implicit valuations. It is important that medical staff as well as 
families are aware of these biases and acknowledge them, as they will 
likely influence our decisions. In most cases, careful analysis of such 
implicit valuations will lead us away from treating newborns differ-
ently. Such analysis may often place us in conflict with prevailing 
social and professional norms. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This central question addressed in this thesis is whether there is a moral difference 
between premature infants and neonates compared to oIder patients. Empirically, several 
neonatal ethicists have suggested that there may be such a difference, with neonates not 
only being morallY different, but also maybe inferior to "full fledged" persons. I ,2,3 Dr 
William Meadow, an innovative neonatologist and bioethicist, (also co-director ofthis 
thesis) once asked attendees at the beginning of one ofhis talks to imagine the y were 
faced with the following dilemma. They are in a boat, and have 2 of their children with 
them: their 3 day old and their 3-year-old sons. The boat is sinking, they can only rescue 
one chi Id, who do they choose? Because it was an artificial scenario, and unlikely to 
happen, attendees did not want to choose, but when convinced to do so, aIl the hands 
were raised for the 3-year-old. This was at a pediatric conference, many attendants were 
neonatologists. Multiple reasons were brought up: the neonate is not scared; he does not 
know what is or will be happening, nor what he will be missing, nor who he is yet. He 
only "existed" a very short time. His mother knows him, but not as much as her 3-year-
old grabbing her skirt anxiously. The 3-year-old has more of a "story", the mother is 
more attached. The research presented in this thesis presents empirical research which 
supports the implications ofthose responses to this vignette. In my research, this 
devaluation of the neonate is global. Indeed, when only the physician group was 
presented at conferences in 2006,4,5 the main hypothesis raised by attendants was that 
physicians knew what neonates had to endure in the NleU to survive: for sorne, the 
burden oftreatment, witnessed by experienced physicians, was not worth the outcome. 
Interestingly, more than 400 respondents who are not in the medical field have answered 
the questionnaire and have almost identical answers to the physicians. The devaluation of 
the life ofneonates, and to a larger degree the premature infant, is not acquired by 
working c10sely with them and witnessing their illness, nor by knowing what national 
policies recommend at what gestational age. It is also shared by a young educated 
population of future lawyers, anthropologists, and ethicists, regardless oftheir year of 
training. 
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1. SUBSTITUTIVE ETHICS 
My research has been built around cases that have been compared to each other in 
order to investigate moral differences. Casuistry is an approach to ethical reasoning based 
on illustrative cases, often comparing different cases. Comparing cases which are 
artificially constructed to differ in only one detai! is a fOTIn of casuistry which can be very 
illuminating. 1 have called this fOTIn of casuistry "substitutive ethics" in every day clinical 
work. Indeed, by changing the patients' stories minimally, one can find surprising 
answers and stimulate caregivers to examine their own biases. It can thus be much easier 
to understand the way we make judgments, and the source of our own prejudices. For 
example, delivery room nurses, NICU nurses, and physicians in perinatal medicine can 
be reluctant to offer intensive care to premature infants with a GA of 23 weeks. Lately, a 
mother came in contracting regularly, in active labour at 23-week gestation. She was 
young, pregnant with her third child and the couple, after our neonatal consult, had 
expressed they wanted intervention for their baby if she was to be bom. The resident 
thought: "this is not the ethical thing to do, this is futile". This baby had a 30% predicted 
survival and intervention was not "physiologically futile", as the resident believed. He 
thought we should never offer resuscitation at that gestational age. 1 asked him to 
consider a 40-year-old mother, who had no children, but had been infertile for now 15 
years, had 6 attempts of IVF and had a second mortgage on her house because of 
infertility treatments. The mother was a physiotherapist and treated children who had 
cerebral paIsy. Would he consider intervening for that particular baby? He thought he 
would, that this was probably acceptable, but that "the case was different". By only 
changing the mother' s demographic infoTInation, and keeping the baby' s predicted 
outcome identical, an ethically unacceptable position became "probably acceptable" and 
it became in this "baby' s best interest" to be treated. Many difficult cases are also 
encountered in critical care of older patients, adults and children. By comparing the 
responses to such patients with those to newbom infants interesting windows about the 
real foundations behind our beliefs can be opened. The empirical quantitative research 
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presented in this PhD has been conceived using substitutive ethics. In the third article, for 
example, we used identical descriptions of the outcomes for 4 patients of different ages. 
Neonatologists are frequently faced with paradoxes with regard to the babies they 
treat. For example, they might be asked to see mothers pregnant with a baby who has 
been diagnosed with Down's syndrome and a heart malformation which requires open 
heart surgery and cardio-respiratory bypass. They will generally convey the serious 
cognitive impairment that these children have, that they rarely have the ability to enter 
normal school, that the cardiac surgery is overall a big procedure, but that most children 
survive the procedure. Most important, what paediatricians will say to these parents, is 
that most ofthese children, ev en ifhandicapped, can have a good quality oflife, and that 
families generally adapt to these difficult situations. Considerable amounts of money are 
invested in screening for Down syndrome, because this diagnosis brings about many 
families to terminate the pregnancy. When the baby is born, the situation is reversed. 
Neonatologists are compelled to treat in most cases. Cases may occasionally be reviewed 
byan ethics committee, and sorne cases in North America have gone to court. Although 
the court decisions have not all been consistent, the recent decisions have generally 
determined that ifwithholding treatment would not be accepted for a "normal" child then 
it is not acceptable for an infant with Down syndrome, otherwise the decision is 
discriminatory and unacceptable. We cannot discriminate on the basis ofhandicap. But 
when we medically analyse the situation, sorne babies with Down syndrome may appear 
to be over-treated: sorne ofthem have 4-5 surgeries, never eat by mouth, are riever 
continent, and live in the hospital for years. While sorne babies with Down syndrome 
may be over-treated, the majority ofpotential Down syndrome babies are terminated 
following neonatal screening. On the other hand, many babies of23-25 weeks are not 
actively treated in the developed world, even ifthey have potential outcomes that are 
much better than babies with Down's syndrome. These situations are paradoxical for the 
neonatologist and do not make rational sense: perhaps it is easier to discriminate against 
the possibility of handicap than confirmed handicap. 
The same can be said about other babies. Ifwe take the substitutive ethics 
approach we can create cases that have an outcome that would be considered a "severe 
handicap" for a premature baby, a handicap severe enough to consider, to offer, or even 
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to recommend withholding care to families. For example, a baby is born with the 
following malformations: he has on]y one leg, and will be deaf. Scientifically, this could 
be due to amniotic bands that amputated his leg and an ear with the ear canal. The 
mother's labour is induced at 34 weeks because the amniotic band is circ1ing the ear and 
might amputate one si de of the face. Because he was born too early, he develops RDS 
and need to be placed on a respirator for respiratory failure. Before he was intubated, he 
also aspirated the milk he had been given to drink, and develops a severe pneumonia. He 
becomes unstable from his pneumonia, which will probably resolve, but which has 20%-
30% risks ofkilling him. The baby will not be on a respirator for months. The parents 
object, the y think this is unreasonable and do not want "a handicapped child". l have 
asked this question to many nurses, residents, and physicians, and am starting a 
questionnaire study with this vignette. Rare are the caregivers that would accept to relieve 
the baby's gasping with morphine and to keep him comfortable while he is dying. As a 
resident said: "Sure, he williimp, he might be deaf and might have problems at school 
with his deafness, but this baby's projected quality oflife is "too good" and it is in his 
"best interest" to be treated". This NICU care ofthis infant is similar to sorne extent to 
that of preterm infants, but his future outcome is worse than most preterm infants: he is 
already and will definitely have multiple severe disabilities. Only 5% of premature 
infants < 28 weeks will be that affected (having multiple severe impairments).37,38 
Interestingly, premature infants with better outcomes will frequently have intensive care 
and NICU admissions withheld. As a c1inician, l am confronted with these conflicting 
cases where justifications for actions seem to have no scientific nor moral basis: we often 
"make" the outcomes bad by the way we look at them, we can also "make" many 
conditions terminal for babies ifwe don't treat them. 
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2. POLICY STATEMENTS FOR NEONATES 
PoIicy statements and recommendations about premature infants have not been discussed 
in this thesis and merit consideration.6 The Neonatal Resuscitation Pro gram (NRP) 
textbook, the standard neonatal resuscitation text used in many parts of the world, states: 
"The ethical principles regarding resuscitation ofnewborns should be no different from 
those followed in resuscitating an older child or adult".7 Yet, the reality seems to be 
different. Many professional societies and national commissions have developed policies 
or guidelines about the treatment of pretenn infants. For example, in 1994, the Canadian 
Paediatric Society and Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada published 
"Management of the woman with threatened birth of an infant of extremely low 
gestational age". 8 The Canadian position statement was directive, focusing on parental 
choice and expected outcomes at varying gestations. At 22 completed weeks of GA or 
less, a newborn was considered too premature to survive and palliative care was 
recommended; at 23 to 24 completed weeks, prognosis was deemed so po or that life-
saving interventions were considered optional; and after 25 completed weeks life-saving 
therapies were generally indicated. Twelve years later, the Nuffield report, recently 
published in the UK,gexamines the same issues and cornes to very similar conclusions, 
which correspond to many other position statements of professional associations around 
the world. IO,II,12,13,14 In sorne countries, admitting a baby of24 weeks gestation to the 
NICU is not recommended. IO,II,14 
These policies are generally based solely upon GA and fail to address, and even in 
sorne cases dismiss9 the possibility that premature infants might be different from other 
incompetent patients. We will explore these factors and conclude by asking what the 
policy should be for these special patients. 
A. Certainty in quîcksand: gestation a) age assessment 
Assessment of GA antenatally, based on menstrual timing, is known to be 
unreliable. Gestational age is only precisely known when the pregnancy results from in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) as the exact date -and even hour- of fertilisation is known. 
Pregnancies resulting from IVF have been used to analyze the accuracy of early (12 to 14 
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weeks gestation) ultrasound, and have demonstrated small average differences ofup to 
2.5 days, but the range of individu al differences, more important for this discussion, is 
large, with the best performing formulas for GA calculation being inaccurate by up to -10 
to +7 days.15 Comparing early ultrasound to menstrual timing shows that the latter is still 
more inaccurate, by more than 14 days. GA dating based on second trimester ultrasound 
is also as unreliab le as menstrual timing, 16 with differences of up to 14 days. Based on 
international recommendations, an intervention may be considered optional one day and 
become generally recommended the next (often at midnight!). Interestingly, this precise 
number ofweeks at which this transition occurs is different from one country to another, 
and varies between 22 and 26 weeks in "developed" countries.7,9,IO,II,12,13,14 
These limitations should be explicitly recognized; apart from wh en the baby is a 
result ofIVF, we can only know the gestational age within specified uncertainties. 
Instead of referring to a pregnancy as being 23 5/7, it would be more intellectually honest 
to refer to "a pregnancy with a best estimate of gestational age of 23 5/7 and a probable 
gestational age between 22-25 weeks (95% confidence intervals) according to 2nd term 
ultrasound, estimated foetal weight 650g, plus or minus 90 g, (95% confidence 
intervals)". The range of outcomes that would be described to the family for them to 
decide between comfort care versus intervention may be dramatically different, with no 
simple, if comforting, rules to apply. 
B. Deciding on a single variable 
Currently, counselling regarding survival is neither evidence-based nor 
individualized, and frequently fails to recognize that factors other than GA are also 
important. Sorne authors have tried to defend a simplistic universal application of 
"blanket rules" based on completed weeks of gestation, without consideration of the 
inaccuracy of gestational age assessment, nor consideration of other major influences on 
prognosis. 17,18 But birth weight, gender, place ofbirth (tertiary versus non-tertiary center) 
use of antenatal steroids, singleton vs. multiple gestation, socio-economic status and 
infection are all independent predictors of outcome - and adjusting for these factors will 
make prognostication much more relevant for an individu al family than estimates made 
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from GA alone. For example, a female infant at 23 weeks, bom in a tertiary hospital after 
antenatal steroids weighing 750 g has far better predicted survival, than a male infant at 
26 weeks weighing 550g who has not been exposed to steroids and is bom in a 
community hospital. 19 Yet application of current blanket policies would allow or 
recommend no active intervention of the 23-week gestation infant, but would strongly 
recommend resuscitation of the infant at 26 weeks. Using completed weeks of gestation 
alone over-simplifies decision-making, and although being simple and user friendly, 
ignores a substantial body of evidence. 
There is no other medical condition for which decisions regarding life and death 
are taken based on a single characteristic of the patient. A spokesman for Bliss, a 
premature baby charity in the lJK, recently highlighted the lack of scientific rigor of such 
"blanket" policies by stating: "Decisions as to what course oftreatment is appropriate 
should be based in the individual circumstances of each baby rather than a blanket policy 
ofnot treating patients bom at less than a certain gestation ... We might as weIl have a 
policy ofnot treating victims of car crashes which occur at over 50 miles an hour, or 
denying medical services to those over a certain age.,,20 
C. Uncertainty in the delivery room 
"Conditional" or "limited" resuscitation is also commonly offered, based upon an 
assessment of the newbom in the delivery room.?, the Neonatal Resuscitation Pro gram 
textbook states that: "If the baby's viability is thought to be marginal [ ... ] You can assure 
the parents that you will make every effort to support their wishes, but it is also important 
to advise them that decisions made about neonatal management before birth may need to 
be modified in the delivery room depending on the baby's condition at birth and the 
postnatal GA assessment."? While this approach may be philosophically appealing and 
supported by leading ethicists,21 as weIl as by policy statements,22 epidemiologic studies 
suggest that there are no reliable predictors of outcome that can be obtained in the first 
minutes or hours of life. 23,24 Indeed, a premature infant may cry and appear vigorous at 
birth, and have a devastating cerebral haemorrhage the next day. AIso, many neonates are 
bom because their mother's sickness or instability, for example, when the placenta 
detaches and the haemorrhage threatens the mother's life. In sorne ofthese cases, an 
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urgent caesarean section under general anaesthesia is done and the baby will also "be 
under general anaesthesia" at birth, as he will have received the anaesthetic that the 
mother just received. This neonate will often have marked respiratory depression and 
hypotonia at birth, but has no worse outcome as a result. Clinical assessment of 
gestational age, even after stabilization of the infant, when there is time to perform a 
careful standardized examination, is extremely unreliable with an uncertainty of greater 
than 4 weeks.25 In a commentary, Mercurio illustrates this fact by recounting a fellow 
estimating the gestational age of 2 babies: one was assessed as less than 24 weeks with 
his transparent skin and fused eyelids, while the other was considered to be much older: 
in fact the babies were twins.26 
The true importance of delivery room predictors of survival and intact outcome 
requires further investigation to determine if there are ways to make a "condition al" 
resuscitation a truly ethical option.27 If for example a prolonged resuscitation of over 10 
minutes were shown to discriminate adequately between infants who do weIl and those 
with devastatingly bad outcomes, the decision making process could then be explicit, 
such as "we will attempt to resuscitate for 10 minutes". Emotive and unhelpful phrases 
such as "ifhe's a fighter", "ifshe wants to live enough", "ifhe isn't too gelatinous and is 
strong,,28 imply an ability to clinically discriminate between infants who will do weIl and 
those with a poor outlook, they are therefore dishonest and should be avoided. 
The birth process brings about something considerable: a new person having the 
same legal rights as any other incompetent patient in the hospital. On the other hand, 
before birth, the fetus was not a legal person and had only very limited rights. This legal 
difference, although valuable for lawyers, does not help neonatologists predict the 
outcome of a person with more certainty then they did for a human being or a fetus a few 
minutes before. Antenatal consultations are indeed quite unique: the neonatologist speaks 
to the parents about probabilities, before the baby is bom. Unlike obstetricians or fetal 
interventionists, he does not perform ultrasounds, interventions, or examine the mother; 
he 'just speaks about probabilities, about the future, a "crystal baIl kind of medicine" as a 
student once stated. 
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3. ANAL YSIS OF OUTCOMES: which study justifies my opinion? 
In this "crystal baIl" medicine of prenatal consultations, the neonatologist relies 
on scientific knowledge to be able to be more precise about his prognoses. The recent 
Nuffield report suggests that survival at 24 to 25 weeks gestation is 26%.9 These figures 
are taken from the Epicure study, an important regional study incorporating aIl infants 
born at less than 26 weeks in the United Kingdom and Ireland.29 However, in that study, 
a large proportion of the infants did not receive active care, and even among those who 
did, many were cared for in centres with little experience in caring for extreme preterm 
infants. Long term outcomes, expressed in terms ofpercentage of infants with intact 
survival, suggested that the chance of a baby surviving with a good outcome were much 
lower than previously described; however, babies who were not resuscitated, and babies 
who were not transferred for tertiary level care were included in this estimation. Such 
figures are of no relevance to counselling a mother with threatened preterm delivery in a 
tertiary care center. She needs to know the chances of a good outcome with active care 
(overall survival to discharge 72% at 24 weeks and 78% at 25 weeks from the Canadian 
Neonatal Network, 20053°), and the chances without active care (100% mortality). Of 
still more value to that individual mother would be a rational analysis of the likely 
outcomes that takes into account the other good and poor prognostic features for her 
particular baby.31 Blanket policies that declare life optional at 23 and 24 weeks usually 
give great weight to tlle Epicure studl,9. 10. 1 1,12.\3, while those who are more 
interventionist focus on other data.22.32 For example, the Australian and certain German 
outcomes are probably the best in the world at extremely low gestations, and are less 
frequently referenced in policy statements.33,34 This picking and choosing ofwhich data 
are given the most weight appears to be directed by the underlying ethos of the 
committee making the recommendations. A systematic evidence-based approach requires 
an honest assessment of aIl the data that are relevant to the particular family. 
Unfortunately, most articles do not report which infants actually received active care, 
complicating such a systematic approach. For future descriptions of outcomes ofvery 
immature infants such explicit descriptions are essential. 
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Mortality is not the only outcome considered in ethical decision-making. Also 
important are the burdens of prolonged intensive care (with or without survival), and the 
risks oflong-term disability, or later death. 12-25% ofbabies bom before 27 weeks, if 
they survive, will have major neurodevelopmental disabilities; and up to 50% will have 
behavioural or educational problems. 19,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41 The severity of disability also 
requires consideration. Motor delay is the most common neurodevelopmental disability, 
and although cerebral paIsy is usually classified as serious disability in the outcome 
literature, most affected children are ambulant with good quality of life. 42 Cognitive 
impairment, although common, is rarely severe, with average IQ levels being 
approximatelyone standard deviation below controls.43 Indeed the IQ of very preterm 
infants at 8 years of age is more than 1 SD below the mean (less than 85) in only 38% of 
cases,44,45 compared to a mean IQ of 40.2 for children with Down's syndrome,46 who are, 
in contrast, judged to have a good quality of life by most physicians. On the other hand, 
sorne disabilities such as hyperactivity or schooling problems, classified as minor in the 
literature, can be more devastating to families than cerebral paIsy. Multiple serious 
disabilities, with a profound burden on an individual and their family, are devastating 
when they occur, but are infrequent and arise in less than 5% ofbabies bom at less than 
28 weeks. 37,39 Unfortunately, such disabilities are very difficult to predict. Neonatal units 
have been leaders in developing outcomes surveillance and many infants having a 
moderate risk of neurodevelopmental sequelae are followed prospectively. Premature 
babies bom before a GA of 29 weeks are usually followed prospectively, often in the 
neonatal department. This is quite different then for other areas of medicine where 
victims ofhead traumas, strokes, and other diseases at high risk ofneurological sequelae 
are treated. Neonatal follow-up then helps neonatologists and parents take decisions. 
Rather than numeric analysis of outcomes, the projected overall quality of life for 
the infant is a consideration that should influence parental choice. However, "qualityof 
life" is largely a subjective construct: physicians and other healthcare providers routinely 
estimate the quality of life of patients to be worse than the patients and families do 
themselves. As a result, caregivers and parents differ substantially in their attitudes to the 
salvaging ofpotentially disabled newboms.47 ,48 When extremely preterm infants were 
studied in adolescence and adulthood, they were found to adapt to adversity: even those 
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with disability perceived themselves to have a good quality oflife.49.50.51 This valuable 
evidence should be taken into account during counselling, but is generally ignored in 
simplistic blanket policies, although similar research has rarely been done in survivors of 
other diseases. It seems that because of enormous reserves of resilience, human beings 
are able to cope with tragedies and adapt to most situations, this is also not usually 
discussed during neonatal consultations. 
Even the word resuscitation is problematic, by asking parents if they want their 
baby resuscitated, they might imagine we do cardiac massage, give medications to start 
the heart, cut open their chests and defibrillate their arrhythmias. In fact, extremely 
premature infants usually need little support immediately after birth, often requiring only 
a tube in the nose to provide continuous positive pressure, or sometimes having a tube 
inserted into the trachea for assisted ventilation and administration of surfactant. It is rare 
that an extremely preterm infant delivered in a tertiary care centre, ev en when born 
unexpectedly in a "crash" delivery, receives cardiac massage. 52 Instead of asking families 
if they want resuscitation for their neonate, we should ask them if they want us to 
intervene -intubate, admit to the NICU- for their baby, a much less colourful but more 
accurate representation ofwhat we do. Ifwe again make the contrast with another acute 
clinical situation; we never ask parents of children who come in to emergency rooms with 
a respiratory arrest from sepsis if they want us to resuscitate their children. 
A. Self-fulfilling prophecy 
In an article describing the dialogue with parents in the delivery room, Desfrere et 
al state that parents should receive appropriate information of survival and risk,53 but later 
state that "In France, a do not resuscitate order is appropriate for newborns weighing less 
than 500g and/or with a gestation of less than 24 weeks since the mortality is nearly 
100%".53 Although survival at 23-weeks is not the rule, it is by no means O. In the 
NICHD neonatal network, the survival ofa 23-week female weighing 620g is 40%.54 
Similarly, in another study, a group has decided to not recommend resuscitation below 25 
weeks17 to decrease the variability in neonatal consultation. As a result, the self-fulfilling 
prophecy will continue: more infants will die and a po or survival at 24 weeks will 
continue being used to justify non-intervention. When outcome data is given for the 
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parents to decide, it should not be based on what the physicians and parents have decided 
in the past, but on the best assessment ofwhat the survival would be ifthere was or was 
not an intervention for this particular baby. 
4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NON-INTERVENTION, A DOUBLE STANDARD 
BETWEEN NEONATES AND OLDER PATIENTS? 
A. Recommendations for older patients 
Based on analysis of the literature, a number ofprofessional bodies have 
determined that at less than 25 weeks of gestation, resuscitation is optional (or even not 
recommended) 8,9,10,11,12,13 These blanket policies justify this by referring to the poor 
outcomes of preterm infants and the burdens of the intensive care stay. These 
recommendations imply that it is ethica11y appropriate to offer palliation to an 
incompetent patient whose chance of survival is 50%-80%, when 25% of survivors face 
the possibility of survival with severe disability.8,9,31,34,39 
l have reviewed a11 Canadian and American recommendations regarding 
withholding or withdrawing intensive care in acute situations. A review of cardiac arrest 
in older children fo11owing severe trauma noted that none of the children in this category 
who had a brain injury survived, but nevertheless recommended that "aIl children should 
receive aggressive resuscitation after injury".55 In one large study ofrecovery in over 700 
adults who were comatose following resuscitation from cardiac arrest, the mortality for 
the entire group was about 80%, and the long term functional outcomes among the 
survivors were in general extremely limited.56 A related position statement of the 
American Academy of Neurology on the prediction of outcome of comatose survivors 
after cardiopulmonary resuscitation was recently published.57 Despite an overa11 chance 
ofless than 5% ofhaving either a good long term recovery or being moderately disabled 
(substantially worse than the overall results at 23 weeks gestation), the recommendations 
suggested further prognostic information were required prior to consideration of 
withdrawal of care in addition to the clinical situation. 57 For incompetent adults, the 
reasons for withholding resuscitation when cardiac arrest is noted fo11owing trauma 
included decapitation or rigor mortis! One could reason that is only the neonatologists 
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who have an ethically acceptable approach in these uncertain situations, and that we 
should have a comparable attitude to older patients. Indeed ifthat were true, and 
intervention was only offered to adults at the same predicted outcomes as are considered 
appropriate for premature infants, the frequency of intervention would be dramatically 
reduced. 
B. Outcomes and paradoxes 
Although the explicit justification within blanket guidelines for preterm infants is 
that outcomes are too poor to justify intervention, there are no other populations in which 
a 50-80% survival rate would be seen as too dismal to justify resuscitative efforts. A 2-
month-old infant presenting with group B streptococcal meningitis,58 a 50-year-old adult 
with an extensive haemorrhagic stroke,59 or a 3-year-old with 75% full thickness bums 
would be likely to have immediate resuscitation and institution of care, despite broadly 
similar risks of death or disability. This was confirmed with the empirical research 
presented in this thesis. Similar outcomes in older populations would even be considered 
excellent! 
C. Pain and suffering 
Pain and suffering is also used as a justification for many blanket policies for not 
intervening in preterm infants. Although their hospitalization is by no means a pleasant 
experience in the first months, other children with much more pain are treated (for 
example patients with severe bums) without physicians considering the pain as a reason 
for not intervening. Victims of multiple traumas with fractures, bum victims, children 
with brain cancers or leukemia probably have more pain throughout their terrible 
illnesses. Although pain relief cau always be better in the NICU, neonatologists are 
pioneers in pain research and management in paediatrics.60,61,62 In many NICUs babies 
receive pain relief for installing IV s, for blood drawing and for vaccination; which is 
rarely the case in paediatric wards, emergency rooms or clinics. A child is expected to 
feel pain with his vaccination. A baby in the NICU is not. The extreme scrutiny of pain 
practices in the NICU, and about "pain and suffering of neonates" is not matched in other 
areas ofpaediatrics. What about suffering? Unlike a 3-year-old bumed victim, the 
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neonate will not be able to verbalise his anxiety and his fears. The psychological 
suffering will probably be experienced more by his parents and caregivers than by the 
neonate himself. Also, when babies die in the NICU, it is often very quickly: 70% of 
deaths occur in the first 5 days of life. Prolonged suffering with eventual death before 
leaving the hospital is less frequent, unlike sorne childreri treated for childhood cancers. 
Prolonged suffering because of disability can also occur, but not more than for many 
other diseases, from head trauma, to oncology patients, to strokes. 
D. Costs 
The costs ofneonatal care and the principle of distributive justice have also been 
used as an argument for withholding or withdrawing care from premature infants, with 
the suggestion that enormous resources were being expended on very immature infants. 8 
The costs for NICU care have been scrutinized extensively compared to those of adult 
ICUs. When babies die in the NICU, 70% do in their first 5 days oflife.63 Given this high 
mortality of extremely preterm babies in the first week of life,64 the majority of the 
expenditure is on survivors who do well. 65 In addition, the tiniest infants utilize a small . 
proportion ofNICU resources: in one study, care of infants <25 weeks used 5.4% of the 
NICU resources.66 Denying intensive care to infants born at <500g, and <600g would 
lead to a total NICU care savings of 0.8% and 3.2% respectively. One could object by 
stating that the babies with disabilities will need further care and resources. In fact, if one 
do es a true economic analysis and uses the long-term rationale, NICUs become even 
more cost effective. Economical analyses are utilitarian; the y place a value on lives and 
lives saved. Because most of the premature infants in the NICU survive without 
disabilities, and most can be economically productive even wh en living with limitations, 
neonatal intensive care is among the most cost efficient of acute medical endeavours. The 
majority of ev en the tiniest surviving infants achieve functional outcomes and 
economically productive lives.67 ,68 The costs per quality adjusted life year (QAL Y) saved 
in the NICU being about 1/100 of the cost of acute adult coronary care.69 It is also 
noteworthy that major improvements in newborn survival have not resulted in 
proportionate increases in severe morbidity.70 Even with this intense scrutiny ofNICU's 
cost effectiveness, sorne policy statements use distributive justice as a rational ethical 
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argument for declaring life optional before 25 weeks.8 ls this argument based on emotion 
or evidence? 
But perhaps restricting intensive care to only patients with a better than 70% 
chance of survival is appropriate, and this reasoning should be applied for aIl individuals. 
This would mean a drastic decrease in PIeU and adult leU admissions, while leaving the 
NleU admissions largely unaffected (because of the small number of premature infants 
less than 26 weeks) and would save billions to health care systems; entire hospitals could 
probably be closed! We can think: of no professional associations who would promote 
such an approach. If one was really to study justice in resuscitation of incompetent 
individuals, as I did in the fourth article presented, the reality would seem otherwise. 
Indeed as demonstrated in "Nobody likes premies", we compared caregivers preferences 
for active treatment of 8 hypothetical vulnerable incompetent patients needing intubation 
and immediate intensive care, one ofwhom was an extremely preterm infant. The 
preterm infant was resuscitated overall in seventh position, despite having outcomes at 
least as good as, or in sorne cases dramatically better than, the six higher-ranking 
patients. 71 
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CONCLUSION 
1. WHY ARE NEONATES TREATED DIFFERENTLY? 
Despite their long-standing acceptance in the neonatal community, blanket 
policies are morally problematic: they implicitly treat neonates as a special and different 
moral category of patients without acknowledging that they might be different from oider 
individuals, and sometimes ev en stating they are not. The Nuffield council report states 
"we tind no difference in the moral status of the chi Id of six days, months or years, we 
find no morally relevant differences between disabled and able-bodied children and 
adults".9 Then why are there no analogous simplistic blanket policies for older patients? 
The rapidity of the transition from having no legal rights in utero to being a "full 
fledged citizen" may be one reason for the moral confusion felt by many doctors, parents 
and ev en judges and may be the reason why professional bodies have felt the need to 
offer position statements regarding resuscitation. Is the micropremie still in the realm of 
reproductive decisions? Perinatologists and neonatologists are more willing to intervene 
for "precious babies",72 born to older mothers or by artificial reproductive technologies. 
They are also less willing to intervene when families already have many children who are 
well and could potentially have their family affected with a disabled chi Id. Such 
considerations are considered irrelevant when a child is admitted to the PIeu. We are 
taught to not tell parents who have lost an extreme preterm that they can have another 
baby,1 or that it might be for the best. Yet, this is what sorne parents themselves say after 
withholding care for their neonate or after a 10ss in the NIeU. Physicians would be 
surprised if parents said the same for an older child. An extreme preterm is generally not 
considered to have a real disease per se. He is born too soon, he is not supposed to be 
there, and by choosing life, nature 1 physicians 1 medicine give him several diseases. If a 
neonate survives with disabilities, the caregivers often feel directly responsible for his 
disabilities. On the other hand, when a child, victim of a severe burn survives his PIeU 
stay with disabilities, the PIeU physician can always blame the tire or the smoke 
detector. Is this why physicians are expected to talk to parents about survival, disability, 
ROP, IVH, PDA, RDS, pain, PVL and obtain their full informed consent before treating 
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premature infants? Is this why many neonatologists feel responsible to make parents 
understand every possible scenario that could happen to have the best informed consent 
possible? Perhaps it makes them feelless responsible if the baby survives with a 
disability. 
Would The AAP recommend that we speak in that much detail about outcome -as 
is done for preterm infants-, stating infection rate, tremendous pain, opioid addiction, 
pneumonia, length of stay, rejection of skin grafts, contractures etc. in the ER to parents 
of a child victim of a house fire, and offer withholding of care? Would physicians even 
feel comfortable flooding parents in distress with that much information so soon after a 
catastrophic accident? 
Do we have a diminished sense of dut Y towards these brand new persons with 
Iimited personhood; do the y have less social standing? Is it because they haven't really 
Iived yet, because we don't know them, because the y are "interchangeable 
nonpersons,,?73 Because the premature baby seems barely human to sorne caregivers, it 
can cause moral di stress to intervene, sorne can even not feel the imperative to protect 
them.28 Is it because ofthis lack ofpersonhood that micropremies are often seen as being 
"replaceable"? When we know our 3-year-old son, his personaIity, his favourite foods, 
his smell in the moming, his tantrums; when he has a head trauma, we know what we are 
missing. It might not be the case for neonates. Although difficult, it is easier for me, and 
for many other physicians 1 know, to see a premature baby die than an infant born at 
term, and easier to see a term baby die than a baby who has been in the NICU with us for 
many months, whom we have grown attached to. Oider children are "not supposed to 
die". In the relative devaluation of neonates, the media, who mainly focus on disasters for 
premature infants and at times dubious miracles, never show the average family coping 
with everyday life, this would not be a best seIler.74,75,76 
A. Is tbis position etbically problematic, are tbere any alternatives? 
Clearly, one cannot reaiistically demand the preservation of life at all co st s, nor 
perseverance against overwhelming odds. One should th en wonder if the neonate and 
preterm infant are morally different from oIder patients. Two positions exist: they are or 
they are not. If the same ethical reasoning is not being applied at aIl ages, the rationale 
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should be made explicit. Justifications cou Id be made according to personhood, sense of 
dut y, or by suggesting that the value of life of a preterm baby is perhaps less, or at least 
not the same, as that of an older incompetent patient. Instead of these justifications, 
simplistic blanket statements based solely on GA are used for decision-making, using 
outcomes and cost justifications that would not be applied in oIder populations. 
Finally, if the ethical principles regarding resuscitation ofnewborns are no 
different from those followed in resuscitating older incompetent patients, do we even 
need policy statements? It is traditionally stated that, for patients of all ages, wh en the 
burdens of disease or its therapy are excessive or disproportionate to expected benefits, 
non-initiation of intensive care or withdrawal oflife-sustaining therapies should be 
considered. This way of formulating the issues may be intellectually appealing, but what 
does it mean in a practical sense? Would it be ethically and scientifically appropriate to 
recommend intervention for all patients according to a predicted range of outcomes, for 
example: "intervention is optional and should be done only according to family's wishes 
when survival is less than X% and severe handicap is Y% or more"? There are very few 
policy statements in the literature regarding resuscitation at any other age for life-
threatening situations: whether it be for head traumas, near drowning, meningitis, stroke, 
or burns. The lack of policy statements in these domains may reflect the clear and 
universal understanding that X and Y are almost impossible to define for each individual 
patient, because such critical, life-saving decisions are extremely complex and should be 
individualized, taking into accountthe nuances of the literature, the condition of the 
patient, the desires of the family, and the expectations of society. 
Is it ethically problematic to treat preterm infants and neonates differently to older 
patients? It makes me uneasy to read policy statements that are categorical in their refusaI 
to intervene before 25 or 26 weeks. 10,11,13 In the same countries that originate these 
policies older individuals with much worse outcomes are given a chance, or at least their 
families are offered intervention. In many delivery rooms around the world, parents of 
babies of23-26 weeks gestation are told "there is nothing to do", and given the "better 
luck next time" approach. Death is assumed in these cases to be better for that child and 
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family than life after an NleU stay with a subsequent risk of disability. Interestingly, we 
often think we do a complete infonned consent in the delivery room, but it is rare indeed 
to talk to the families about what complications they may encounter after their baby's 
death. Premature delivery often is a risk for future pretenn deliveries. Will the parents 
experience guilt and depression, will they separate, have sexual dysfunction, experience 
an intensely stressful future pregnancy? No publications on these issues exist. Once the 
baby dies, the neonatologist is no longer involved, with the best of intentions, he saved 
the baby a difficult NleU course, but he also saved the caregivers a difficult admission 
and hospital stay. The NleU caregivers will not have to live with that baby's death all 
their lives, but the family will. Experiencing death of one of our children is a traumatic 
event, even if the baby is extremely premature. A true infonned consent in the delivery 
room would completely inforrn parents about the possible outcomes for each treatment 
alternative, yet this is not done and there is only scarce scientific infonnation on which to 
base such counselling. Further research is needed in that area. Are biases regarding 
extreme prematurity so ingrained that even knowledge and experience cannot overcome 
our prejudices? Maybe health professionals working in the NleU should receive more 
teaching about outcomes, as opposed to what is often the focus or neonatal training: 
randomized controlled trials, new modes of ventilation, and new technology. Even then, 
teaching on outcomes should focus on excellent research available on quality of life, on 
parental and family perception ofhealth, on perceptions ofhealth ofindividuals living 
with disabilities, as opposed to teaching about handicaps as seen by physicians and those 
who teach. At the bedside, "substitutive ethics" might also help change the ingrained 
devaluation of neonates, especially around cases where health care professionals are 
contemplating withholding or withdrawing intensive care. 
Perhaps neooatologists are the only ooes who have it right? One could 
postulate that restricting intensive care to only patients with a better than 70% chance of 
survival is appropriate, and that this reasoning should be applied for alI individuals. This 
would mean a drastic decrease in leu admissions at aIl ages, while leaving the NleU 
admissions largely unaffected (because ofthe small number of premature infants less 
than 26 weeks) and would save billions to health care systems, entire hospitals could 
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even be closed down and many physicians would have to become palliative care 
specialists. 
Ifbabies of 23-26 weeks have similar outcomes when they survive, should aIl 
babies with more than 20% survival be admitted to the intensive care? This also do es not 
seem to be particularity appealing. l don't consider the enormous reserves of resilience of 
human beings and families to be valid arguments to make the families cope with 
whatever physicians decide they can cope with. If this was the case, we could stop 
offering prenatal screening for Down's syndrome, and stop offering "social" abortions 
altogether. The extreme preterm lies in such close vicinity to accepted reproductive 
decisions that, ifwe were to make intervention at 22 weeks mandatory, abortions could 
bec orne more problematic. There would also be repercussions on mother's health. Maybe 
sorne ofthem, ifthey were bleeding at 22 weeks gestation, would not visit a tertiary care 
hospital (or their obstetrician would not transfer them to a tertiary care facility) for fear 
their baby would be admitted to the NIeD. These women would suffer consequences 
themselves, as a tertiary care hospital is better equipped in treating severe maternaI 
haemorrhage, for example. 
A reasonable option seems to tolerate the ambiguous status quo, where the lives 
ofneonates, and more particularity extremely preterm infants, are relatively devalued. 
But if this status-quo is tolerated, we should have the intellectual honesty to say why, and 
not hide behind outcomes, costs, pain, or best interests arguments. 
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PERSPECTIVES 
Is this position amenable to change? 
Morality seems to change with time. Before baby Doe in the US, many babies 
with Down syndrome were left to die for want ofminor surgeries. In the past, individuals 
with psychiatrie illnesses were institutionalized and isolated from society. This is still the 
case in sorne countries, while other societies have evolved. To quote John Lantos, 
morality seems to be relative: 
«It seems to me morality does change. The evidence is aU around 
us. It used to be that one could smoke cigarettes in hote! rooms but had to go out 
into a dark aUey to buy pornography. Now, we can lie in bed and choose among 
four dirty movies on Spectravision but have to sneak out into the al/ey for a smoke.»77 
In sorne countries, babies who don't breathe immediately after birth are left to die, 
manyare full tenn babies who need only a few assisted breaths to survive intact. Five to 
ten percent ofbabies are bom this way and need a little he1p to start breathing on their 
own. In sorne cultures, babies are not named until they are a couple of months old. While 
for example in Vietnam, babies are bom at the age of9 months, as though they clearly 
already existed and their chronologicallife started in utero. Our society has evolved and 
individuals with disabilities and psychiatrie illness are integrated in. society, although at 
times imperfectly. We can see whee1chair ramps, blind dogs are admitted in aIl public 
institutions, it is now possible for patients who live with deafness or with other 
limitations to find a job. Will our society evolve to find the death of premature infants 
less acceptable, the way we now find that the death of a 3-year-old "is not supposed to 
happen, a tragedy"? 
Because neonatology is a rather new field, this might be true. On the other hand, it 
may also be that our evolutionary "wiring" has made us inherently tolerant ofneonatal 
deaths, whether or not NICUs will exist for 100 or 300 years. The relative devaluation 
could be more nature than nurture. The systematic devaluation of the newbom may be 
primarily due to deep-rooted anthropological, cultural, social and evolutionary factors. 
Until the late twentieth century, most parents experienced the death of at least one 
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newbom or infant. To survive the commonness of infant death, sorne protective cultural 
and emotional meehanisms in the fonn ofmoral (philosophie) differentiation of the 
newbom from older people might have been selected? Waring, a philosopher, remarks 
that the way we value a person is indicated by how we react to their death, "feelings of 
tragedy, evil, loss and sharp regret are supposedly more appropriate responses to the 
deaths of younger people. One might view the deaths of older people as tolerable. Indeed, 
"it is not rare to hear that it is "better this way, nature took its course," that "he/she lived 
long enough" for an older individual.,,24 Similar statements sueh as "it is better this way, 
nature took its course" and "at least he/she did not suffer" are also said for the death of 
neonates. Maybe a premature infant has not yet lived long enough to justify feelings of 
tragedy and regret; do we have feelings of detachment that desensitize us to the loss of 
newboms? Considerations of personhood may weIl continue to be important for decision-
making for newboms. Will morality of our society change in regards to the relative 
devaluation ofneonates? Only time will tell. 
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( 
• 
Ethics of resuscitation at different ages of life 
(Dr Janvier, Leblanc and Barrington) 
Informed Consent 
We are conducting a survey of opinions and attitudes towards resuscitation at different 
ages of life. Opinions are divergent when is cornes to resuscitation of patients with potential brain 
injury or with very reduced lifespan. It is important to detennine how these decisions are made, 
and what influences them. An institutional review board approved this questionnaire. 
This questionnaire is anonymous. It will be distributed to individuals involved directly or 
indirectly with resuscitation decisions in several specialities. The findings from these 
questionnaires will be published in a medical or bioethics journal, and the results and conclusions 
could also be presented in a conference. After the results have been established, the 
questionnaires will be destroyed. There are no risks in participating in this study, it takes 10-15 
minutes to fill. 
__ Check here to indicate that your have read the above informed consent, and that 
your participation in this research is voluntary 
__ Check here if you choose not to participate in this study . 
• 
• 
Ethics of resuscitation at different ages of life 
(Dr Janvier, Dr Leblanc and Dr Barrington) 
You are in a level 3 emergency. For the following scenarios. indicate your willingness to 
intubate + resuscitate the following incompetent patients and consult intensive care. This 
hospital has neonatal. paediatric and adult feUs. 
A mother arrives 24 weeks pregnant about to give birth. The baby has a 50% chance of 
survival. The prognosis for survivors is: 50% normal, 25% severe handicap (deafness, 
blindness, cerebral paisy, or psychomotor development significantly abnormal), and 40% mild 
handicap (hyperactivity, learning disorder). The baby delivers at 650g (compatible with 24 
weeks) and does not breathe efficiently. Vou don't have time to consult with parents. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
If the parents ask you not to resuscitate, will you respect their decision? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating, resuscitating and consulting intensive care for admission is in the patient's best interest? 
al ways gen erall y exceptionally never 
If it was your child and you had a few minutes to consider your decision, wOlild you wish the physician to intubate, 
resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Ifit was your sibling's child and you had time to think (not an emergency situation), and sihe asks for your opinion, 
would you recommend that the physician intubate, resuscitate and con suit intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
A term baby is born precipitously in the ER. He has a brain malformation diagnosed ill 
IItero. According to the prenatal consultations, the baby has 50% chance of survival. The 
prognosis for survivors is: 50% normal, 25% severe handicap, and 40% mild handicap. The 
baby is born and does not breathe efficiently. Vou don't have time to consult with parents. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
always gen era Il y exceptionally never 
[fthe parents ask you not to resuscitate, will you respect their decision? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating, resuscitating and consulting intensive care for admission is in the patient's best interest? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If it was your child and you had a few minutes to consider your decision, wou Id you wish the physician to intllbate, 
resuscitate and con suit intensive care for admission? 
al ways gcncrally exceptionally Ilc\cr 
If it was your sib\ing' 5 chi\d and yOli had time to think (not an emergency situation), and sihe asks for yOllr opinion, 
would you recommend that the physician intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptiona\\y never 
• 
• 
A previously healthy 2-month-old baby presents to your ER with fever, irritability and 
respiratory pauses according to parents. He is very sick with neurological signs. The lumbar 
puncture is purulent and confirms the diagnosis of meningitis. The prognosis for this bacterial 
meningitis is 50% survival. The prognosis for survivors is: 50% normal, 25% severe handicap, 
and 40% mild handicap. The baby stops breathing. You don't have time to consult with parents. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exception ail y never 
[f the parents asked you not to resuscitate, wi Il you respect their decision? 
al ways general[y exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating, resuscitating and consulting intensive care for admission is in the patient's best interest? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If it was your child and you had a few minutes to consider your decision, would you wish the physician to intubate, 
resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
[f it was your sibling's child and you had time to think (not an emergency situation), and slhe asks for your opinion, 
would you recommend that the physician intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exception ail y never 
A 7~year-old boy has cerebral paisy, he walks with a Iimp without any help and plays 
most sports. He will repeat his 1"' grade because of a learning disorder and hyperactivity. He has 
a hearing deficit that requires aids entirely correcting his condition. He presents in ER with 
shallow breathing after being hit by a car. He has a brief seizure that stops with medication. His 
CT scan shows moderate to severe brain swelling. His prognosis is 50% survival with 50% 
chances to recover back to his baseline if he survives. He starts seizing again and the airway 
cannot be maintained. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
[fthe parents asked you not to resuscita.te, will you respect their decision? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating, resuscitating and consulting intensive care for admission is in the patient's best interest? 
always generally exceptionally never 
[f it was your child and you had a few minutes to consider your decision, would you wish the physician to intubate, 
resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
[fit was your sibling's child and you had time to think (not an emergency situation), and slhe asks for your opinion, 
would you recommend that the physician intubate, resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
• 
A 13-year-old child has acute myeloblastic leukemia. She has brain involvement that 
will require radiation therapy. Staging predicts a S% long-term survival, after bone marrow 
transplant. If she survives, the risk of long-term neurological sequelae is 20%, including major 
schooling problems. She arrives by ambulance in septic shock and needs intubation. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
al ways generaJly exception ail y never 
If the parents asked you not to resuscitate, will you respect their decision? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating, resuscitating and consulting intensive care for admission is in the patient's best interest? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Ifit was your child and you had a few·minutes to consider your decision, would you wish the physician to intubate, 
resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Ifit was your sibling's child and you had time to think (not an emergency situation), and s/he asks for your opinion, 
would you recommend that the physician intubate, resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
A 3S y old with no previous medical history cornes to the ER with headaches increasing 
for the past month and difficulty with fin ding his words. His neurological exam is abnormal and 
he is disoriented. His CT scan shows a very large left-sided tumour consistent with glioblastoma 
mllitiforme, which has a S% survival rate at S years. The surgery to remove this large mass will 
leave sequelae (variable, including paralysis, cognition and speech difficulty) and inability to 
work. You come back to speak with your patient and his family, but he has lost consciousness. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If the family asked you not to resuscitate, will you respect their decision? 
always genera!ly exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating and resuscitating is in the best interest of the patient? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If this \Vas your partner and you had ta decide for them. Would you want the physician to intubate, resuscitate 
and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
lfthis \Vas your brotherlsister and you had to decide for himlher. Wou Id you want the physician to intubate, 
resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Ifthis \Vas you and you were able to decide. Would you want the physician to intubate, resuscitate and consul! 
intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exception ail y never 
• 
A 50-year-old trauma patient (car accident) arrives in the ER with multiple 
fractures and a cervical vertebra (C6) fracture (non-displaced). He needs fluid 
resuscitation and is semi conscious. His CT scan shows large areas of haemorrhages. 
His prognosis for survival is 50%. If he survives, the risk of normal outcome is 50%, 
and abnormal outcome is 50% with a significant probability of quadriplegia. The 
patient needs to be intubated, you don't have time to speak with the family. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If the family asked you not to resuscitate, will you respect their decision? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating and resuscitating is in the best interest of the patient? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Ifthis was your partner and you had to decide for them. Would you want the physician to intubate, resuscitate 
and consul! intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
If this was your brother/sister and you had to decide for himlher. Would you want the physician to intubate, 
resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If this was you and you were able to decide. Would you want the physician to intubate, resuscitate and consult 
intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
An 80-year-old patient arrives by ambulance. According to his wife, he is acutely 
paralysed on his left side and cannot talk. He has moderate Alzheimer's disease, recognizes only 
his close family and keeps wandering off and needs help in his daily activities. His cerebral scan 
shows a massive stroke. The prognosis for survival is 50%. If he survives, the prognosis for 
recovery to his previous health state is about 50%. The patient stops breathing. 
Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
If the family asked you not to reslIscitate, will yOll respect their decision? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Do you think intubating and resuscitating is in the best interest of the patient? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Ifthis was your partner and you had to decide for them. Would you want the physician to intubate, resuscitate 
and consult intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
Iflhis was your brollicrlsister and you had to decide for hinllht:r. Would you want the physician to intubate. 
resuscitate and consul! intensive care for admission? 
al ways generally exceptionally never 
Ifthis was you and you were able to decide. Would you want the ER physician to intubate, resuscitate and 
consult intensive care for admission? 
always generally exceptionally never 
(' IF ALL OF THE PREVIOUS PATIENTS HAD TO BE RESUSCITATED AT THE 
SAME TIME, IN WHAT ORDER WOULD YOU RESUSCITATE THEM, INDICATE 
1 TO 8. (1 = THE FIRST PATIENT TO BE RESUSCITATED) 
( 
• 1 
Premature 24 weeks 
Newbom with brain malfonnation 
2 months old with meningitis 
7-year-old in a car accident 
13-year-old with leukemia 
35-year-old with brain cancer 
50-year-old in car accident 
80-year-old with stroke 
YOUARE: 
Male 
ETHICS 
Student 
MEDICINE 
Student 
Female 
Resident, Jumor, semor 
ER 
Physician, 
Family medicine 
Paediatrics 
Obstetrics 
Adu1t: ER 
Paediatrics: ER 
Obstetrics 
Do you have children? Yes No 
Family medicine 
NICU 
Jess than 5 years experience, more than 5 years experience 
Do you have childrcn? Y cs No 
